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THE HONORABLE DEANELL REECE TACHAt
INTRODUCTION
The Denver University Law Review asked me to provide an over-
view of the Tenth Circuit's work during the survey period, September
2001 through August 2002. The Tenth Circuit's case docket is as diverse
as the twelve circuit judges and seven senior judges who handle our
workload, and reflects the rich geographic and cultural assets of the cir-
cuit. We hear appeals from eight district courts throughout our six-state
region,' in addition to cases that originated in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court, the United States Tax Court, and various federal adminis-
trative agencies.
During the survey period, litigants initiated 2,616 appeals in the
Tenth Circuit.2 Of this total, nearly one-third involved habeas corpus
petitions or civil rights suits brought by state and federal prisoners. The
following table provides a percentage breakdown of all Tenth Circuit
cases by type:
3
Type of Case Percentage of Total
Criminal 17.7
United States Civil (Civil suits in 8.7
which the U.S. is a party)
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of
Kansas, 1968; J.D., University of Michigan, 1971.
1. The states within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit are Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas.
2. See E-mail from Regi Aichlmayr, UNIX/Web Systems Specialist, United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to Greg Deis, Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit (Jan. 23, 2003) (copy on file with the Denver University Law Review).
3. Id.
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Private Civil 27.9
Prisoner Habeas Corpus Petitions 15.4
(other than § 2254 and § 2255
petitions)
Prisoner Habeas Corpus Petitions 5.4
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and
2255
Prisoner Civil Rights Suits (state 11.5
and federal prisoners)





During 2001, 4 the Tenth Circuit decided 2,792 appeals. 5 Of this to-
tal, 34% were decided after oral argument, while the remaining cases
were disposed of without oral argument.6 These percentages closely track
the national average for the circuit courts throughout the United States.7
4. Numbers for the survey period were unavailable for this article.
5. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRcUIT, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT
(2001) (on file with author).
6. Id.
7. In 2001, the national averages for cases decided with oral argument and without oral
argument were 32% and 67%, respectively. Id.
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RECENT TENTH CIRCuIT DECISIONS
A. Overview
The Tenth Circuit cases highlighted in this survey cover a broad
spectrum of issues, ranging from qui tam actions filed under the False
Claims Act8 to First Amendment freedoms in the public-school setting. 9
In the following section, I briefly discuss these cases, while the case
comments in this issue provide a more thorough analysis.
In reviewing these decisions, one overarching theme emerges: the
federal courts function within a governmental construct based on several
"first principles,'" structural elements embodied in the Constitution and
undergirding our system of government. These first principles permeate
much of the Tenth Circuit's work, as illustrated by the cases that are re-
viewed in this issue.
The first among these fundamental principles is federalism. Federal
courts are vested with the vital role of demarcating the proper spheres of
authority assigned to the dual sovereigns in our federalist system. Feder-
alism ideals emphasize the importance of placing many aspects of gov-
ernment closer to the people, increasing political accountability, while
serving to enfranchise the citizenry, and thereby promoting individual
liberty. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 'Rather, federal-
ism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sov-
ereign power.""'
Second, within the federal government, the judiciary is but one of
three co-equal branches of government, and the federal courts must ob-
serve the boundaries set forth in the first three articles of the Constitu-
tion, while delineating these boundaries in specific cases. This diffusion
of power functions to promote individual liberty, reinforcing the values
underlying federalism principles. As James Madison noted in Federalist
No. 51:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peo-
8. See United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
10. Deanell Reece Tacha, The Federal Courts in the 21st Century, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 9
(1999).
11. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
20031
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pie. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.1
2
Similarly, within the federal court system, we as appellate courts
must adhere to the limited role bestowed upon us, respecting the primary
role of the federal district courts in certain regards.
Finally, and most importantly, federal courts exist to protect indi-
vidual sovereignty, the ideal embodied in the preamble to our Constitu-
tion, which reminds us: "We the People of the United States ...or-
dain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution for the United States of
America."' 3 The concept of individual sovereignty is primary among
these fundamental principles, as it is the purpose for which the other two
principles function.
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of exces-
sive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front.... In the tension between federal and
state power lies the promise of [individual] liberty.
14
Thus, in the end, all three first principles converge into one over-
arching tenet: the primacy of individual liberty. In order to accord proper
protection to this basic precept that underlies our entire system of gov-
ernment, it is important to recognize the many contexts in which these
first principles manifest themselves. The cases discussed in this issue
illustrate this point, highlighting the essential functions performed by the
Tenth Circuit and other federal courts.
B. Our Federalist System
I begin with federalism. Three cases touch on this first principle,
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-J,1-5 a First Amendment
case, and two habeas corpus cases, Herrera v. Lemaster16 and Johnson v.
McKune.'7
In Fleming, we held that school-sponsored speech need not be
viewpoint neutral18 under the Supreme Court's decision in HazelwoodSchool District v. Kuhlmeier,19 so long as the school's actions further
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
13. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
14. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
15. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
16. 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
17. 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
18. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926.
19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
[Vol. 80:3
FOREWORD
legitimate pedagogical interests.20 In reaching this holding, the court af-
forded substantial deference to the local educators' stated educational
concerns.2' We stressed that such deference and restraint was appropri-
ate, in light of the fact that "[b]y and large, public education in our Na-
tion is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
' 2
Federalism and comity principles were also at the forefront in two
habeas corpus cases before the Tenth Circuit. In Herrera, we held that a
federal court on habeas corpus review must apply harmless-error analy-
sis,23 even when a state court decision is contrary to or involves an un-
reasonable application of controlling Supreme Court authority.24 This
holding furthers the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court in Brecht
v. Abrahamson:25 (1) the State's primacy in defining and enforcing
criminal laws; (2) the State's interest in the finality of criminal convic-
tions; and (3) respect for state court sovereignty, specifically, the state
court's "initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights [in state
criminal trials]. ''26
The court echoed these themes in Johnson.27 In considering the ret-
28
roactivity of the constitutional rule set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana,
we stressed that "the intrusiveness and the inordinate and overwhelming
burden that widespread retroactivity would have on the states' judicial
resources," and the understandable frustration of state courts "when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court
discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands. 29
Based on these considerations, we held that the Sandstrom rule did not
30apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
20. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
21. Id. at 925.
22. Id. at 925 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch.
Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 2000)).
23. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200. We also reinforced the Supreme Court's holding in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993), that a federal court on habeas corpus review must apply the
more relaxed harmless-error standard under Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946), as
compared to the more rigorous standard applicable on direct review under Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200.
24. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200. Although this was clearly the state of the law prior to 1996,
the defendant in Herrera argued that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act displaced
prior law and made harmless-error analysis inappropriate where the state court decision was contrary
to clearly established law. Id. at 1194-95.
25. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
26. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
27. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195.
28. 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that a jury instruction-that the law presumes an
individual intends the ordinary consequences of her actions-which a jury may have interpreted as a
conclusive presumption or as shifting the burden of persuasion, was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
29. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)).
30. Id. at 1200.
2003]
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C. Separation of Powers Principles
1. The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches
An equally important constitutional principle is the notion of sepa-
ration of powers, perhaps most often implicated in considering the inter-
play between the judicial and legislative branches of government. Two of
the cases analyzed in this issue touch on separation of powers principles:
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Insurance Group31 and Hall v.
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America.
32
In Holmes, the en banc court considered whether a federal em-
ployee, who was participating in an ongoing governmental investigation
of fraud pursuant to her job duties, was a proper qui tam plaintiff under
the False Claims Act.33 The majority concluded in the affirmative, invok-
34ing the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction. As numerous
commentators have observed, this principle of statutory construction
furthers separation of powers values by "constraining" a court's ability to
go beyond the statute's plain meaning. 35 The dissent, on the other hand,
concluded that the government employee in question was not a proper
qui tam plaintiff.36 The dissent reached this conclusion based in part on
the principle of statutory construction under which federal courts must
strictly construe jurisdictional statutes.37 This cannon of statutory con-
struction similarly serves to maintain the balance of power between the
federal courts and Congress set forth in Article Ill, Section 2 of the Con-
38stitution.
In Hall, we considered the scope of our evidentiary review in an
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") case.39 The ques-
tion presented was the circumstances, if any, in which a district court
may supplement the administrative record in considering an employee-
beneficiary's challenge to a plan-administrator's benefits determina-
tion.40 After acknowledging Congress' agency-like setup in the context
31. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
32. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).
33. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1200-02.
34. Id. at 1209.
35. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 73 &
n.303 (1993) (citing cases that make the argument). The dissent in Holmes also relied on the plain
meaning rule. See Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1209 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) ("To determine a statute's
plain meaning, '[we] must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole."' (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871,
878 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
36. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1221 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1216 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) ("[We must strictly construe statutes conferring
jurisdiction, resolving any doubts against jurisdiction.").
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the authority and limits to the authority of the federal
courts).
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). We considered this question in the context of de
novo review. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1201.
40. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200.
(Vol. 80:3
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of employee-benefits decisions under ERISA, we strictly limited the cir-
cumstances in which a district court might supplement the administrative
record.4' That holding could be viewed as an effort to strike the appropri-
ate balance between two competing concerns: avoiding a system in
which federal district courts function as substitute plan administrators
and protecting employees' substantive and procedural rights.
2. The Proper Role of the Appellate Court in the Federal Court Sys-
tem
Although the concept of separation of powers is primarily identified
with the three branches of our federal government, similar principles
operate in defining the proper role of the appellate court in reviewing
district court decisions. For example, appellate courts accord substantial
deference to the district court's role as fact finder, granting the district
court broad discretion in performing this role. The decision in Hall rein-
forced this principle. Similarly, the plain-error doctrine at issue in United
States v. Lujan42 and United States v. Avery,43 both Apprendi44 cases,
serves to minimize instances in which appellate courts disrupt the final
judgments of district courts.45
D. Individual Sovereignty
The final first principle that I will discuss is the concept of individ-
ual sovereignty, the notion that government exists first and foremost not
as an end in itself, but as the protector of individual liberty. The cases in
this survey touch on numerous individual rights, including: First
Amendment freedoms; 46 Fourth Amendment protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures;4 7 protection against racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 48 rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 49 and the
right of incarcerated persons to seek federal habeas corpus relief.50 As
41. Id. at 1202. Specifically, we held that although review of an ERISA benefits decision
should generally be limited to the administrative record, the district court may, in its discretion,
supplement that record when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to
adequately conduct its de novo review. Id.
42. 268 F.3d 965, 967 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's sentencing decision).
43. 295 F.3d 1158, 1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's sentencing decision).
44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (establishing constitutional requirements
for applying sentencing guidelines that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maxi-
mum).
45. Although the plain-error doctrine primarily seeks to promote the adversary system and
further judicial efficiency, it also serves to protect the finality of district court judgments.
46. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 922.
47. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1164; Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1194.
48. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). The action in
Townsend was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which embodies the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1236.
49. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1192; Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1233.
50. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1191; Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1193.
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the courts of last resort in most cases, the federal courts of appeal are
vested with the weighty responsibility of defining the contours of these
numerous individual procedural and substantive rights.
In performing this function, it is imperative that federal courts rec-
ognize the manner in which "procedural" rights function to protect "sub-
stantive" rights. Our holding in Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casu-
alty Co.51 aptly illustrates this point. In Townsend, an employment dis-
crimination case, we held that in certain contexts a trial court must in-
struct a jury that they may infer a discriminatory motive if they disbe-
lieve the employer's proffered explanation.52 We recognized the substan-
tial danger of jury confusion, noting that it would be "unreasonable... to
expect that jurors, aided only by the arguments of counsel, will intui-
tively grasp a point of law that until recently eluded federal judges who
had the benefit of such arguments. 53 Securing this procedural right
heightened the protection afforded the substantive right to equal treat-
ment under the law, embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 54 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
55
CONCLUSION
The first principles, which animate our work, stand as powerful re-
minders of the great legacy of a government "of the people, by the peo-
ple, and for the people" 56 that we have inherited. In these troubled times
in our country, it is essential that we all-judges, lawyers, and all citi-
zens-be vigilant in protecting and preserving these first principles and
the other cornerstones of this republic. The system of checks and bal-
ances, separation of powers, and protection of individual sovereignty
stand at the heart of our definition of freedom as it has been experienced
in the United States. The judges and staff of the Tenth Circuit are privi-
leged and humbled by the opportunity to serve this nation representing
the Third Branch of government in the six states within the borders of the
circuit. We particularly appreciate the assistance and support we receive
from the law schools in the circuit. We are indebted to the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review for its annual review of our case law. We are hopeful
that students and the public alike will not only read the opinions, but will
also, from time to time, visit the historic courtrooms in the Byron White
51. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241.
52. Id. We did not hold that such an instruction was always required. Rather, such an instruc-
tion is required where "a rational finder of fact could reasonably find the defendant's explanation
false and could 'infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up
a discriminatory purpose."' Id.
53. Id. at 1241 n.5.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
56. President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pa. (Nov. 19, 1863), in MORTIMER J.
ADLER & WILLIAM GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT (1975).
[Vol. 80:3
FOREWORD
United States Courthouse 7 to be reminded of the lasting legacy of the
rule of law and the more than almost seventy-five years of development
of that law in this circuit.




THE NOT-so-GREAT WRIT: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS REFLECTING THE CURRENT
DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR
STATE PRISONERS
INTRODUCTION:
THE EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA
A writ of habeas corpus directs prison officials to bring a prisoner
before a judge to determine whether the prisoner is being held unlaw-
fully.' Based on the simple idea that nobody should be confined in viola-
2tion of the Constitution, the writ does not require a court to determine a
prisoner's innocence or guilt, but the writ guards against illegal impris-
onment.3 Therefore, while put into action by individual prisoners who
hope for their own release, the writ of habeas corpus functions as an im-
portant mechanism of enforcing structural reform within the criminal
justice system.4 In Anglo-American legal history, habeas corpus-The
Great Writ-"has been for centuries esteemed the best and only suffi-
cient defence [sic] of personal freedom.",
5
Despite the writ's acknowledged importance in "protecting constitu-
tional rights,"6 the United States Supreme Court and Congress have sub-
stantially contracted the availability of habeas relief for state prisoners
over the last several decades. Two recent decisions by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,7 Herrera v. LeMaster8 and John-
son v. McKune,9 reflect the current difficulty state prisoners face in ob-
taining habeas relief. In Herrera, the Tenth Circuit held that a habeas
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999); see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
238 (1963) ("In England, as in the United States, the chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the
release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail."); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS
CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2001); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2.10 (2d ed. 1992).
2. Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1115, 1118-19 (1998).
3. See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968) ("[T]he great and central office of
the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention."); Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948) ("The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to make certain
that a man is not unjustly imprisoned.").
4. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 425 (1999) ("Federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners is largely the product of the Supreme Court's efforts in the middle decades of this century
to improve the quality of state criminal justice.").
5. See Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1868).
6. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
7. This paper surveys the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 2001 and
August 31, 2002.
8. 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
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court, in assessing the harmlessness of a constitutional violation, is to
apply the less demanding harmless-error standard normally required in
habeas cases even when a state court fails to apply the required and more
demanding harmless-error standard on direct review. ° In Johnson, the
Tenth Circuit held that a habeas petitioner, convicted with the help of a
jury instruction later found unconstitutional by the United States Su-
preme Court, could not have that subsequent Supreme Court decision
applied retroactively to his petition." Both of these cases, therefore, are
emblematic of the current contraction of habeas law, a trend that runs
counter to the general expansion of the writ's availability in American
legal history.
At the very beginning of our nation, the founding fathers recognized
the importance of habeas corpus as a safeguard against a new and power-
ful central government,' 2 and provided for its protection within the Con-
stitution.' 3 Due to its position as "the symbol and guardian of individual
liberty,"' 4 the writ of habeas corpus has demonstrated a propensity for
progressive expansion.' 5 The United States Supreme Court recognized
the writ's capacity for liberal growth, noting in Ex Parte Yerger that "the
general spirit and genius of our institution has tended to the widening and
enlarging of the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the
United States."'1
6
The expansion of the writ of habeas corpus was particularly dra-
matic during two periods in American history. Immediately after the
Civil War, Congress created the statutory writ of habeas corpus, enabling
a prisoner tried in a state court to ask for a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral court based on constitutional errors or violations of federal law.
17
Prior to this legislation, the writ only applied to federal prisoners, and to
the exclusion of state prisoners.' 8 This statutory expansion of the com-
mon law writ grew out of a concern that the defeated Southern states
were limiting the rights of black citizens. 19
10. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1193-94, 1198-99.
11. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189-90, 1200 (considering whether to apply Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne 1901) (noting
the importance of habeas corpus as a protection against the "the practice of arbitrary imprison-
ments," which Hamilton labeled one of the "favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny").
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
14. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
15. See, e.g., Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1950) ("[Hlabeas corpus
has long been regarded as a proceeding in which a liberal judicial attitude is peculiarly appropriate in
view of the broadly remedial nature of the writ.").
16. Yerger, 75 U.S. at 102.
17. Joseph L. Hoffman, Justices Weave Intricate Web of Habeas Corpus Decisions, 37 TRIAL
62, 62 (2001).
18. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 98-99 (1807).
19. Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 339 (1997).
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Then, nearly one hundred years later, the Warren Court further
transformed the statutory writ of habeas corpus with a series of decisions
that removed many of the practical procedural hurdles faced by state
prisoners.20 These critical decisions altered the balance of power in the
field of criminal law2' and "the writ became an effective tool for enforc-
ing federal constitutional standards in the states by allowing federal
courts to determine whether a state criminal prosecution fully complied
with the more exacting federal rules of constitutional criminal proce-
dure. 22 As a result of the Warren Court's work, federal courts became
the watchdogs against constitutional violations in state courts. 23 How-
ever, the rapid expansion of habeas relief also led to a significant back-
lash-one that continues nearly forty years later.24
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist reexamined
many of the principles of habeas relief established by the Warren
Court. 25 Through a series of cases in the early 1990s, the Court con-
stricted the scope of the statutory writ of habeas corpus and reversed
many of the effects of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court. 6 The
decisions of the Rehnquist Court undeniably contracted the availability
of writs of habeas corpus.27 Today, federal courts routinely deny the peti-
tions of many prisoners with valid constitutional claims2 8 But despite
these limitations on habeas relief erected by the Rehnquist Court, Con-
gress subsequently passed legislation creating another set of procedural
hurdles.29
20. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963) (formulating a new test to be
applied in determining whether successor petitions would be dismissed; a successor petition would
be granted unless the petitioner had knowledge of a constitutional claim and yet purposely failed to
raise that claim); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99, 438-39 (1963) (holding that a procedural error
was not sufficient grounds for denying a petitioner habeas relief unless the state procedural rules
were "deliberately bypassed"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (using the reasoning
from Fay to hold that a petitioner for habeas relief was allowed a full evidentiary hearing during the
collateral appeal to federal court, unless the petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedural rules).
21. Hartman & Nyden, supra note 19, at 340,
22. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 62.
23. Hartman & Nyden, supra note 19, at 340.
24. See id. at 342-52.
25. See id. at 342.
26. Id.; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631-32, 638 (1993) (adopting a separate,
less stringent harmless error standard for collateral review); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1992) (changing the "deliberate bypass" standard of Faye v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain to one
of "cause and prejudice"); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-35 (1991) (limiting Fay v.
Noia by declining to review questions of federal law where the state court decision rests on inde-
pendent state law grounds); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (holding that the stan-
dard for evaluating successor petitions is also "cause and prejudice"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
299-310 (1989) (implying that a decision of the Supreme Court is not to be applied retroactively to
habeas corpus cases, unless the decision announces a "new rule").
27. David Gottlieb & Randall Coyne, Habeas Corpus Practice in State and Federal Courts,
31 N.M. L. REV. 201, 201 (2001).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 202.
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In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA")3 ° in response to the bombing in Oklahoma
City.31 Intending to stop "abuse of the writ," Congress designed the
AEDPA to bar habeas relief for certain claims.32 The AEDPA included a
bar on successive petitions,33 a statute of limitations, 3a and a standard of
review.35 Although some commentators feel that the AEDPA was merely
36a codification of the Rehnquist Court's habeas corpus decisions, federal
courts must still wrestle to integrate the statute's language with the ex-
tensive case law regarding habeas corpus.37
It was during this transitional period, marked by an ongoing con-
traction of habeas corpus and evolving judicial adaptation to the
AEDPA, that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the two cases
that are the focus of this survey. Herrera and Johnson reveal that the
Tenth Circuit adopted a strict interpretation of the rules surrounding the
statutory writ of habeas corpus and that the court is willing to aid in the
relatively recent contraction of the availability of habeas relief for state
prisoners. 38 Part I of this survey introduces the concept of harmless-error
standards and the Tenth Circuit's application of the current standard in
Herrera. Part II discusses the current limit on applying Supreme Court
decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure retroactively to
habeas proceedings and the Tenth Circuit's analysis of retroactivity in
Johnson.
I. THE HARMLESS-ERROR STANDARD IN HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDINGS
A. Background: A History of the Harmless-Error Standard in Habeas
Corpus Proceedings
Even where a state admits in a habeas proceeding that a constitu-
tional error was committed, the state can argue that the error was harm-
less. 39 Until recently, federal courts used the same standard for judging
constitutional violations during habeas proceedings as they used on di-
30. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
31. See Stahlkopf, supra note 2, at 1117.
32. Id.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c) (2000).
34. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
35. Id. § 2254(d)(1).
36. See, e.g., Gottlieb & Coyne, supra note 27, at 202 (reporting Professor Gottlieb's opinion
that AEDPA "can be read primarily as a codification of much of the Court's work").
37. See id. at 203 (discussing the difficulties federal courts face in trying to apply AEDPA's
bar on successive petitions given their prior decisions on the issue).
38. See Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1192; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1187.
39. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("By now
it goes without saying that harmless-error review is of almost universal application; there are few
errors that may not be forgiven as harmless."); YACKLE, supra note 4, at 451 ("If federal courts
determine that prisoners' claims are meritorious, they nonetheless withhold relief if the error was
harmless.").
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rect appeal.40 That standard required relief from a constitutional error
unless the state could prove the violation was "harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."41 The United States Supreme Court announced this high
standard in Chapman v. California,42 and emphasized the constitutional
importance of the harmless-error rule.43
In 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,44 the United States Supreme
Court adopted a new standard for evaluating constitutional errors on fed-
eral habeas review.a In his murder trial, the defendant, Todd Brecht,
admitted that he shot his brother-in-law, but asserted that it was an acci-
dent.46 The prosecutor, however, presented Brecht's silence at the time of
his arrest as evidence of his guilt and the jury found Brecht guilty of
first-degree murder.47 On direct appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
set aside the conviction, finding that Brecht's constitutional rights were
violated by the prosecutor's use of Brecht's choice to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right to silence.48 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated
the conviction even though it found that the State had violated Brecht's
due process rights because it found that the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."49
On habeas review, the district court used the same standard used by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and found that the error was not "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt., 50 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, declaring that the "harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard was only applicable to direct review.5 Further,
the Seventh Circuit held that for habeas corpus review the test is whether
the error "had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury's verdict. 52 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the Seventh Circuit,53 adopting the language originally
40. Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2409 (1993) ("In a
number of cases, the Court applied the Chapman test in habeas corpus just as on direct review.").
See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 (1986) (finding that a jury instruction that shifted the
burden of proof on the element of malice and that a prisoner challenged in a habeas proceeding did
not violate the Chapman test).
41. Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 660 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n otherwise valid conviction
should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Deleware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1996))).
42. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
43. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21 (stating that the harmless-error standard protects rights "rooted
in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the
Congress that the 'independent' federal courts would be the 'guardians of those rights."').
44. 507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993).
45. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630-31, 637-38.
46. Id. at 624.
47. Id. at 624-25.
48. Id. at 625-26.
49. Id. at 626 (quoting State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 626-27 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
53. Id. at 639.
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used in Kotteakos v. United States54 to assess errors that do not affect
constitutional rights." The Brecht decision leaves federal courts with two
different harmless-error standards: the more stringent Chapman standard
for direct review, and the less stringent Brecht standard for use during
habeas proceedings.56 The Court provided a detailed rationale for the
two-tiered system of harmless-error standards.
57
Writing for the majority of the justices on the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished the standard used for harmless error on direct
review from the standard federal courts are to use in habeas proceed-
ings.58 Because habeas review is limited to preventing serious break-
downs in the criminal justice system, the majority opinion adopted a less
stringent standard for harmless error in habeas proceedings. 59 The Court
identified "the State's interest in the finality of convictions that have
survived direct review within the state court system" as a principal ra-
tionale for having a separate harmless-error standard for collateral re-
view.6° Applying the same standard to both types of review could lead to
"the frustration of 'society's interest in the prompt administration of jus-
tice."' 61 The Court was also concerned that it respect the interests of
comity and federalism.62 The Court also justified the dual standard on the
assumption that state courts would apply the more stringent Chapman
standard and thus it would be duplicitous for a federal court to apply the
63same standard in habeas proceedings.
Just three years after the Court declared its new harmless-error
standard in Brecht, Congress handed the federal courts another potential
standard when it passed the AEDPA.64 The AEDPA states that a federal
court shall not issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court, on
direct review of a conviction, has either used an "unreasonable applica-
tion" of, or come to a decision "contrary to," Supreme Court precedent.
65
In Herrera, the Tenth Circuit addressed two questions concerning the
application of harmless-error analysis during habeas review.66 First, it
had to decide whether the standard articulated in Brecht remained intact
54. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
55. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
56. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.
57. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627-39.
58. Id. at 634.
59. See id. at 637.
60. id. at 635.
61. Id. at 637 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
62. Id. at 636.
63. Id. ("[lit scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas courts to engage in the identical
approach to harmless-error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct re-
view.").
64. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
66. 301 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002).
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or whether the AEDPA abrogated Brecht.67 Second, the court had to de-
cide what standard to apply, Brecht or Chapman, when a state court did
not apply the more stringent Chapman standard on direct review.
68
B. Whether the Harmless-Error Standard of Brecht Is Still Good Law
After the AEDPA
1. Tenth Circuit: Herrera v. LeMaster69
a. Facts
Ruben Robert Herrera was sentenced to life in prison after he was
convicted in a New Mexico state court "of first degree murder and ag-
gravated assault.",70 On direct appeal, Herrera claimed that police officers
had illegally searched his home. 7' Therefore, he argued, the admission at
trial of evidence seized during the illegal search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.72 The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the
search warrant did not meet constitutional standards.73 Nonetheless, it
concluded the error was harmless.74 In reaching this conclusion, the New
Mexico Supreme Court did not use the "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard required by the United States Supreme Court in Chap-
man. 
75
Herrera then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asking for
relief based on the illegal search.7 6 A magistrate recommended denying
relief, basing his conclusion on a Brecht analysis of the illegal search.77
The district court adopted this recommendation, and Herrera appealed to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the passage of the
AEDPA eliminated the requirement of a Brecht harmless-error analy-
sis. 78 Herrera hinged his argument on the ambiguous wording of the stat-
ute.79 Specifically, the AEDPA states that "[an application for a writ of
habeas corpus ... shall not be granted... unless the adjudication of the
claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by
67. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1195 n.6.
68. Id.
69. 301 F.3d 1192.





75. Id. (referring to the standard adopted in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). The New Mexico
Supreme Court instead based its harmless error conclusion on State v. Moore, 612 P.2d 1314, 1315
(N.M. 1980). Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting the magistrate's recommendation that Herrera's petition be dismissed with
prejudice).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1194-95.
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the Supreme Court of the United States., 80 Herrera argued that the statu-
tory requirements supplanted the standard articulated in Brecht.8' He
claimed he was entitled to habeas relief because the state court decision
was "contrary to clearly established federal law" because the court did
not use the required Chapman standard on direct review. 8 Herrera ar-
gued that because the statute does not require any analysis for a constitu-
tional error beyond that required by the statute, Congress eliminated the
Brecht standard.83
b. Decision
In deciding whether the AEDPA eliminated the Brecht analysis and
created a new standard for harmless-error review in habeas proceedings,
the Tenth Circuit compared the language of the statute and the legislative
intent behind its passage with the United States Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Brecht.84 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the principle that "collateral review is dif-
ferent from direct review" in habeas corpus jurisprudence. 85 The Su-
preme Court also identified four concerns that justify use of the less
stringent standard during habeas proceedings. 86 First is "the State's inter-
est in the finality of convictions." 87 Second and third are concerns of
"comity and federalism." 88 The Court reasoned, in Brecht, that federal
review after a state court has already reviewed a case for constitutional
error would frustrate both the state's authority in the field of criminal law
and its efforts to enforce constitutional rights.89 Finally, granting the writ
liberally "'degrades the prominence of the trial itself,' and at the same
time encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral
review.9°
The Tenth Circuit then compared this set of rationales to the con-
cerns that led Congress to pass the AEDPA.9' In order to assess Con-
gress's intent, the Tenth Circuit looked to two recent Supreme Court
cases that identified the policy concerns underlying the passage of the
Act. 92 In one case, the Supreme Court declared that the "AEDPA's pur-
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
81. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1198-99.
82. Id. at 1195 n.6.
83. Id. at 1199. For example, the AEDPA does not require that the error had a "substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
84. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1197.
85. Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633).
86. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
90. Id. (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 127).
91. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1198.
92. Id. (referring to a case involving Michael Williams, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420
(2000), and a case involving Terry Williams, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
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pose [was] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism,"
and emphasized that "[t]here [was] no doubt Congress intended [the]
AEDPA to advance these doctrines., 93 Furthermore, in another case, the
Supreme Court said that "Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent
'retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the
extent possible under law." 94 Equating this set of concerns with the ra-
tionales underlying the decision in Brecht, the Tenth Circuit held that the
AEDPA did not eliminate the harmless-error standard set forth in
Brecht.95 The court declared that if it held otherwise, it would frustrate
Congress's intent to "raise the bar with respect to availability of federal
habeas relief."
96
2. Circuits Supporting the Decision of the Tenth Circuit in Herrera
Two other circuits have spoken explicitly on the issue of whether
the Brecht harmless-error standard still applies after passage of the
AEDPA.9 7 Both the First and Sixth Circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit
that Brecht remains the appropriate standard for federal habeas review of
the harmlessness of constitutional errors.98
a. First Circuit: Sanna v. Dipaolo
99
Sanna was convicted of first-degree murder.'0° He argued that he
was entitled to habeas corpus relief because the state court denied him
due process when it did not properly instruct the jury about all of the
effects a conclusion that Sanna was intoxicated might have on its ver-
dict. 01 In addressing the possible constitutional error, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals noted the confusion about the survival of Brecht, then
summarily stated: "[W]e have consistently employed Brecht in cases
arising under the AEDPA. We reaffirm that praxis today and hold that
the Brecht standard applies in conjunction with the AEDPA amend-
ments." 0 2 The court applied that standard and found that the instructions
did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury because the peti-
tioner's defense at trial was mistaken identity and because the trial court
gave a supplemental instruction that cured most of the problems with the
original instructions.1
0 3
93. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 436).
94. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 386).
95. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200.
96. Id. at 1199.
97. See Sanna v. Diapaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352,
371 (6th Cir. 1999).
98. See Sanna, 265 F.3d at 14; Nevers, 169 F.3d at 371.
99. 265 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 2001).
100. Sanna, 265 F.3d at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 15.
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b. Sixth Circuit: Nevers v. Killinger'
14
Nevers was convicted of second-degree murder. 10 5 He was a police
officer and the charge was widely publicized before the trial. 1°6 The trial
court, however, refused to grant Nevers a change of venue.'0 7 A district
court granted his petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 0 8 On ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "when the issue
before the federal habeas court is the state court's finding of harmless
error, the test set out by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos and explicitly
reiterated in Brecht quite precisely captures Congress's intent as ex-
pressed in AEDPA and, therefore, continues to be applicable."'" 9 The
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Nevers the
writ based on extraneous influences on the jury, but reversed its "reason-
ing and conclusions . . . that Nevers was denied a fair trial because of
pretrial publicity."'"10
3. Circuits Reserving the Question of Whether the AEDPA Elimi-
nated the Brecht Harmless-Error Standard
a. Eighth Circuit: Whitmore v. Kemna"'
Defendant Whitmore was convicted of robbery in the first degree
and three counts of armed criminal action, based on an armed robbery of
a flower shop, and subsequently sentenced to eighty years in prison.' 12 In
Whitmore's appeal for post-conviction relief, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals found that the prosecution had unconstitutionally used Whitmore's
post-arrest silence and request for an attorney at his trial." 3 However,
utilizing the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the court held that
the error was harmless." 4 Whitmore then applied for a federal writ of
habeas corpus."15 The federal district court denied him relief under the
Brecht harmless-error standard. 1 6 However, the district court also ques-
tioned the continuing validity of the Brecht standard in light of the
AEDPA."17
104. 169 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 1999).




109. Id. at 371.
110. Id. at 354.
111. 213 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 2000).
112. Whitmore, 213 F.3d at 432.
113. Id. at 433.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 432.
116. Id. at 433.
117. Id.
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In reviewing the district court's use of the Brecht standard, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed similar doubts about the con-
tinuing vitality of the standard. 1 8 The court was "not convinced that the
AEDPA did not abrogate the requirement that federal habeas courts con-
duct a harmless-error analysis under Brecht." 9 The court commented
that the "AEDPA is unambiguous as to the scope of federal court review,
limiting such review (at least as compared with past practice) in order to
effect the intent of Congress to expedite habeas proceedings with appro-
priate deference to state court determinations."' 120 The doubts expressed
by the court, however, are dicta, since the court found that Whitmore's
conviction would stand under either the Brecht or AEDPA standards.'
2'
Three circuit courts have joined the Eighth Circuit in reserving
judgment about the continuing vitality of Brecht after the passage of the
AEDPA.
b. Second Circuit: Noble v. Kelly
122
In Noble, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asked "whether a
federal habeas court should continue to apply Brecht or determine in-
stead whether the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of Chapman.' 2 3 In that case, the defendant
was convicted of attempted murder after a trial court excluded the testi-
mony of a witness who would have testified to the defendant's where-
abouts at the time of the shooting at issue.124 The defendant requested
habeas relief on the ground that the trial court erred when it excluded the
witness's testimony. 2 5 The court did not decide which standard should
apply because it was able to find reversible error under either standard.
26
c. Fifth Circuit: Tucker v. Johnson'
27
In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of murder and "sentenced to
death."'' 28 He argued that he was entitled to habeas relief because the
prosecutor introduced an audiotape of the defendant's confession, which
included his confession to crimes that were not at issue in that murder
trial. 129 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the confusion over





122. 246 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
123. Noble, 246 F.3d at 101 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
124. Id. at 95.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 101 & n.5.
127. 242 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2001).
128. Tucker, 242 F.3d at 619.
129. Id. at 628.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the AEDPA."'3 ° The court, however, sidestepped the issue of Brecht's
continued validity by finding that the defendant had not proven that he
was "entitled to relief under either standard."' 31 The court relied on the
defendant's "confession, the overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt, and
the fact that the State did not emphasize the other crimes."'1
32
d. Seventh Circuit: Denny v. Gudmanson
33
Finally, in Denny, the defendant was convicted of murder after in-
criminating statements that his brother made were admitted at their joint
trial. 34 The Seventh Circuit expressed some doubt "that the Brecht stan-
dard . . . survived the passage of the AEDPA."'135 However, the court
decided not to "weigh in on the debate at this juncture."'' 36 It found that
admitting the statements the defendant's brother made was harmless un-




Despite the potential that those circuits that express doubt about the
continuing vitality of Brecht could split the circuits, the general direction
of federal courts of appeals is toward affirming the view adopted by the
Tenth Circuit. The continuing vitality of Brecht after the AEDPA hardly
seems open to controversy. Congress intended to further comity, finality
of litigation, and federalism through the passage of the AEDPA,'38 which
coincides with the Supreme Court's justifications for adopting the less
stringent harmless-error standard in Brecht.139 The Tenth Circuit was,
therefore, correct when it equated the policy concerns underlying the
AEDPA and Brecht.14° One might wish that the drafters of the AEDPA
would have paid more attention to the relevant language of Brecht and
directly addressed the issue of whether Brecht remained binding author-
ity. 14' Yet the statute's silence regarding Brecht may itself be an indica-
tion that the drafters intended to retain the Brecht standard. 142 However,
130. Id. at 629 n.16.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 629.
133. 252 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2001).
134. Denny, 252 F.3d at 898.
135. Id. at 905 n.4.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Williams, 529 U.S. at 436.
139. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
140. See Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1198.
141. See Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to
Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
203, 222 (1998) (discussing the difficulty in interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), in light of the lack of
insightful legislative history and the drafters' vague and inconsistent statements on the topic).
142. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 784 (2001) (applying the AEDPA standard to a state
court's ruling and finding it not unreasonable, then commenting that relief would also not be avail-
able because Brecht analysis would lead to the same result).
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despite any shortcomings in the statutory language, one can hardly argue
against the notion that Congress intended the AEDPA to restrict the
availability of writs of habeas corpus. 143 As the Tenth Circuit noted, a
ruling that replaces the high bar of Brecht with an interpretation of the
AEDPA that expands the availability of habeas relief would frustrate the
legislators' intentions. nn
The lingering confusion about the effect of the AEDPA on the ap-
plicability of Brecht may have more to do with ideological opposition to
the Act itself than a misunderstanding of Congress's intent in limiting
habeas relief.1 45 In addition, the disagreement may stem from dissatisfac-
tion with the ephemeral nature of harmless-error standards, which in-
volve statements that judges must struggle to "operationalize."'
' 46
C. Whether a Habeas Court Should Still Apply the Brecht Test If the
State Court Failed to Apply the Required Chapman Test on Direct
Review
Although the question of the continued existence of Brecht has cre-
ated some confusion among the circuits, the second question addressed
by the Tenth Circuit in Herrera147 presented a knottier problem. In
Brecht, where the Supreme Court first formulated the less stringent stan-
dard for use in federal habeas proceedings, the state court had already
applied the more stringent Chapman rule on direct review. 148 The Tenth
Circuit, in Herrera, addressed whether the less stringent harmless-error
standard of Brecht applies in a habeas proceeding when the state court
did not apply the Chapman standard on direct review.
149
1. Tenth Circuit: Herrera v. LeMaster1
50
a. Facts
Ruben Robert Herrera was sentenced to life in prison after being
convicted in a New Mexico state court of first-degree murder and aggra-
143. See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 409 (1997) ("[It is evident that
prisoners' habeas rights are now bound by a myriad of stringent restrictions.").
144. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1199.
145. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 141, at 206-07 (discussing the "virulent condemnation" of
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which limited the retroactive application of Supreme Court
decisions in habeas review and that some argue was codified in the AEDPA; identifying ideological
dissatisfaction as the possible source of the discomfort).
146. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 17-19
(2002) (discussing the difficulties with different methods used by appellate courts to determine
whether an error was harmless).
147. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1195 n.6 ("[W]e address on rehearing whether a federal court on
habeas review should assess harmlessness under Chapman or Brecht when the state court has failed
to apply Chapman.").
148. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 625-26.
149. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1195 n.6.
150. 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
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vated assault.15' On direct appeal, Herrera argued that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violated when the police illegally searched his
home. 52 The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with Herrera, but
concluded the error was harmless. 5 3 In deciding that the constitutional
violation was harmless, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not use the
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman. 54 Herrera then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, asking for relief based on the State's illegal
search. 55 A magistrate recommended denying him relief, basing his con-
clusion on a Brecht analysis of the illegal search and finding that the
error did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in de-
termining the jury's verdict."'' 56 Herrera argued that because the state
court had not analyzed the illegal search under the Chapman "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, the harmless-error standard of Brecht should
not apply on collateral review in habeas proceedings. 57 Instead, he




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Herrera and held
that Brecht applies even where the state court on direct review failed to
use the appropriate harmless-error standard. 59 In reaching its conclusion,
the Tenth Circuit relied principally on two authorities. First, the court
looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in Brecht.160 Writing for the ma-
jority in Brecht, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the "less onerous
harmless-error" analysis was better suited to "the considerations underly-
ing our habeas jurisprudence. 161 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opin-
ion, emphasized that the Brecht standard, while less stringent than the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman, is nonetheless "ap-
propriately demanding."'' 62 In particular, Justice Stevens noted that the
Brecht standard still "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why
those errors were harmless; requires a habeas court to review the entire




155. Id. The court noted that it was not barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), from
reviewing Herrera's Fourth Amendment claim since he did not receive a "full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim" since the state court failed to apply the Chapman standard in
reviewing the constitutional error at issue. Id. at 1195 n.4. Stone held that a state prisoner may not
raise a Fourth Amendment claim in habeas proceedings when the state "provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation." Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82.
156. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1194.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1194-95.
159. Id. at 1200.
160. Id. at 1199.
161. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.
162. Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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record de novo in determining whether the error influenced the jury's
deliberations; and leaves considerable latitude for the exercise of judg-
ment by federal courts.' 63 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the "broad
language" used in the opinion indicated the Court's intention to make
Brecht applicable to all federal habeas review of state court decisions,
whether or not the state court applied Chapman on direct review.
164
The Tenth Circuit also relied on dicta from a Supreme Court case
that was decided after Brecht.165 In Penry v. Johnson,166 the Supreme
Court reviewed a habeas petition made by a prisoner who claimed that
his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated during a trial in a state
court. 16 7 Because the state court did not find that the State had violated
the constitution, it did not undertake a harmless error analysis. 168 The
Supreme Court agreed there was no constitutional violation, but added in
dicta that if the State had committed such an error, the proper test for
harmlessness during habeas review was the Brecht standard. 169 Even
though Penry never received the benefit of the Chapman standard on
direct review, the Court indicated that it was willing to use the Brecht
standard on collateral review. 170
2. Eighth Circuit: Orndorff v. Lockhart
171
a. Facts
Michael Ray Orndorff was convicted of murder. 7 2 After he ap-
pealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court, he discovered that
the prosecutor had hypnotized a key witness to aid her recall. 173 The state
court did not conduct a harmless error analysis under any standard be-
cause Orndorff did not discover the constitutional violation until after his
direct appeal ended. 174 Orndorff petitioned for habeas relief based on the
argument that the state violated his "[S]ixth [A]mendment right to con-
front the witnesses against him" by preventing him from questioning the
witness about the hypnosis. 175 The federal district court agreed that the
State committed a constitutional error when it did not inform Orndorff of
163. Id. at 640-41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
164. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1199.
165. Id. at 1199-1200.
166. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
167. Penry, 532 U.S. at 793.
168. See id. at 791.
169. Id. at 795.
170. Id.
171. 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993).
172. Orndorff, 998 F.2d at 1428.
173. Id. at 1429.
174. Id. at 1430.
175. Id.
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the hypnosis, but found the error harmless, upheld the murder conviction
and denied habeas relief.
176
b. Decision
On review of the district court's denial of habeas relief, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals began by addressing the question of whether
the Brecht harmless-error standard applies, where the state court failed to
apply any prior harmless-error standard at all.177 The Eighth Circuit held
that the Brecht harmless-error standard only applies where the state court
has conducted an analysis under the Chapman harmless-error standard
on direct review. 178 In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked at
the facts underlying the Supreme Court's holding in Brecht.179 The
Eighth Circuit noted that courts reviewed the constitutional errors in
Brecht four times under the Chapman standard before the case reached
the Supreme Court. 180 The Eighth Circuit also found support for the lim-
ited application of Brecht in the Supreme Court's strong assertion that
"[s]tate courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and
evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process under Chapman."'8' In
other words, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a primary rationale for
mandating the high bar of Brecht for collateral review was the assump-
tion that the state court would apply the lower bar of Chapman on direct
review.1 82 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, applied the harmless error stan-
dard of Chapman since the appellate court was the first court to address
the violation of Orndorff s constitutional rights. 83 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the testimony of the witness who had been hypnotized
might have influenced the jury's decision and, consequently, reversed the
district court's decision to deny Orndorff habeas relief.'
84
3. Other Circuits Supporting the Decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Herrera
The Eighth Circuit is swimming against the tide of federal court
opinion. Six other circuits have addressed the applicability of the Brecht
harmless error standard when there is no Chapman analysis on direct





180. Id. (explaining that the analysis was conducted by two state appellate courts, a federal
district court, and a federal court of appeals).
181. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1436.
185. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998); Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466
(5th Cir. 1997); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519
(10th Cir. 1995); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486
( lIth Cir. 1995).
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state court did not use the proper harmless-error standard on direct re-
view. 186 In addition, two other circuits have expressly declined the oppor-
tunity to rule on the issue.
187
a. Third Circuit: Hassine v. Zimmerman
188
In Hassine, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and
other crimes after a prosecutor made two references in his closing argu-
ments to the petitioner's silence after he was arrested. 89 The Third Cir-
cuit gave four reasons for holding that the less stringent harmless-error
standard of Brecht applies on habeas review even when the state court
failed to use the more stringent Chapman standard on direct review. 19°
First, the court looked to the plain language of the Brecht decision and
noted that the Supreme Court "never restricted the issues or the holding
in Brecht to situations where a petitioner has already had his or her claim
evaluated by the state courts under Chapman."'9'
Second, the Third Circuit separated the facts of Brecht from the
holding. 92 It noted that the "holding was based primarily on a finding--
apart from the particular facts or history of the case--that 'the costs of
applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas outweigh the addi-
tional deterrent effect, if any, that would be derived from its application
on collateral review."' ' 93 The Third Circuit claimed that the Supreme
Court in Brecht was driven primarily by concerns about the "nature and
purpose of collateral review" and that those concerns were never explic-
itly linked to an assumption about whether or not a court performed a
Chapman analysis on direct review. 194
Third, the court in Hassine rejected the notion that the policy con-
cerns identified in Brecht only come into play when a habeas court re-
peats the same harmless-error analysis conducted by the state court on
direct review.' 95 The Third Circuit reasoned that those concerns do not
turn on the repeated application of the same standard, but instead on the
fact that a state court has "rejected a defendant's direct appeal.' 96
186. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 953; Hogue, 131 F.3d at 500; Sherman, 89 F.3d at 1142; Brewer, 51
F.3d at 1529; Tyson, 50 F.3d at 446; Horsley, 45 F.3d at 1492.
187. See Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034 (9th
Cir. 1996).
188. 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998).
189. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 945.
190. Id. at 951-53.
191. Id. at 951.
192. See id.
193. Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636).
194. Id. at 952.
195. Id. at 952-53. The Supreme Court was concerned with comity, federalism, and showing
respect for the ability state courts to interpret the Constitution in Brecht. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 620,
636.
196. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 952.
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Lastly, the Third Circuit expressed concern about the practical ef-
fects of using Chapman in every habeas case where the state court failed
to use Chapman.197 In most circumstances a state court will not have
found constitutional errors and, therefore, will not have occasion to use
Chapman.'98 The court, therefore, reasoned that "any rule requiring
Chapman to be used when the state courts fail to address harmless error
would render Brecht inapplicable to the majority of habeas petitions."' 99
b. Fifth Circuit: Hogue v. Johnson
200
In Hogue, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death.20 ' No state court reviewed the petitioner's claim that the State had
committed a constitutional error during his trial.202 The Fifth Circuit ac-
cepted Brecht as the appropriate harmless error standard even when a
state court had not conducted a Chapman analysis.20 3 Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit noted that "the reasons given by the Supreme Court in
Brecht for adopting the Kotteakos v. United States harmless error stan-
dard for federal habeas review of nonstructural constitutional errors in
state criminal cases are fully applicable whether or not the state courts
have conducted a Chapman harmless error review.
' 204
4. Analysis
The principal objection to the decision in Herrera, and to the rea-
soning of the six other circuits that agree with that decision, is that it
affords disparate treatment to similarly situated habeas petitioners. The
Herrera decision leaves open the possibility that some habeas petitioners
will receive an analysis of their constitutional claims under Chapman's
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, while others simply will not. Jus-
tice White recognized this discrepancy and expressed his disfavor in his
dissent in Brecht.20 5 He commented that "the same constitutional right is
treated differently depending on whether its vindication is sought on di-
rect or collateral review. 2 °6 In other circumstances, the Supreme Court
has strongly opposed such inequality.2 7 Justice Powell, concurring in
Hankerson v. North Carolina,20 8 said that treating similarly situated de-
fendants disparately "hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration
197. Id. at 953.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1997).
201. Hogue, 131 F.3d at 469.
202. Id. at 499.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 649 (White, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977); Teague, 489 U.S. at
315.
208. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
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of justice with an even hand."",20 9 In Teague v. Lane,210 another seminal
habeas corpus decision,21' Justice O'Connor stated that "the harm caused
by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants alike cannot be exag-
gerated.
' 212
The federal courts may have found it easy to disregard the inherent
inequality of inflexibly applying Brecht to all habeas proceedings be-
cause they suspect that when courts apply them there is little practical
difference between the two standards. The Tenth Circuit seemed to argue
this point in Herrera when it pointed out that the Supreme Court had
stated that "[g]iven the critical importance of the faculty of judgment in
administering either standard, however, that difference is less significant
than it might seem., 21 3 However, the Tenth Circuit takes seemingly in-
consistent positions by vigorously defending expansive application of the
Brecht standard while at the same time arguing that it really does not
make a practical difference in habeas proceedings.
II. RETROACTIVITY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
The second major habeas issue recently addressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concerns the issue of retro-
activity of Supreme Court decisions to habeas petitions filed before the
relevant change in the law. In Johnson v. McKune,2 14 the Tenth Circuit
held that it would not apply a Supreme Court decision that found a Kan-
sas jury instruction unconstitutional retroactively to the habeas petition
of a man who was convicted after a court gave a jury that instruction.2 5
A brief examination of the history of retroactivity doctrines is necessary
in order to understand the full significance of that holding.
A. Background: A History of Retroactivity Doctrines in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings
Retroactivity-whether a new rule should control the outcome of
cases decided before the new rule was announced-has a long been the
subject of debate in legal circles.21 6 William Blackstone expressed a view
that is known as the declaratory theory, which posits that the duty of a
judge is not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
209. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
210. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
211. Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? - A Comment on Recent Proposals to
Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1701 (1990). "A series of deci-
sions, beginning with the seminal Teague v. Lane in February 1989, have now established that no
new rule of criminal procedure may be announced or applied retroactively by habeas courts unless it
falls within one of two very narrow exceptions." Id. (citation omitted).
212. Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.
213. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 643).
214. 288 F.3d 1187 (2002).
215. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1200.
216. Yin, supra note 141, at 210.
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old one."2t 7 The strength of the declaratory theory had the simple idea
that if "a law was declared unconstitutional," then it "should never have
been the law. 21 8 In contrast to the declaratory theory is the notion that
judges do not find law, but actively make it.219 The tension between those
two theories has played out repeatedly through the years, as judges have
had to decide between applying new rules retroactively or only prospec-
tively.22°
The struggle between retroactive and prospective applications of
law in the context of habeas proceedings emerged in the Supreme
Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker.221 In Linkletter, the Court faced
the question of whether Mapp v. Ohio,222 which extended the rule that
excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
states, applied retroactively to collateral appeals.223 Police officers
searched the petitioner's home and "place of business" and seized evi-
22dence without the authorization of a search warrant.2 24 The petitioner was
convicted of robbery.225 The state supreme court and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction; however, a year later, the United
States Supreme Court decided Mapp.226 The petitioner then applied for
habeas relief, but was denied such relief by both the state and federal
227courts. In holding that Mapp did not apply retroactively, the Court held
that future questions of retroactivity need to be decided on a case-by-case
basis.228
In two strongly worded opinions in the years following Linkletter,
Justice Harlan argued against this case-by-case determination of retroac-
tivity.229 Instead, he advocated for separate standards for direct and col-
217. Id. at 210 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *69).
218. Id. at 211.
219. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 191 (Henry Hart ed.,
1954) (1832).
220. Yin, supra note 141, at 211.
221. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
222. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
223. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.




228. Id. at 629 ("Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohib-
ited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-
spective operation will further or retard its operation.").
229. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing to
the "incompatible rules and inconsistent principles" of Linkletter and urging the creation of different
rules for cases that are subject to direct review at the time of the new decision and for cases that are
subject to collateral review); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court should bar retroactive application of new
rules on collateral review, except for rules with a substantive effect on due process or that are "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
[Vol. 80:3516
2003] HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS 517
lateral review. 3 ° On collateral review, Justice Harlan argued, new rules
should never be retroactively applied unless they are "new rules of sub-
stantive due process" or "watershed procedural rules." 23'
Twenty-two years after Justice Harlan's dissent in Mackey, a plural-
ity of the Court adopted his retroactivity analysis.232 In Teague v.
Lane,233 a black man was convicted of attempted murder and other
crimes by a jury made up entirely of white people.234 A district court
denied him habeas relief even though a prosecutor used all of his per-
emptory challenges to exclude potential jurors who were black.235 A cir-
cuit court also denied the petitioner relief because it concluded that he
was not entitled to rely on a discrimination case that the Supreme Court
had decided since the district court's judgment of conviction.
The Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure are generally not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review.237 The Court then defined a "new rule" as one that "breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Gov-
ernment" or one that was not "dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final. 238 However, the Court created
two exceptions to this general standard of nonretroactivity. 239 A new rule
may be retroactively applied if it places "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making author-
ity to proscribe" or if it "requires the observance of those procedures that
... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
240
The Court identified two policy concerns supporting this hard line
on retroactivity. 24' First, the Court noted the burden that applying deci-
sions retroactively places on states, requiring them to "marshal resources
in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed
to then-existing constitutional standards. 242 Second, a conservative ap-
proach to retroactivity respects the desire states have to see final resolu-
tions of their criminal proceedings.243
230. Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679-80, 691-93
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Yin, supra note 141, at 216.
232. See id. at 219.
233. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
234. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292-93.
235. Id. at 293.
236. Id. at 294.
237. Id. at 310.
238. Id. at 301.
239. Id. at 311.
240. Id. at 307 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
241. Id. at 310.
242. Id.
243. See id.
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In practice, a Teague retroactivity analysis typically involves two
steps.244 First, a habeas court determines if the Supreme Court holding
under consideration announced a new procedural rule.245 If not, then the
holding can be applied retroactively. 24 Second, if the holding is consid-
ered a new rule, the reviewing court must decide if the rule fits within
either of the two Teague exceptions. 247 If the Supreme Court decision
falls under one of the two exceptions, then it can be applied retroactively
on collateral review. 48 If not, then the Supreme Court decision will not
be applied retroactively to the habeas proceeding.2 49 The Tenth Circuit
engaged in this two-step analysis in Johnson v. McKune.
250
B. Whether the Supreme Court's Decision in Sandstrom Announced a
New Rule
1. Tenth Circuit: Johnson v. McKune
251
a. Facts
A jury found Noble Leroy Johnson guilty of murder in 1976 and
sentenced him to life in prison.252 At the trial, the jury received an in-
struction concerning the intent element of the crime of murder, which
stated: 'There is a presumption that a person intends all the natural and
probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This presumption is over-
come if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true. 253
Two years after Johnson made a direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme
Court, the United States Supreme Court held, in Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana,254 that the type of jury instruction given in Johnson's case violates
255 theCgiven rs case
the Due Process Clause. In particular, the Court expressed concern that
a juror "could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory. 256
Further, such instructions potentially shift the burden of persuasion, forc-
ing the defendant to prove he "lacked the requisite mental state" to com-
mit the crime.
257
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Johnson argued that his
due process rights had been unconstitutionally violated because the state
244. See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195-96.
245. Id. at 1196.
246. Id. at 1197.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1199-1200 (holding that the decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), was neither a "wellspring" principle nor a "watershed rule," therefore it was not to be ap-
plied retroactively in collateral review proceedings, and Johnson's claim was properly denied).
250. 288 F.3d 1187, 1195-1200 (10th Cir. 2002).
251. 288 F.3d 1187.
252. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189.
253. Id. at 1191.
254. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
255. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 518-20.
256. Id. at 515.
257. Id. at 524.
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had been improperly relieved of the burden of proving the intent element
of the crime he was charged with committing.258 The success of John-
son's petition hinged upon a retroactive application of the holding in
Sandstrom since at the time of Johnson's conviction and direct appeal,
Sandstrom had not yet been decided and, therefore, the jury instruction
that the court gave in his case was not considered unconstitutional.259 In
Johnson's habeas proceeding, the federal district court applied the two-
part analysis dictated by Teague and declared that (1) Sandstrom an-
nounced a new rule, and (2) the rule did not fall within one of the two
exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity. 26
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision.26' In deciding that Sandstrom created a new rule, the
Tenth Circuit looked both to the language in Teague and to other Su-
preme Court decisions that expounded upon the definition of a new
rule.262 In Teague, the Supreme Court declared that a rule meets the stan-
dard for newness if it "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal government" or if it "was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became fi-
nal.' ' 263 In other words, a rule is not new where a trial court, even before
the actual formulation of the rule, would nonetheless "have felt com-
pelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the defendant]
,,214seeks [to have a court apply] was required by the Constitution.
Applying the Supreme Court's definition of a new rule to the Sand-
strom holding, the Tenth Circuit found no persuasive indications that the
decision "was dictated or compelled by precedent as contemplated by
Teague." 265 The court acknowledged the strong influence that the Su-
preme Court decision In re Winship
266 had on the Sandstrom ruling.267
Winship held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 268 However,
the Johnson Court determined that the Supreme Court's admittedly
heavy reliance on Winship in Sandstrom did not rise to the level of com-
pulsion required by Teague to find that a rule was not new. 269 Therefore,
258. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1189,1193.
259. Id. at 1189.
260. Id. at 1189-90.
261. Id. at 1189.
262. Id. at 1195-97.
263. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
264. O'Dell v. Netherand, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997).
265. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
266. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
267. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
268. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
269. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court's holding in Sandstrom
pronounced a new rule.
c. Judge Henry's Dissent
Judge Henry concluded that Sandstrom did not create a new rule for
the purposes of a Teague analysis. 71 Judge Henry analyzed three previ-
ous Supreme Court decisions and determined that the combination of
those holdings compelled the result in Sandstrom.272 In Winship, the Su-
preme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is
charged.,273 In Morissette v. United States, 74 the Court held a jury in-
struction that allowed the jury to presume intent to steal based on the
defendant's voluntary act of taking property unconstitutional. 275 Finally,
in Mullaney v. Wilbur,27 6 the Court charged the government with proving
that there was no heat of passion in a murder case in order to comply
with the Due Process Clause.277 According to Judge Henry, the combined
weight of those Supreme Court decisions should have dictated the result
in Sandstrom.278 Therefore, in his opinion, the Sandstrom decision was
"hardly surprising" and should not be labeled a new rule in the context of
a Teague analysis. 79
2. Other Circuits Finding that Sandstrom Announced a New Rule
Apart from the Tenth Circuit, three other circuit courts have decided
that the rule articulated in Sandstrom was a new rule for the purpose of
analyzing whether to apply a rule retroactively.280 However, none of
those three courts explored the issue as fully as the Tenth Circuit did,
which led Judge Henry to question the strength of their agreement with
the Tenth Circuit in his dissent in Johnson.
28
1
a. Sixth Circuit: Cain v. Redman
282
Cain was convicted of first degree murder.283 At his trial, the judge
instructed the jury that the law implies the malice necessary to convict a
270. See id.
271. Id. at 1203 (Henry, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 (1990)).
273. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
274. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
275. Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 275-76.
276. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
277. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1204.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1204, 1205.
280. See, e.g., Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1991); Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910
F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11 th Cir. 1990).
281. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202-05.
282. 947 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1991).
283. Cain, 947 F.2d at 818.
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defendant of murder when a defendant "killed another suddenly without
provocation." 284 The district court dismissed a petition that Cain filed for
a writ of habeas corpus based on a magistrate's conclusion that a court
could not apply Sandstrom retroactively to his case.285 In Cain, the Sixth
Circuit held the rule articulated in Sandstrom was a new rule because the
jury instruction that the Court invalidated in Sandstrom was very preva-
lent just prior to the Court's decision.286 The circuit court reasoned that
the constitutionality of the instruction was 'susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds.2 87 The sheer number of jurisdictions not recognizing
any Supreme Court precedent that would compel the invalidation of the
jury instruction led the Sixth Circuit to conclude that the decision in
Sandstrom created a new rule of criminal procedure. 88
b. Seventh Circuit: Prihoda v. McCaughtry
2 89
Prihoda petitioned for habeas relief from his convictions of armed
robbery and murder in the first degree.290 He argued that the trial judge
gave a pattern instruction to the jury that shifted the burden from the
State to him and required him to prove that he did not intend to kill the
person whose death was at issue.291 A district court dismissed Prihoda's
petition.292 Prior to Prihoda's petition, the Seventh Circuit had on three
occasions held that the pattern instruction the trial court gave in Pri-
hoda's case did not violate the Constitution. 93 Based on these decisions,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that a state court would not have con-
cluded that the instruction was unconstitutional under the precedent that
existed at the time Prihoda's conviction became final.294 The Court in
Prihoda declared, "[a]ny federal decision holding instruction 1100 un-
constitutional therefore would be a new rule for purposes of Teague and
could not be applied on collateral review." 295 The circuit court affirmed
the district court's decision.2 96
c. Eleventh Circuit: Hall v. Kelso
297
Hall was convicted of felony murder after a trial court instructed a
jury that "acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to
284. Id. at 819.
285. Id. at 819-20.
286. Id. at 821.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 910 F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1990).
290. Prihoda, 910 F.2d at 1381.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1382.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1387.
297. 892 F.2d 1541 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
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be the product of the person's will."'298 A district court denied Hall a writ
of habeas corpus.29 In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that
Sandstrom created a new rule.300 The court held "that Teague [was] no
bar to the application of Sandstrom"30' because the rule developed from
Sandstrom is a "bedrock, axiomatic and elementary [constitutional] prin-
ciple"30 2 that "diminishes the 'likelihood of an [in]accurate convic-
tion. ',303 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
deny Hall habeas relief.
3 4
3. First Circuit: Mains v. Hall
305
Robert Mains was convicted of first degree murder and "unlawfully
carrying a firearm."306 He petitioned for habeas relief twice.30 7 In his
second petition Mains claimed that the instruction the trial judge gave the
jury about the malice element of murder violated the Due Process Clause
because it shifted the burden of proof from the State to him. 30 8 The dis-
trict court dismissed the second petition and Mains appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. 30 In Mains, the First Circuit wrote that since
Sandstrom was a "lineal descendant of Winship," it could not be classi-
fied as a new rule. 0 Winship held that the state bears the burden of prov-
ing all of the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 311 The
holding in Sandstrom, according to the First Circuit, simply applied the
premise articulated in Winship to jury instructions that create presump-
tions of facts.312 In other words, the court concluded that presumptive
jury instructions violate the Constitution in the precise manner prohibited
by Winship if they relieve the state of its burden of persuading the jury of
each element of a crime charged.313 Therefore, the Sandstrom holding
was not a "new rule" and the circuit court affirmed the district court's
decision.31 4
298. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542.
299. Id. at 1543.
300. Id. at 1543 n.1.
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,213 (1988)).
303. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
304. Id. at 1543.
305. 75 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1996).
306. Mains, 75 F.3d at 11.
307. id.
308. Id. at 12.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 14 (quoting Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343 (1993)).
311. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
312. Mains, 75 F.3d at 14.
313. See id.
314. Id. at 14-15.
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4. Analysis
a. Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Holdings from the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Seventh Circuit and Eleventh
Circuit is unjustified due to its misreading of both cases. In particular
Prihoda did not involve the type of jury instruction at issue in Sandstrom
and Johnson,31 5 while the court in Hall never addressed whether or not
Sandstrom was a new rule.316 In Prihoda, the Seventh Circuit stated that
any rule making jury instruction 1100 unconstitutional would constitute a
new rule.3 17 In order to equate the Prihoda holding with the Johnson
holding, the jury instructions at issue in those cases must both be similar
to the instruction found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sand-
strom. However, the jury instruction at issue in Prihoda does not corre-
spond to the type of instruction held unconstitutional in Sandstrom.3 18 In
fact, the Seventh Circuit had previously ruled that the jury instruction
used in Prihoda remained valid after Sandstrom.3 19 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit's citation of the ruling in Prihoda as support for the notion that
Sandstrom created a new rule seems tenuous at best.
The Tenth Circuit stated that in Hall, the Eleventh Circuit endorsed
the idea that Sandstrom created a new rule.320 The Eleventh Circuit's line
of reasoning and identification of Sandstrom as a "bedrock" principle
321
indicates that the court merely assumed Sandstrom created a new rule
and jumped immediately to the second Teague question: whether Sand-
strom fits within one of the exceptions to the general rule in Teague.322 In
other words, the Eleventh Circuit never squarely addressed the prelimi-
nary question as to whether or not Sandstrom created a new rule.
323
b. Continuing Confusion Over What Rules Are New
The fact that the circuit courts of appeals disagree about whether
Sandstrom announced a new rule is not surprising, considering the diffi-
culty the Supreme Court has had settling on a single definition of a new
rule.324 Commentators acknowledge the difficulty in applying the princi-
315. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202 (Henry, J., dissenting) (calling the decision in Prihoda, "irrele-
vant to the question before our panel").
316. Id. at 1203 (Henry, J., dissenting) ("[The Eleventh Circuit had no reason to consider
whether Sandstrom actually constituted a 'new rule."').
317. Prihoda, 910 F.2d at 1382.
318. See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1202 (Henry, J., dissenting).
319. See Fencl v. Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760, 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
320. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1196.
321. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n. 1.
322. See Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195-96.
323. Id. at 1202-03 (Henry, J., dissenting).
324. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 25.5 (4th ed. 2001).
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pie.325 The source of the confusion can be traced to the plurality opinion
in Teague, which admitted that "[i]t is .. .often difficult to determine
when a case announces a new rule, 326 then provided two different con-
cepts of what constituted a new rule.327 On one hand, the Court took a
restrictive view of new rules when it stated that a rule is new when it
"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government." 328 On the other hand, the Court also adopted a
more inclusive standard when it said that a rule is new if it was "not dic-
tated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's convictions be-
came final. 329 In the years since Teague, the Supreme Court has swung
back and forth between expansive and restrictive definitions of what con-
stitutes a new rule.330 The ambiguity of the definition and this oscillation
has created a myriad of intra-circuit and inter-circuit splits about the
categorization of several Supreme Court rules.33' Until the Supreme
Court takes an opportunity to settle upon a single definition of "new
rule," this trend of confusion among the circuits will likely persist.
C. Whether the New Rule in Sandstrom Fits Within One of Teague's
Exceptions
1. Tenth Circuit: Johnson v. McKune
332
Once the court concluded that Sandstrom was a new rule for the
purposes of Teague analysis, the general prohibition of retroactive use of
a new rule applied.333 In order to escape from this bar, Johnson claimed
that the second Teague exception applied to the Sandstrom rule.
3 34
Teague allows courts to retroactively apply any new rule that "require[s]
the observance of those procedures that.., are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty., 335 The Tenth Circuit looked first to the Teague opinion
for further clarification of the boundaries of this exception. 336 It noted
that the Supreme Court took an extremely conservative approach to the
exception because it reserved the exception for "watershed rules of
325. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1735 (1991) (pointing out that critics call the
new rule principle an "ill- defined and problematic legal concept").




330. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 324, § 25.5.
331. Examples of Supreme Court holdings where the circuits have split over the issue of
whether or not the announced rule was new or not, include Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), and Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
332. 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
333. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1197.
334. See id.
335. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 290).
336. See id.
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criminal procedure. 3 37 The Court hoped to avoid the burden retroac-
tively applying new rules of criminal procedure would place on states.338
The Supreme Court expected only "a small core of rules" to fit within the
second Teague exception.
339
The Tenth Circuit concluded the new rule was not a "watershed
rule." 34° Even though it acknowledged the possibility that the jury in-
struction the judge gave at Johnson's trial may have affected the reliabil-
ity of the conviction,341 the Tenth Circuit held that the rule needed to also
meet the higher burden of "alter[ing] our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." 342 The
court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom, relying
as it did on the reasoning in Winship, was built upon a foundation of
"bedrock" principles of criminal procedure.343 In Yates v. Aiken,34 the
Supreme Court called Winship's requirement that a jury only convict a
defendant with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every necessary fact
a "bedrock, axiomatic and elementary constitutional principle. 345 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit distinguished between the building blocks of the
Sandstrom decision and the Sandstrom rule itself and declared that "[n]ot
every holding that draws on a wellspring rule is itself a wellspring hold-
ing., 346 The court concluded that the rule announced in Sandstrom lacked
the "primacy and centrality" that was needed for the court to apply it
retroactively to Johnson's habeas proceeding.
347
2. Eleventh Circuit: Hall v. Kelso
348
In Hall, a jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and felony
murder in the shooting death of a liquor store clerk.349 The trial judge
instructed the jury that "the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion
are presumed to be the product of the person's will. ' 350 The Supreme
Court had not decided Sandstrom and held such burden-shifting jury
instructions unconstitutional until after Hall had exhausted his direct
appeals. 351 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to apply
Sandstrom retroactively in order to grant Hall's habeas petition.352 The
337. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
338. Id. at 1195.
339. Id. at 1198 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,477 (1993)).
340. Id. at 1200.
341. Id. at 1198.
342. Id. at 1198-99 (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 (2001)).
343. Id. at 1199.
344. 484 U.S. 211 (1988).
345. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199 (quoting Yates, 484 U.S. at 214).
346. Id. at 1199.
347. Id. at 1200 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
348. 892 F.2d 1541 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
349. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542.
350. Id. at 1543.
351. Id. at 1543 n.1.
352. See id.
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court justified the retroactive application with the same set of Supreme
Court cases the Tenth Circuit used to argue against retroactive applica-
tion.353 The Eleventh Circuit called the burden-shifting prohibition of
Sandstrom a "bedrock, 'axiomatic and elementary' [constitutional] prin-




The fact that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits made similar argu-
ments, yet reached different conclusions about whether the rule against
burden-shifting jury instructions announced in Sandstrom should be ap-
plied retroactively to habeas proceedings, demonstrates that the resolu-
tion of this issue is not clear. Both courts compared the rule to the same
elusive terms "bedrock," "axiomatic," and "watershed. 356 Although
ideological differences between the judges who sit on the courts may
partly explain this polarization of opinion, the differences between the
facts in the two cases also stands out. In Johnson, the court did not indi-
cate in its published opinion that Johnson's guilt was ever a question.357
The damning testimony of his wife, plus his own rambling testimony,
left little doubt that Johnson was responsible for the grisly murders of
two of his neighbors. 358 On the other hand, the potential that Hall was
innocent loomed in the background of his habeas proceeding. The court
included Hall's plausible story that he was simply in the wrong place at
the wrong time in its published opinion. 35 In fact, on direct appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed Hall's armed robbery conviction and
reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment. 360 Therefore, while the
purpose of a habeas proceeding is not to determine a prisoner's guilt or
innocence,361 it is possible that habeas courts are in fact swayed by that
question. Despite the supposed uniformity of Teague's prohibition of
retroactive application of new rules, the practical differences between
that standard and Linkletter's requirement of case-by-case analyses may
be fewer than at first appear.
353. See id. at 1543 n.1, 1543-44; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199. Both courts considered Winship,
Sandstrom, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), and Yates. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1, 1543-
44; Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199.
354. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Yates, 484 U.S. at 214).
355. Id.
356. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1199-1200; Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1.
357. Johnson, 288 F.3d 1187.
358. See id. at 1190.
359. Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542-43.
360. Id. at 1543.
361. See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968) ("[Tjhe great and central office of
the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention.").
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CONCLUSION
The English common law writ of habeas corpus gradually devel-
oped into "the symbol and guardian of individual liberty." 362 Its further
development has been slowed, and potentially reversed, by recent Su-
preme Court decisions and the passage of the AEDPA. As the two cases
from the Tenth Circuit that are analyzed in this survey reveal, the con-
traction has not yet ended. The Tenth Circuit has joined with other cir-
cuits in strictly interpreting the recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court,
making it increasingly difficult for state prisoners to obtain habeas relief.
In these two decisions, the Tenth Circuit let stand the use of an improper
harmless-error standard on direct appeal of a prisoner's conviction, and
allowed for the influence of a jury instruction that the Supreme Court
later struck down as an unconstitutional violation of due process. While
the net effects of these two decisions may be small by themselves, they
are representative of a larger trend within the American judiciary of at-
tacking the foundations of the Great Writ.
Mark R. Barr*
362. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.

EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE TENTH CIRCUIT' S STANCE ON
THE EVIDENTIARY SCOPE OF A "DENovo" REviEw IN
ERISA BENEFITS SUITS
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")' regu-
2lates most aspects of the administration of employee benefits plans.
Rather than addressing all of the issues encompassed in ERISA, this sur-
vey focuses solely on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit's recent decision in Hall v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica.3 Specifically, this paper will discuss an issue of first impression in
the circuit: whether evidence not included in the record of an administra-
tor of an employee benefits plan is admissible evidence in a suit under
ERISA that is commenced in federal court.4
Part I of this survey provides a framework for understanding ERISA
benefits suits. Part II describes the events leading up to the conflict sur-
rounding the scope of evidentiary review in cases under ERISA. Next,
Part III of this survey introduces the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hall and
discusses three approaches circuit courts take when deciding whether to
admit facts absent from the administrative record. 5 Finally, Part IV ana-
lyzes the decision in Hall and suggests that it is appropriate on policy
grounds.
1. ERISA: GENERAL CONCEPTS AND SCOPE OF THIS SURVEY
A. Concepts: Pension Benefit Plans and Welfare Benefit Plans
Under ERISA, participants or beneficiaries of an employee benefit
plan may bring a civil action in federal court when those obligated under
the employee benefit plan breach either a fiduciary obligation or an obli-
gation to provide benefits due under the plan.6 Employee benefit plans
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of Titles 5, 18, 26, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Mason Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits
Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575, 1578-79 (1994).
3. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002). Hall was decided on August 20, 2002. Hall, 300 F. 3d at
1197. In order to be included in this survey a decision by the Tenth Circuit had to be made between
September 1, 2001 and August 31, 2002.
4. ld. at 1201.
5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). A "participant" is defined as "any employee or former em-
ployee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or
may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers
employees of such employer or members of such organization." Id. § 1002(7). A "beneficiary" is "a
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are divided into two categories under ERISA: 1) employee "welfare
benefit plans",7 and 2) employee "pension benefit plans." 8 Welfare bene-
fit plans, whether provided by an employer or maintained through an
insurance policy, provide medical, disability, death, and other similar
benefits. 9 Pension benefit plans provide retirement income for employ-
ees.
1°
In addition to authorizing civil actions, courts generally interpret
ERISA as requiring employee benefit plans to establish an "internal
claim-review procedure."" This interpretation is based on 29 U.S.C. §
1133, which states:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor],
every employee benefit plan shall-
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or benefici-
ary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting
forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. 12
Thus, recovering benefits under ERISA is generally a two step process.
13
First, an employee must avail herself of any administrative processes for
challenging the denial of a claim set forth in the controlling employee
benefit plan. 14 Second, after exhausting administrative procedures, the
employee may seek redress in federal court.15 Employing this two-step
process, courts generally treat ERISA benefit suits as an "appellate-type"
procedure and review a plan's administrative process 16 and record of
events with federal appellate procedures.1
7
person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. § 1002(8).
7. Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 575, 575 n.2
(1992) [hereinafter Conison I] (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
8. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A); see also Hogg, supra note 2, at 1578 n.20 (noting that
"[e]mployee welfare benefit plans include health, accident, disability, death, unemployment, vaca-
tion, job training benefits, day care, legal services, or [even] scholarship funds").
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i); see also Conison I, supra note 7, at 575 n.2.
11. Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 21 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Conison III.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
13. Conison 11, supra note 11, at 21.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Employee benefit plans have "plan administrators" or "plan sponsors" who provide the
rights to notice that a claim has been denied and to review of the denial conferred by 29 U.S.C. §
1133. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A)-(B), 1025.
17. See Conison II, supra note 11, at 21.
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B. Scope: Participant and Beneficiary Civil Actions
ERISA authorizes civil suit by a number of parties, including par-
ticipants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans, in several circum-
stances.18 Under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a):
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ....
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan .... 19
Under § 1132(a)(1), a participant or beneficiary may avail herself of
both legal and equitable remedies because "[r]ecovery of benefits prom-
ised under the plan is monetary in nature, whereas injunctive or declara-
tory relief regarding such benefits is equitable in nature. ' 0
ERISA also authorizes courts to grant plan participants "appropriate
equitable relief' in § 1132(a)(3)(B). 21 However, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that monetary damages are not equitable relief as
contemplated under this cause of action, thus, greatly limiting the relief
permitted under § 1132(a)(3)(B). 22  Additionally, pursuant to
§ 1132(a)(3), ERISA authorizes a cause of action for a breach of fiduci-
ary duties to the plan.23 However, this particular cause of action does not
help a participant or beneficiary whose claim has been denied because
this relief is not intended to benefit an individual.24 Instead, this type of
action is "intended to benefit the plan as a whole.,
25
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)-(c).
19. Id. § 1132(a)(1), (3) (emphasis added).
20. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy I].
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
22. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1092 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-
58 (1993)). According to several federal courts, punitive damages are also generally not considered
equitable relief as contemplated by 29 U.S.C § 1 132(a)(3). See Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA
Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in Managed Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1146 & n.111 (1999).
23. 29 U.S.C. § I I32(a)(3).
24. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1092.
25. Id.
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Two practical considerations arise from the federal courts' interpre-
tation of ERISA. First, a participant or beneficiary is most likely to suc-
ceed in a suit under ERISA when availing herself of the protection
granted by section 1132(a)(1)(B). 26 Second, ERISA only authorizes civil
actions against plans provided by private organizations.27 Consequently,
government agencies and also a few types of private organizations are
exempt from actions brought pursuant to ERISA.28
II. HISTORICAL SETTING
A. Employer Abuses Necessitating Congressional Intervention
Abuses surrounding the administration of employee benefit plans
peaked as early as the 1960s.29 These plans provided employees an op-
portunity to set aside earnings from their jobs for retirement and, in other
situations, provided disability benefits and other medical benefits.30
However, because of the complexities involved in the administration of
these plans, many employees were left without pensions after plan ad-
ministrators failed to adequately manage employee funds.3' Moreover,
absent federal regulation of employee benefit plans, plan administrators
were not subject to any apparent standardized procedures holding them
accountable for abusing their discretion.32
B. Congress's Response
In reaction to the funding failures, fiduciary abuses, and vesting in-
equities that plagued employee benefit plans into the 1970s, Congress
enacted ERISA.33 Congress primarily sought to establish a uniform body
of law governing employee benefit plans, while seeking to prevent ad-
ministrative and funding abuses of employees.34 By providing uniform
employee benefit laws, ERISA was designed to eliminate the disparities
among the various state and local regulations. 35 The Act, therefore, pre-
empted state laws relating to "any employee benefit plan, '36 and granted
federal courts the authority to create a body of federal common law.37 In
26. Id. at 1093.
27. Conison 1, supra note 7, at 575 n.2 (noting that government plans as defined by the Act,
are not covered by ERISA).
28. Id. (listing the exemptions granted under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)).
29. See Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1136 n.29 (noting that Senator Jacob Javits initially
presented the bill for ERISA in 1967); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, Note, New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies
ERISA Preemption, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1996).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
31. Id. § 1001(a).
32. See Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
33. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-
forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
34. Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
35. Id. at 1137 & n.36.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
37. Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
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order to prevent administrative and funding abuses, Congress established
standards and procedural guidelines for administering employee benefit
plans.38
1. Federal Common Law and State Law Preemption
Although ERISA's language explicitly grants participants and bene-
ficiaries a right to bring a civil action, the statute itself is silent about
"important procedural aspects necessary to enforce a claimant's substan-
tive rights., 39 This omission was apparently the intent of Congress.
40
Congress did not establish specific procedures because it contemplated
that federal courts would "fashion a body of federal common law to gov-
ern ERISA suits.'4
ERISA preempts state law claims that "relate to" employee benefit
plans.42 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the vague term
"relates to" as applying to plans where there is a "connection" or "refer-
ence to" an ERISA plan43 that is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral.
'"
Thus, in determining the outcome of ERISA benefits suits, federal judges
are not restricted by state laws.
45
2. Obligations Created by ERISA
ERISA sets forth rules affording participants and beneficiaries
rights "at the plan level" and prior to adjudication in federal court.46 Spe-
cifically, a participant or beneficiary is entitled to:
(1) a clear explanation of the specific reasons for the denial [of bene-
fits], (2) the right to appeal that decision internally with the plan ad-
ministrator, and (3) a full and fair review of the claim on internal ap-
peal. [Additionally,] [t]he courts generally require the participant to
exhaust these internal remedies before proceeding to litigation.
47
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1461; see also Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137 (stating that
Congress met its goal of preventing abuses by "establishing standards for the administration of
employee benefit plans").
39. Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of Pursuing an
ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REv. 329, 332 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy III (emphasis added).
40. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
41. Scott, 754 F.2d at 1502; Kennedy 11, supra note 39, at 332. A claimant asserting a denial
of ERISA benefits claim faces procedural hurdles that appear inconsistent with ERISA's intent. Id.
at 332-33. Recall that ERISA seeks to protect participants and beneficiaries from abuses under
employee benefit plans. See id. at 331. Procedural hurdles that differ from one circuit court to the
next do not create a uniform body of law. See id. at 332. Moreover, such procedural hurdles conflict
with the policy of protecting participants and beneficiaries. See id. at 333.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
43. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
44. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
46. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1091.
47. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
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The civil actions that ERISA authorizes implicate three types of ob-
ligations or duties of organizations responsible for the administration of
employee benefit plans.4a First, there is a statutory duty to participants
and beneficiaries to pay benefits provided for in the plan.4 9 Second, there
is a statutory duty whereby persons who are fiduciaries may be held per-
sonally liable for breach of "any of the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon fiduciaries" under ERISA.50 That duty is owed to
the plan. 5 Lastly, federal common law imposes duties that are not statu-
tory.52 After an individual exhausts remedies at the plan level and a fed-
eral court finds that an employer breached a duty, the court may grant
relief developed in federal common law or as set forth in ERISA.
5
C. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA 's Language
Federal courts have struggled over the applicable standard of judi-
cial review for ERISA benefits suits. 54 Conflicting interpretations arose
even though the United States Supreme Court directed federal courts to
create a consistent body of "federal common law" to protect participants
in ERISA plans.55
1. Conflict Surrounding the Standard of Review for Administrative
Decisions
Federal courts encountered several obstacles in developing a consis-
tent standard to apply when reviewing administrative proceedings
involving employee benefit plans.56 Without specific guidelines in
ERISA, the majority of the circuits reviewed such administrative
proceedings under the arbitrary and capricious standard.57 Under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a court may only overturn
an administrative decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious or made in bad
faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a question
of law."58 Other circuits, however, favored the de novo standard of
48. See Conison II, supra note I1, at 14 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
51. Conison 11, supra note 11, at 14.
52. Id. Although these duties are not explicit in ERISA, the legislative intent to forge a federal
common law creates an implicit duty. See id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. Conison II, supra note 11, at 12-14.
54. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
55. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1094.
56. Id. at 1108.
57. Id. at 1108-09; see, e.g., Atkinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Trust Funds S. Cal. & Nev.,
833 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1987); Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir.
1985); Johnson v. Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1984); Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters Confer-
ence Pension & Ret. Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1977). Arbitrary means "founded on
prejudice -or preference rather than on reason or fact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed.
1999) (defining arbitrary).
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review, which allowed a court to review the record without deference to
the rulings of the administrator. 59
In support of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, sev-
eral courts likened the administrative proceedings of employee benefit
plans to those of administrative agencies. 6° Federal courts have also
adopted the standard from the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA").6 t One party supported this practice by pointing to Congress's
intent to incorporate most of LMRA's fiduciary law into the Act and to
the fact that both acts "impose[] a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries ....
However, a growing number of circuit courts criticized the arbitrary and
capricious standard.63 The circuits split over whether to apply the arbi-
trary and capricious standard when the decision-maker had a conflict of
interest and was not necessarily impartial.64 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 1989 to resolve this divergence among the
circuits in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.
65
2. Developing a Consistent Judicial Standard of Review Under
Federal Common Law
Since the advent of employee benefit plans, courts have struggled to
find the appropriate judicial standard of review for claims asserting a
denial of employee benefits.66 Before ERISA and Firestone, federal
courts turned to contract, labor, and trust laws for standards of review.
67
As a result, courts turned to these areas of law to form a federal common
law for ERISA benefits suits. 68 It is therefore instructive to examine the
justifications courts give for preferring the standard of review of one
source to another.69
Courts used contract law to develop a standard of review for em-
ployee benefit claims before federal statutes protected benefits. 70 Reason-
ing that employee benefit plans are unilateral contracts, courts looked to
the terms of the plan to determine whether the employer had a contrac-
59. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) (stating that the
de novo standard of review of trust law "is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee
benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA," and that in those pre-enactment decisions courts did
not defer to the employer or administrator but decided the case "as it would have any other contract
claim.").
60. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th
Cir. 1987) (noting that "[tihe arbitrary and capricious standard is familiar from administrative law,
where it is used to guide judicial review of discretionary decisions by administrative agencies.").
61. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.
62. Id.
63. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1109.
64. Id. at 1097, 1109-10.
65. Firestone, 485 U.S. at 105.
66. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1096.
67. Id. at 1096, 1101, 1107.
68. Id. at 1094-95.
69. Id. at 1096.
70. Id.
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tual obligation. 7' Early cases focused more on whether an enforceable
contract existed than on what was the appropriate judicial standard of
review.
72
Once federal labor laws controlled employee benefit rights of union
employees, courts began to rely on labor law for claims challenging de-
nials of employee benefits, even to non-union employees.73 Since federal
labor laws emphasized collective bargaining between an employer and
its employees, the courts began to reject the notion that employee benefit
plans should be reviewed under contract law because they could no
longer view benefit plans as gratuities. 74 Moreover, federal labor laws,
such as the LMRA, were silent about the appropriate scope of judicial
review for cases where participants or beneficiaries sued plan trustees.75
On these grounds, the federal courts developed the arbitrary and capri-
cious judicial standard of review and applied it in the context of ERISA
benefits suits.
76
After labor laws were enacted that protected employee benefits,
trusts began to serve as "funding vehicles for plan assets. 77 Further,
when ERISA was enacted, trust vehicles became mandatory for funding
retirement plans.78 Federal courts began interjecting principles of trust
law into ERISA benefit suits once plan administrators used trusts to fund
employee benefit plans.79 Under trust law, trustees may be granted, at the
discretion of the settlor,80 either discretionary or non-discretionary au-
thority.81 When a trustee is only found to have non-discretionary author-
ity, the courts generally review the case de novo.82 However, if the trus-
tee has discretionary authority, courts apply a more deferential standard
of review.
83
71. Id. at 1096-97.
72. Id. Under contract law, a gratuity from an employer does not create contractual rights that
are enforceable by an employee. See id. at 1096 (citing Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th
Cir. 1944)). However, if a contract existed courts "focused on the terms of the plan or promise by the
employer . I..." ld  at 1096-97 (citations omitted). Courts generally subject the interpretation of the
contract to a "reasonableness standard." Id. at 1099.
73. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1100-01.
75. ld. at 1101.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1104.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
79. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1107.
80. A settlor is the entity or person who creates a trust. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (7th
ed. 1999). Significantly, under ERISA, the plan sponsor or administrator, who in essence, acts as the
settlor of trusts and the trustee can be one and the same. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1104.
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3. The Supreme Court Chooses De Novo Review of Administrative
Proceedings
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,84 the United States Su-
preme Court held that, "[c]onsistent with established principles of trust
law," the de novo standard of review applies when courts hear claims
under section 1132(a)(1)(B).85 However, if the employee benefit plan
confers discretionary authority upon the plan administrator, the de novo
standard of review is not applicable. 86 In resolving this issue, the Court
addressed the sources of the conflict over the judicial standard of review
for ERISA benefits cases.87
First, the Court noted that the "wholesale importation of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard [from the LMRA] into ERISA is unwar-
ranted., 88 The arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the
LMRA was developed in order to provide courts jurisdiction over em-
ployees suing trustees.89 Since ERISA explicitly granted employees the
right to bring a civil action in federal court, the same standard of review
was not necessary to establish jurisdiction.90 Consequently, the Court
found the analogy between labor law and ERISA unpersuasive. 91
The Court then turned to trust law and found that several provisions
of the Act and the legislative history of ERISA indicate that "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. 92 Moreover,
the Court noted that "[t]he trust law de novo standard of review is consis-
tent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the
enactment of ERISA. 93 The Court, therefore, directed lower courts to
interpret the appropriate standard of review of employee benefit plans
based upon what authority was conveyed to the administrator or fiduci-
ary under the plan. 94 Under trust law precedent, the Court held that a de
novo standard of review applies in ERISA benefits suits where the bene-
fit plan does not confer authority on the plan administrator "to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."
95
Although the United States Supreme Court solved the quandary
over the standard of review for ERISA benefits suits, the Court did not
address whether lower courts may review facts outside of the plan ad-
84. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
85. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The Court limited its holding to the suits arising under 29 §
1132(a)(1)(B). Id. at 108, 115.
86. Id. at 115.
87. See id. at 108-12.
88. Id. at 109.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 112.
94. Id. at 115.
95. Id.
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ministrator's record.96 Prior to Firestone, under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review, federal courts denied litigants the opportunity
to admit evidence that had not been presented to the plan administrator.
97
Some courts favored such a rule because of practical considerations.98
Some of those considerations were conserving judicial resources and
minimizing litigation costs. 99 Further, under the LMRA, federal courts
limited the admissibility of evidence outside of the record. 00 Some
courts adopted labor law and applied the rule under ERISA. 10' Finally,
courts favored the rule limiting admissibility of such evidence because
plan fiduciaries were given "primary responsibility for claim processing"
under ERISA.1
0 2
However, in Firestone, the Court withdrew the initial deference that
many circuits gave to plan administrators.' °3 Moreover, since the Court
rejected the "wholesale" adoption of LMRA principles in ERISA bene-
fits suits, a comparison to the LMRA now seemed questionable.'1 4 Thus,
with little direction on this issue, the circuit courts have had to reinterpret
ERISA in light of the decision in Firestone.1
0 5
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON ADMISSIBILITY OF FACTS OUTSIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Since Firestone, most of the circuits have faced the issue of whether
evidence outside of the administrative record is admissible. 0 6 With def-
erence to administrators moderately withdrawn, 0 7 the circuit courts
faced the decision whether to allow litigants to admit facts unheard in the
administrative proceeding. °8 Some circuit courts have opted to allow
claimants to introduce evidence outside of the administrative record. 1°9
Others, however, have refused to admit such evidence." 0 Finally, other
96. See id. at 104-05; see Hogg, supra note 2, at 1581 & n.37.
97. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
98. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F.
Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
99. Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 820.
100. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1976); Danti v. Lewis, 312
F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
101. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1097.
102. Challenger v. Local Union No. 1,619 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1980).
103. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
104. Id. at 109-10.
105. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1584.
106. See cases cited infra notes 109-12.
107. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
108. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1575.
109. See, e.g., Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184 (3d Cir. 1991); Moon v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989).
110. See, e.g., S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1993); Pierre
v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./ Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1558 (5th Cir. 1991); Perry v.
Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990). But see VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing the district court to admit evidence where
the plan administrator failed to give proper notice and due process).
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circuit courts have chosen a "multi-factor" approach, reviewing evidence
outside the administrative record under certain circumstances."'
A. Tenth Circuit: Hall v. UNUM Life Insurance Co.
112
1. Facts
On June 5, 1993, Russana H. Hall ("Hall") dislocated her left
shoulder after falling from a bicycle." 3 At the time she was employed as
the Regional Vice President of Sales for Nova Information Systems, Inc.
("Nova")." 14 As an employee of Nova, Hall participated in a long-term
disability insurance plan.1 5 Under this plan, Hall was entitled to benefits
from the issuer of the insurance policy, UNUM Life Insurance Company
of America ("UNUM")."16
After Hall's administrative appeals to the plan administrator were
exhausted, Hall continued to experience pain in her shoulder."' Ulti-
mately, almost five years after her first surgery, Hall subjected herself to
two more surgeries in 1998.'18 Hall appealed the administrative decision
to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.' 9 At 'is-
sue in the district court was whether Hall was disabled and could not
perform her regular duties at Nova when UNUM terminated her benefits
and whether that disability continued through the time of trial and
"[could] reasonably be expected to continue for the indefinite future.','
120
The district court found in favor of Hall, citing the two surgeries under-
gone by Hall as "persuasive proof of disability."'
121
UNUM appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, asserting that the district court erred in considering evidence out-
side the administrative record.1 22 First, UNUM noted that the trial court
included depositions, medical records, and testimony of witnesses that
were not included in the administrative record. 23 Most importantly,
UNUM emphasized that the two surgeries Hall underwent in 1998 ap-
111. See, e.g., DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 66-67 (2d Cir.
1997); Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th
Cir. 1995); Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1994); Donatelli v. Home
Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017,
1026-27 (4th Cir. 1993).
112. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 97-CV-1828, 1999 WL 33485551, at *1 (D.
Colo. Nov. 1, 1999).
114. Hall, 1999 WL 3348551, at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id. at *7. Hall filed suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) and § 1132(a)(3); however,
neither party denied that Firestone applied. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200 n.2.
121. Hall, 1999 WL 33485551, at *8.
122. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200.
123. Id. at 1204.
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peared to be significant evidence in the eyes of the district court. 124 This
evidence was never part of the administrative record because Hall's final
appeal was exhausted in 1997.125
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected UNUM's assertion that evidence outside
of the administrative record could not be considered by a federal court
reviewing an ERISA case de novo. 12 6 Although the court rejected a rule
that allowed a federal court to consider any evidence on review, it noted
that a district court could review such evidence in limited circum-
stances. 127 Relying primarily on case law from the Fourth Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that evidence outside of the record might be admissi-
ble in the following circumstances:
Claims that require consideration of complex medical questions
or issues regarding the credibility of medical experts; the availability
of very limited administrative review procedures with little or no evi-
dentiary record; the necessity of evidence regarding interpretation of
the terms of the plan rather than specific historical facts; instances
where the payor and the administrator are the same entity and the
court is concerned about impartiality; claims which would have been
insurance contract claims prior to ERISA; and circumstances in
which there is additional evidence that the claimant could not have
presented in the administrative process.
128
The court cautioned that district courts are not required to admit
evidence outside of the administrative record in those circumstances.
29
Moreover, the court directed lower courts to "only admit the additional
evidence if the party seeking to introduce it can demonstrate that it could
not have been submitted to the plan administrator at the time the chal-
lenged decision was made.'
' 30
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit rejected two other ap-
proaches to the issue.' 3' One approach prohibits the inclusion of facts
outside of the administrative record. 32 The other view allows a claimant
to freely introduce evidence not previously admitted before the plan ad-
ministrator.133 The court rejected both rules because "[a]llowing a district
124. Id. at 1206-07.
125. See id. at 1200.
126. Id. at 1202-03, 1207.
127. Id. at 1202.
128. Id. at 1203 (quoting Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1027).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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court to exercise its discretion to admit additional evidence in certain
circumstances best reconciles [the] competing purposes [of ERISA]."' 34
The court gave three reasons that the Fourth Circuit's approach was
preferable to the others. 135 First, the court noted that unless it allows sup-
plemental evidence into the record under special circumstances, "we run
the risk of providing employees fewer procedural rights than they had
prior to the enactment of ERISA."'136 Second, admitting evidence outside
of the administrative record protects employee substantive rights "in
those limited circumstances where extra-record evidence is relevant and
necessary.137 Finally, the court emphasized that due to inconsistencies in
the extent of administrative records and the complex issues involved in
some ERISA cases, litigants may proffer additional evidence in appro-
priate circumstances. 38
B. Other Circuits
Hall mandates a multi-factor approach to decide whether evidence
outside of the administrative record is admissible in the Tenth Circuit.
139
In reaching that decision, the Tenth Circuit addressed the approaches of
three other circuits. 14° Because the court adopted one of those approaches
and rejected the other two,lnl it is useful to consider each in greater de-
tail.




The petitioner, Mr. Quesinberry, brought suit against Life Insurance
Company of North America ("LINA") for wrongful denial of benefits
under "an accidental death policy.' ' 143 Mr. Quesinberry's wife died fol-
lowing preparation for a procedure to confirm a diagnosis of multiple
sclerosis.'4a She was given an injection of Renografin to assist the doc-
tors read the results of a computerized tomography scan that they
planned to perform. 145 Within minutes Mr. Quesinberry's wife went into
cardiac arrest. 146 She was in a comatose state until she died on June 19,




138. Id. at 1202-03.
139. Id. at 1203.
140. Id. at 1201-03.
141. Id. at 1202.
142. 987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993).
143. Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1019.
144. Id. at 1020.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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1983.147 An autopsy revealed that she had neurosarcoidosis, a disease
which may have contributed to her reaction to the injection of Reno-
grafin. 1
48
Based upon the results of the autopsy, LINA refused to provide Mr.
Quesinberry with benefits from his wife's accidental insurance policy. 149
After exhausting all administrative appeals to the plan, Mr. Quesinberry
sought redress in a federal district court. 50 Here, he presented evidence
that was not reviewed by the plan administrator at LINA.' 5' The district
court concluded that under the de novo standard of review, Mr. Quesin-
berry was permitted to bring forth all admissible evidence, which in-
cluded evidence that was not before the plan administrator. 52 Moreover,
the district court found that LINA wrongfully denied Mr. Quesinberry
the benefits promised in the accidental life insurance policy.'
53
b. Decision
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected LINA's contention
that the district court erred when it allowed evidence outside of the ad-
ministrative record to be heard. 154 The court held that when "conducting
de novo review of ERISA benefits claims[, courts] should review only
the evidentiary record that was presented to the plan administrator or
trustee except where the district court finds that additional evidence is
necessary."'
155
The court then described the circumstances where admitting evi-
dence outside the administrative record may be appropriate. 56 The ex-
amples included cases involving complex medical questions and situa-
tions where the evidence does not exist at the time of the administrative
proceeding. 57 Even though circumstances may suggest that review of
evidence outside of the record is appropriate, a district court may exclude
that evidence. 158 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Quesinberry
directs lower courts to decide whether evidence outside the administra-
tive record should be admitted on a case-by-case basis. 59
147. Id.
148. id.
149. Id. at 1020-21.
150. Id. at 1020.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1021.
154. Id. at 1023, 1032.
155. Id. at 1026.
156. Id. at 1027.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1032.
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2. The Eleventh Circuit's Inclusion of Evidence Outside of the
Administrative Record: Moon v. American Home Assurance
Co. 160
a. Facts
While taking off from McCollum Airport in Cobb County, Georgia,
the airplane in which Robert Moon was riding crashed and he was
killed. 16 Moon was a vice president of Day Realty of Atlanta ("Day Re-
alty"). 162 Day Realty provided a group travel insurance policy which
provided accidental death insurance for officers of the corporation.1
61
The defendant, American Home Assurance Company ("American"),
denied Moon's widow benefits under the policy based on its belief that
Moon was not an officer of Day Realty.164 Moreover, American asserted
that even if Moon qualified as an officer of Day Realty, his widow was
not entitled to benefits because the purpose of Moon's trip was not busi-
ness related.165 The district court granted the widow's motion for sum-
mary judgment and American appealed. 166 On appeal, American argued
that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard of review. 1
67
b. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected American's conten-
tion that the district court erred in admitting evidence outside of the ad-
ministrative record. 168 The court found in favor of Moon's widow. 169 The
court held that limiting the evidence would be contrary to the notion of
de novo review.' 70 In addition, excluding evidence outside of the admin-
istrative record would afford employees less protection than they enjoyed
prior to the enactment of ERISA.17 ' Therefore, the court concluded that
there should not be any restrictions on the evidence courts consider in
ERISA cases.
172
160. 888 F.2d 86 (11 th Cir. 1989).






167. Id. at 88.
168. Id. at 89.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113-14).
172. See id.
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3. The Sixth Circuit's Exclusion of Evidence Outside of the Ad-
ministrative Record: Perry v. Simplicity Engineering'
73
a. Facts
Max Perry ("Perry") was employed at Simplicity Engineering
("Simplicity") from 1973 through 1985.174 For roughly ten years Perry's
performance was satisfactory. 175 However, in 1982 or 1983, Perry's work
performance deteriorated significantly due to alcohol abuse. 176 In fact,
Perry was hospitalized twice in 1984 for ailments associated with alcohol
abuse. 177 Ultimately, Simplicity became increasingly unsatisfied with
Perry's performance and terminated him on April 25, 1985.178
After his termination, Perry's alcohol abuse continued and he was
again hospitalized in January 1986. 179 Perry filed a claim for long-term
disability benefits with Simplicity based on his treatment.! 8 After re-
viewing his claim, the plan administrator denied his claim because Perry
was not disabled within the meaning of the plan during his employment
at Simplicity. 181 Perry challenged the administrative decision in district
court and sought to admit vocational evidence that was not reviewed by




The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Perry's contention that
the district court erred in excluding evidence that was outside of the ad-
ministrative record. 184 Although the Sixth Circuit noted that it was inap-
propriate for the district court to apply the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Firestone,
the court concluded that the error did not warrant remand to the district
court. 185 The court emphasized that even under a de novo standard of
review, the result would be the same.
186
The court next turned to Perry's assertion that the lower court erred
in not admitting vocational evidence that was outside the administrative
173. 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).







181. id. at 964-65.
182. Id. at 965.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 967.
185. Id. at 965-66.
186. Id. at 967.
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record.187 Before the Supreme Court decided Firestone, the Sixth Circuit
limited evidence to the administrative record in cases where it applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 88 However, even in light of Fire-
stone, the Sixth Circuit found that "the de novo review required by [Fire-
stone] is a de novo review of the record before the administrator or fidu-
ciary."'189 As a result, the court concluded that it was appropriate to ex-
clude the vocational evidence.
190
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's decision to expand the evidentiary scope of a de
novo review in certain ERISA benefits suits is a choice based on pol-
icy.' 91 When courts review evidence outside the record, they honor Con-
gress's intent to protect employees. 92 However, such a policy burdens
federal courts and increases litigation Costs. 19 3 Courts that exclude evi-
dence outside the administrative record provide more expedient proceed-
ings at a lower cost to the litigants. 194 However, this approach conflicts
with the holding of Firestone and overlooks the possibility that a plan
administrator could abuse an employee during the internal appeal. 9 5 Fi-
nally, courts that choose a multi-factor approach try to balance fairness
with prudent allocation of judicial resources. 196 The multi-factor ap-
proach is flexible; 197 yet, two circuits adopting the standard could treat
similarly situated employees disparately. This standard of review, how-
ever, is implicitly supported by the language of ERISA, the legislative
history of ERISA, and is appropriate as a matter of policy.
ERISA is silent on many issues, and the legislative history reveals
that Congress intended to grant federal courts the authority to develop a
federal common law. 198 Congress, therefore, gave substantial deference
to federal judges. Moreover, circumstances surrounding ERISA benefits
claims can vary dramatically, so judges should have the discretion to
decide whether to admit evidence outside the administrative record on a
case-by-case basis.' 99
187. See id. at 966-67.
188. Id. at 965 n. 1.
189. Id. at 966.
190. Id. at 967.
191. See Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
192. See Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989); 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) (2000).
193. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1577.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1590, 1597.
196. Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002).
197. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1993).
198. 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a body
of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans.").
199. Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025-26.
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A potential rule's impact on judicial resources is often a valuable
consideration when deciding whether to adopt it.2°° However, Congress
neither explicitly nor implicitly expressed an intention to use the Act to
201conserve judicial resources. Moreover, the argument that plan adminis-
trators are "closer to the facts" and consequently better situated to deter-
mine what evidence is relevant 202 is not supported by ERISA or its legis-
lative history. Deference to plan administrators should be approached
cautiously. ERISA is primarily created to protect participants and benefi-
203
ciaries of employee benefit plans from abusive plan administrators.Relying on administrators, therefore, ignores the very purpose of ERISA.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that considering evidence outside the
administrative record "would frustrate the goal of prompt resolution of
claims by the fiduciary under the ERISA scheme., 204 In direct conflict
with the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that excluding evidence
outside of the administrative record would "require us to impose a stan-
dard of review that would afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than [they enjoyed] before ERISA was enacted. 20 5
Neither the blanket rule excluding all evidence nor the blanket rule
admitting all evidence is sound. 206 Although the Sixth Circuit asserts that
judicial intervention would result in cumbersome review of administra-
tive records and frustrate the goals of ERISA, the court failed to substan-
tiate its contentions with facts.20 7 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit did not
give adequate consideration to the fact that ERISA was enacted to pro-
tect employees from the funding failures, fiduciary abuses, and vesting
inequities that plagued employee benefit plans until the 1970s.2 °8
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit's rule that all evidence outside of
the administrative record is admissible emphasizes the protection of em-
ployees, 209 but does not adequately address the problem of federal judges
usurping the role of plan administrators. This rule may prolong benefits
proceedings considerably as claims await federal review. 2  A rule that
200. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1590, 1597.
201. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4999-5001 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001). Congress was actually more con-
cemed with employees receiving inexpensive and expeditious dispute resolution over claims for
employee benefits. Id. at 4999-5000.
202. Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./ Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.
1991).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
204. Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990). Additionally, "[a] primary
goal of ERISA was to provide a method for workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over bene-
fits inexpensively and expeditiously." Perry, 900 F.2d at 967.
205. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89 (alteration in original) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,114 (1989)).
206. See Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576-77.
207. Id. at 1597-98.
208. Medill, supra note 33, at 5.
209. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89.
210. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1599.
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permits courts to review any evidence outside of the administrative re-
cord provides a loophole whereby claimants may circumvent the internal
review procedures of the particular plan.21' Finally, if a claimant prevails
in federal court and benefits are awarded, plan assets could be signifi-
cantly diminished by litigation expenses and unexpected benefit pay-
ments. 21 2 Thus, blanket rules admitting evidence or excluding evidence
do not adequately reconcile the conflicting interests in protecting em-
ployees and preventing burdensome and unnecessary litigation.
The Tenth Circuit found a solution that addresses the inadequacies
of both blanket rules. Under Hall, "[t]he party seeking to supplement the
record bears the burden of establishing why the district court should
exercise its discretion to admit particular evidence by showing how that
evidence is necessary to the district court's de novo review.' , 21 3 That bur-
den is heavy because "it is the unusual case in which the district court
should allow supplementation of the record., 214 Consequently, a claimant
who seeks to introduce evidence that did not exist at the time of the ad-
ministrative proceeding must overcome the burden of establishing the
need for the evidence.215
Employees are still protected from wrongful denial of benefits by
plan administrators under the Tenth Circuit's approach because it is still
possible for the employee to convince the court to admit evidence out-
side of the administrator's record . 6 Moreover, the interest in preserving
judicial resources is protected because the court need not sift through
additional, often sizable and extraneous, evidence if the claimant cannot
satisfy the initial burden of proof.21 7 Finally, the Tenth Circuit's rule
gives lower courts discretion that is consistent with Congress's objective
of providing guidance to plan administrators through ERISA that will
218prevent abuses of employees.
The position that the Tenth Circuit took in Hall on the admissibility
of evidence outside of the administrative record is the view the majority
of the circuits have taken. 219 The widespread acceptance and consistent
reasoning of a multi-factor approach make it likely that the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision will remain intact should the United States Supreme Court
choose to hear a case that raises the issue.
211. Id. at 1598-99.
212. Id. at 1599.
213. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1203 (emphasis added).
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 1202.
217. See id. at 1203.
218. Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
219. See Hall, 300 F.3d at 1201-02.
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CONCLUSION
Although Firestone established that the de novo standard of review
is appropriate in ERISA benefits suits, the Court's silence on the eviden-
tiary scope of review has caused a significant split between the cir-
cuits. 220 However, the spirit of ERISA and Congress's intent in enacting
ERISA suggest that the multi-factor approach is the most appropriate.22'
It is fair and just because it conserves judicial resources, yet preserves
the rights of employees. Thus, in order to remain true to the mandates of
ERISA, courts should adopt an approach similar to that articulated by the
Tenth Circuit.
Enzio Cassinis*
220. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1582-84.
221. See Hall, 300 F.3d at 1202.
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Denver College of Law.
[Vol. 80:3
THE CRITICAL EFFECT OF A PRETEXT JURY INSTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In June 2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Townsend
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,' and added the Tenth Circuit to the
short list of circuits that require a pretext jury instruction in employment
2discrimination cases. A pretext instruction is an instruction to the jury
explaining that if the plaintiff has met his prima facie burden, and the
jury finds an employer's justification for firing the plaintiff unconvinc-
ing, or a "pretext," the jury may infer that discrimination was the basis of
the termination and find for the plaintiff.
3
The subject of this survey is the critical effect of a judge giving a
pretext instruction to the jury. An examination of circuit cases reveals
that where a jury is informed that they are allowed to infer discriminatory
animus based on pretext, they consistently find in favor of the plaintiff.
Inversely, where they are not informed of the inference, they find for the
defendant. This survey contends that if a jury is not informed that they
are allowed to make an inference, they will not make it. There is a dis-
pute about allowing a pretext jury instruction: several circuits regularly
implement pretext instructions, 4 while many others choose not to alert
the jury that it is able to infer discrimination based on pretext.5 This sur-
vey will show which circuits are in favor of a pretext jury instruction,
which ones are not, and show that decisions in circuits that don't allow
the instruction find for defendants when the decision would not have
been for the defendant had there been a pretext jury instruction.
Disparate treatment claims, which encompass every ground on
which to base a discrimination claim (race, gender, religion, age, and
national origin), can be broken into two categories: direct evidence cases
and circumstantial evidence cases.6 A direct evidence case (also known
as a mixed-motive case) is a case where a plaintiff has concrete evidence
showing that the employer discriminated against her.7 In this situation the
employer's defense is to say that it had a mixed-motive in firing the
1. 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-39.
3. See id. at 1238, 1241.
4. See id. at 1237, 1241 (explaining that the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits are in favor of
a pretext jury instruction).
5. See id. at 1238-39 (explaining that the First, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are not
in favor of a pretext jury instruction).
6. See Hill v. Burrell Comm. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1995). See generally
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-55 (1989) (describing how courts apply either a
clear and convincing standard or a preponderance of the evidence standard when analyzing claims of
discrimination).
7. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-53 (identifying factors that if proven
constitute direct evidence of discrimination).
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plaintiff, i.e., there were several reasons for terminating the plaintiff,
only one of which was discriminatory.8 The burden in a direct evidence
case is placed on the employer to show that the plaintiff would have re-
ceived the same treatment even without the discriminatory motive.9 This
survey will not focus on direct evidence cases.
A circumstantial evidence case is a case where a plaintiff was fired
for reasons that she suspects are discriminatory, but has no concrete evi-
dence to show discriminatory animus.' 0 In this situation, the plaintiff
must present a prima facie case as established by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.' Once the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie require-
ments, the burden shifts to the employer to present legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating the plaintiff.12 At this point, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must show that the em-
ployer's proffered reasons are pretextual; or a false cover-up of discrimi-
natory animus.13 The jury then weighs the credibility of each party's ex-
planation, and disbelief of the employer's reasons can be sufficient to
carry a verdict for the plaintiff. 14
This survey will focus on circumstantial evidence cases where the
plaintiff has met her prima facie burden and the employer has proffered
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Further, this
survey will focus specifically on Townsend and the implications of the
Tenth Circuit's holding that, in such situations, a pretext instruction is
required. 15
8. See id. at 245-48.
9. See id. at 244-45.
10. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that a
plaintiff proved a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII even though the plaintiff did not
have concrete evidence of discrimination).
11. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03.
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
13. Id. at 804. It is important to note that no label for this distinction is satisfactory. There are
situations in a circumstantial or indirect evidence case where the plaintiff does have direct evidence
of discrimination. See Hill, 67 F.3d at 667. However, that direct evidence may be insufficient, on its
own, to carry a verdict for the plaintiff or even to move the case under the more favorable and plain-
tiff-friendly Price Waterhouse framework. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266-71 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[Under the Price Waterhouse framework] I do not think that the employer is entitled
to the same presumption of good faith [as under the McDonnell Douglas framework] where there is
direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration is forbidden by
Title VII."); 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 43
(Paul W. Cane, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996) ("[T]he plaintiff presumably must offer stronger evidence
to invoke the mixed-motive framework than that needed to establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks."). Thus, the direct/indirect distinction can be misleading and
even incorrect. I chose to use the direct/circumstantial labels because the cases examined in this
survey consist of situations where the plaintiff has some (albeit a minuscule amount of) direct evi-
dence showing discrimination, and I concede that the label chosen is subject to dispute and possibly
confusion.
14. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237.
15. See id. at 1237, 1239, 1241.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIRECT EVIDENCE
BURDEN SHIFTING FRAMEWORK
A. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
16
McDonnell Douglas is the landmark decision regarding disparate
treatment claims in employment law cases. 17 In McDonnell Douglas,
Percy Green worked for the defendant, McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
for eight years before he was "laid off in the course of a general reduc-
tion in [the defendant's] work force."'18 Green was a member of the Con-
gress on Racial Equality ("CRE") and "protested vigorously that his dis-
charge and the general hiring practices of [the defendant] were racially
motivated."' 9 Green, along with other members of the CRE, organized a
"stall-in, ' 0 where numerous vehicles were deliberately stalled on major
roads leading to the defendant's factory during the morning rush hour.21
Weeks later, Green and members of the CRE were involved in a "lock-
in,' 22 where a padlock was placed on the factory doors preventing the
defendant's employees from leaving.23
Three weeks after the lock-in, the defendant sought to hire qualified
mechanics, and Green, a qualified mechanic, immediately applied for re-
24employment. Defendant "turned down [Green], basing its rejection on
[Green's] participation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in.' 25 Green then filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
"claiming that [the defendant] had refused to re-hire him because of his
,,26race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement.
The district court found that the defendant's "refusal to rehire
[Green] was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstra-
tions and not on his legitimate civil rights activities. 27 The Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed,2 8 and the Supreme Court granted certioriari.29
16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17. William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not
Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 361, 361 (1998).




22. Id. at 795.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 796.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 797.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 798.
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In deciding McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court announced the
framework to be used in deciding Title VII employment discrimination
cases:
30
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
... of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. This may be
done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seek-
ing applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
31
After determining that the Green met his prima facie requirements,32 the
Court moved to its "burden shifting" framework.3 3
After a plaintiff has met his prima facie requirement, "[t]he burden
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection. ' 34 In this case, the de-
fendant contended that its reason for rejecting Green was his involve-
ment in the illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" protests.35 The Court found
that the defendant's "reason for rejection thus suffices to meet the prima
facie case, but the inquiry must not end here... [the plaintiff] must...
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the defendant's] stated rea-
son for [the plaintiffs] rejection was in fact pretext., 36 Thus, the plaintiff
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."
37
B. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
38
To modify the framework enumerated in McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burdine39 to determine whether,
"after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treat-
ment, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for the challenged employment action existed."4 The Court explained
30. "Indeed, McDonnell Douglas has been so influential that it has spread beyond
employment discrimination cases to employment actions brought under other types of federal and
state employment laws and to discrimination cases in contexts other than employment law." Corbett,
supra note 17, at 363-64.




35. See id. at 803.
36. Id. at 804.
37. Id. at 805.
38. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252.
40. Id. at 250.
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that the burden that shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff has met her
prima facie burden is a burden of production.41 "The burden that shifts to
the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. ''42 The Court further
explained that:
the defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff... If the defendant carries this burden of pro-
duction, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,
and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.
43
At this point in the opinion, the Court engaged in a technical exami-
nation of what happens next under the framework.44 The Court ex-
plained:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the vic-
tim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either di-
rectly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
45
It is this examination that caused confusion among the lower courts, and
that ultimately warranted the Court's 1993 decision in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.46
The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework is as
follows. A plaintiff must carry her prima facie burden of showing that
the factors requisite for a discrimination case exist.47 Upon carrying this
requirement, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions exist.48 This, however, is
merely a burden of production.49 The defendant need not persuade the
court that the proffered reasons were its actual motivation; the defendant
need only rebut the presumption of discrimination that was created when
41. See id. at 255.
42. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 254-55 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
44. See id. at 255-56.
45. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See generally Corbett, supra note
17, at 361 (examining the effect of the Burdine decision and the resulting St. Mary's decision).
47. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
48. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
49. See id. at 507.
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the plaintiff established her prima facie case.5° Upon meeting the burden
of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must then ei-
ther directly show that a discriminatory reason more likely was the true
motivation, or indirectly show that the reasons presented by the defen-
dant are a mere pretext to cover the defendant's true discriminatory mo-
tivations. 51
This was the framework in employment discrimination cases for
over a decade.52
C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
53
In this case, Melvin Hicks, a black man, was hired by St. Mary's
Honor Center in 1978 and promoted to a supervisory position in 1980.54
In 1983, St. Mary's conducted an administrative investigation that re-
sulted in extensive personnel shifts, and while Hicks retained his posi-
tion, two new supervisors were placed above him.55 "Prior to these per-
sonnel changes [Hicks] had enjoyed a satisfactory employment record,
but soon thereafter became the subject of repeated, and increasingly se-
vere, disciplinary actions. 56 Following a suspension, letter of reprimand,
and demotion, Hicks was fired for threatening his boss "during an ex-
change of heated words."57 Hicks then brought suit alleging that St.
Mary's had violated Title VII by "demoting and then discharging him
because of his race. 58 The district court found for St. Mary's and the
Eighth Circuit reversed.59
The Supreme Court used this opportunity to add a caveat to the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework: "although the McDonnell
Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant,
'[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff." '6° The Supreme Court added the caveat because of the way
that the district and circuit court analyzed the case below. 61 The district
court "found that the reasons [St. Mary's] gave were not the real reasons
for [Hicks'] demotion and discharge., 62 It "nonetheless held that [Hicks]
had failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the
50. See id.
51. See id. at 507-08.
52. Burdine was decided in 1981 and St. Mary's was decided in 1993. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248;
St. Mary's, 509 U.S. 502.
53. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
54. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 504.
55. Id. at 504-05.




60. Id. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
61. See id. at 507-09 (comparing the analyses of the district and circuit court).
62. Id. at 508.
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determining factor in [St. Mary's] decision to... dismiss him. '' 63 Thus,
"although [Hicks] ha[d] proven the existence of a crusade to terminate
him, he ha[d] notFroven that the crusade was racially rather than person-
ally motivated." The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that "[o]nce
[Hicks] proved all of [St. Mary's] proffered reasons for the adverse em-
ployment actions to be pretextual, [Hicks] was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law., 65 The Eighth Circuit came to this conclusion by reason-
ing that:
[b]ecause all of defendant's proffered reasons were discredited, de-
fendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for
their actions. In other words, defendants were in no better position
than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established
inference that they had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on
the basis of his race.66
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis with an
emphatic, "that is not so. ''67 The Court explained that the defendant's
burden of production contains no credibility assessment, and that merely
producing evidence tending to rebut plaintiff s contentions, regardless of
68weight, satisfies the burden of production.
At this point, the Court analyzed what it said in Burdine versus
what it meant.69 The Court began by explaining that when it used the
term "pretext" it meant "pretext for discrimination," 70 and that "a reason
cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-
son."71 So, at every point in Burdine where the Court mentioned "pre-
,,72
text," the reader is to understand it as "pretext for discrimination.
Next, the Court explained what it meant when it said that after a de-
fendant has proffered reasons for its decision, the plaintiffs burden to
show that the proffered reasons are untrue "merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. 73 When the Court said "merges," it did not mean that
"the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim
of intentional discrimination' is replaced by the mere burden of 'demon-




66. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.
1992)).
67. Id. at 509.
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text, for the disputed language from Burdine.
70. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515-16.
71. Id. at 515.
72. See id. at516.
73. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
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ployment decision. 74 The Court meant "that proving the employer's
reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater
enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimina-
tion. 75
Finally, the Court asserted that its statement in Burdine, that a plain-
tiff may prove intentional discrimination "indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, ' 76 was inad-
vertent dicta,77 and that disproof of a defendant's proffered reason is an
auxiliary, rather than independent, means of proving unlawful discrimi-
nation.78
The final result of the St. Mary's decision is that a plaintiff must
first prove her prima facie case under the framework established by
McDonnell Douglas.79 A light burden of production is then placed on the
defendant to show evidence of non-discriminatory intent.80 Regardless of
the weight or credibility of this evidence, a plaintiff is entitled to a judg-
ment only if the evidence, taken as true, would not allow the conclusion
that there was a non-discriminatory rationale behind the adverse action
and the plaintiff has proved her prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence.8' So, in addition to producing a prima facie case, and on
top of showing that the defendant's reasons are mere pretext, a plaintiff
must produce evidence that shows that discrimination actually occurred,
because finding pretext is auxiliary to finding discrimination, not
independent.82
Following the St. Mary's decision, it was unclear whether pretext
alone could justify a verdict for the plaintiff because Burdine indicated
that pretext alone was sufficient 83 and St. Mary's indicated that the
statement in Burdine was "inadvertent dictum.,
84
D. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.85
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Reeves to resolve the ambigui-
ties of the St. Mary's decision; specifically, the indications that "pretext-
plus" was the standard in employment discrimination cases.86 So, in
Reeves the Court set out to determine "whether a defendant is entitled to
74. Id.
75. Id. at 517.
76. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
77. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 518.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 506; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie framework).
80. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
81. Id. at 509.
82. See id. at 518.
83. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
84. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 518.
85. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
86. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 137.
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judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists exclusively
of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation for its action. 87
In 1995, plaintiff Roger Reeves was 57 and had worked for defen-
dant Sanderson Plumbing Products for 40 years.88 Reeves was responsi-
ble for recording the hours the people under his supervision worked and
for reviewing weekly reports that listed the hours worked for each em-
ployee.89 In the summer of 1995, Caldwell, Reeves's direct supervisor,
informed Sanderson's executive officials that production was down in
Reeves's department because employees under Reeves's supervision
were often absent and coming in late and leaving early. 90 However, be-
cause Reeves's records indicated no problems, Sanderson executives
ordered an audit of Reeves's department.9' The investigation revealed
that Reeves and his co-supervisors made "numerous timekeeping errors
and misrepresentations. 9 Following the audit, Sanderson executives
recommended that the company fire Reeves and one of his co-
93supervisors.
Reeves filed suit, contending that he had been fired because of his
age.94 At trial, Sanderson argued that it "fired [Reeves] due to his failure
to maintain accurate attendance records. 95 Reeves attempted to demon-
strate that Sanderson's explanation was pretext for age discrimination by
introducing evidence that his records were accurately maintained and,
further, that his immediate supervisor had "demonstrated age-based ani-
96mus" in his dealings with Reeves.
The district court, after twice denying Sanderson's motions for
judgment as a matter of law, instructed the jury that "if the plaintiff fails
to prove age was a determinative or motivating factor in the decision to
terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the defendant." 97 The jury
"found that [Sanderson's] age discrimination had been 'willfu[l]"' and












97. Id. at 138-39.
98. Id. at 139 (alteration in original) (quoting Reeves, 197 F.3d at 691).
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for Reeves in the amount of $70,000, including "$35,000 in liquidated
damages based on the jury's finding of willfulness." 99
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves "had not introduced
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion."' ° The Fifth Circuit noted that Reeves may have presented suffi-
cient evidence for a finding of pretext, but that pretext alone was not
sufficient to resolve the ultimate issue of whether Reeves presented evi-
dence sufficient to show that age was the motivating factor in Sander-
son's employment decision.'0 '
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, noting that the circuit
court "misconceived" the St. Mary's decision in reversing the district
court.'0 2 In fact, the Court spent two pages explaining what it meant
when it decided St. Mary'S. °3 The Court started by stating that it "held
that the fact-finder's rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for its action does not compel judgment for the plain-
tiff." °4 The Court continued: "In other words, '[i]t is not enough ... to
disbelieve the employer, the fact-finder must believe the plaintiffs ex-
planation of intentional discrimination."' 0 5 To get to "this conclusion,
however, [the Court] reasoned that it is permissible for the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the em-
ployer's explanation. ' °6 The Court noted:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. . . .Moreover, once the em-
ployer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be
the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. 1
07
The Court then resolved the St. Mary's ambiguity by concluding
that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."' 0'
Resting on this analysis, the Court held that "because a prima facie case
and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may permit a




102. Id. at 146.
103. See id. at 146-48.
104. Id. at 146.
105. Id. at 147 (quoting St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 519).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 148.
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premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent
evidence of discrimination. ' ' 1 9
The ambiguity of the St. Mary's decision has been resolved, and a
finding that the employer's justification was a pretext, combined with
prima facie evidence, is sufficient for a jury to find in favor of a plain-
tiff.10° The split that now exists between the circuits is over whether the
jury should be informed that a finding of pretext (assuming the plaintiff
has met her prima facie burden) is sufficient to find in favor of the plain-
tiff."'
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: REQUIRING A JURY INSTRUCTION INDICATING
THAT INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PRETEXT Is ALLOWED
A. Tenth Circuit: Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co."12
Prior to the Townsend decision, the Tenth Circuit had not dealt spe-
cifically with whether to require a pretext jury instruction in employment
discrimination cases. 1 3 Townsend is the focus of this survey because of
its holding that a pretext jury instruction is required in employment dis-
crimination cases that involve circumstantial evidence. 1 4 Townsend
aligns the Tenth Circuit with the Second and Third Circuit in holding that
a pretext jury instruction is required in circumstantial evidence employ-
ment discrimination cases." 5
1. Facts
John Townsend began working for defendant Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company in 1986.'16 Over the course of eleven years, Town-
send, a black man, enjoyed numerous merit raises and performance bo-
nuses."17 Citing Townsend's "poor performance," the defendant began
demoting Townsend, and then nine months later fired him." 8 Town-
send's supervisor "informed Townsend that he could either resign or be
demoted to ... a non-management position."" 9 Townsend accepted the
demotion, and a white female, Maureen O'Connor, filled his manage-
ment position. 20 Eight months later, O'Connor terminated Townsend.'
2'
109. Id. at 149.
110. Id.
111. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237-39.
112. 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1237.
114. See id. at 1241.
115. Id.; Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1998); Cabrera v.
Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994).
116. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1234.
117. See id. at 1232, 1234.
118. Id. at 1234.
119. Id. at 1235.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1236.
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Townsend filed an action in which he alleged that "he had been de-
moted and ultimately fired because of his race ... and that he had been
retaliated against for complaining of race discrimination."' 122 He argued
that even though he objectively outperformed Chris Gold, a white man
who held a similar position, Gold was made eligible for a promotion and
Townsend was not. 23 Further, Townsend contended that he was criti-
cized by his supervisor for "giving favorable treatment to black subordi-
nates." 124 The defendant maintained that Townsend was fired because he
"failed to increase sales in his territory" and "failed to show up on time
for scheduled meetings."'
125
The case went to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant. 12 6 Townsend "filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that
the district court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue of
pretext." 27 The district court denied the motion. 1
28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit's primary motivation for overruling the district
court was the high likelihood that a jury would be unable to correctly
apply facts without a jury instruction.1 29 The Tenth Circuit noted that
even after the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split over "pretext-
plus" in St. Mary's, federal courts were still not awarding verdicts to
plaintiffs in pretext cases. 130 Rather than trust juries to reach the correct
conclusion on their own in complex employment discrimination pretext
cases, the Tenth Circuit decided to require a pretext jury instruction in
circumstantial evidence cases. 131 After examining decisions in other cir-
cuit courts, the Tenth Circuit believed that the critical issue was "whether
in the absence of any instructions about pretext, 'the jury found for the
defendant because it believed the plaintiff could not prevail without af-
firmative evidence that his race was a motivating factor in the challenged
employment decisions. '"1 32 Persuaded that juries were being led astray,
the Tenth Circuit held that "in cases such as this, a trial court must in-
122. Id. at 1233.
123. Id. at 1234.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1233.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1241 ("[T]his is a difficult matter for the courts, and would certainly be difficult
for a jury. We consider the danger too great that a jury might make the same assumption that the
Fifth Circuit did in Reeves [v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), that
finding that the defendant's explanation was a pretext was not a sufficient basis for a finding in favor
of the plaintiff].").
130. Id. at 1240-41. "Pretext plus" was a theory that said that "a jury's rejection of an em-
ployee's proffered explanation could not, by itself, suffice to show discriminatory motive." Id. at
1240.
131. Id. at 1241.
132. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 10,
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3055)).
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struct jurors that if they disbelieve an employer's proffered explanation
they may--but need not--infer that the employer's true motive was dis-
criminatory.' 33
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Townsend indicates that if a plaintiff
meets her prima facie burden, a jury may infer discrimination if the em-
ployer is unable to convince the jury of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
rationale. 134 More importantly, the Tenth Circuit now requires that a jury
must be informed that they are allowed to infer discriminatory animus
from the circumstances alone.
135
B. Other Circuits: No Pretext Jury Instruction Required
1. First Circuit: Fite v. Digital Equipment Corp. 1
36
a. Facts
Plaintiff David Fite was fired after twenty years of employment
with the defendant, Digital Equipment Corporation, because of "substan-
dard" performance. 137 Fite filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that he was discharged
because of his age, 53, and disability, a chemical dependence on co-
caine.1
38
In the district court a jury found against Fite on his discrimination
and retaliation claims.' 39 The jury was not given a pretext instruction.'n
b. Decision
On appeal Fite argued that "the jury should have been told affirma-
tively that a prima facie case, coupled with finding of pretext, would
permit the jury to infer discrimination." 14 1 The First Circuit held that
"while permitted, we doubt that such an explanation is compulsory."' 142
The First Circuit is thus in alignment with Reeves: "'[T]he falsity of the
employer's explanation' may permit the jury to infer a discriminatory
motive but does not compel such a finding.' ' 143 So, despite being aligned
with the Supreme Court by allowing inference of discrimination based on
pretext, a pretext jury instruction is not mandated in the First Circuit.
144
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. 232 F.3d 3 (1 st Cir, 2000).
137. Fite, 232 F.3d at 4-5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at5.
140. See id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
144. See id.
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2. Seventh Circuit: Gehring v. Case Corp. 1
45
a. Facts
Plaintiff Dale Gehring was discharged in a general lay-off scheme
during a downsizing. 146 Gehring contended that his age, 52, was the de-
terminative factor in defendant Case Corporation's decision to fire
him. 147 The jury found in favor of the defendant, and Gehring appealed




The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding
that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies exclu-
sively to pretrial proceedings and "not to the jury's evaluation of evi-
dence at trial."' 149 The court continued its analysis with the proposition
that pretext itself is not an element to be examined:
Once the judge finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum neces-
sary demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that the defendant has
produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus
has served its purpose, and the only remaining question--the only
question the jury need answer--is whether the plaintiff is a victim of
intentional discrimination. 1
50
Thus, in the Seventh Circuit, not only is a pretext instruction not allowed,
but an inquiry into pretext itself is impermissible outside of pretrial mo-
tions.15'
3. Seventh Circuit: Russell v. Acme-Evans Co.'52
a. Facts
Plaintiff John Russell, a 59-year old black man, was hired by the
Acme-Evans Company in 1975, and from 1977 to 1990 Russell worked
as "mill sweeper," a job that he enjoyed and that was considered light
work.153 By 1990, Russell had worked at the plant longer than anyone
else. 154 In 1990, new supervisors, who were white, began giving Russell
"warnings for failing to wash his hands and for other infractions of work
145. 43 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1994).
146. Gehring, 43 F.3d at 342.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 342-43.
149. Id. at 343.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 344.
152. 51 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995).




rules."' t5 5 In 1992, when Russell was 59 years old, the management trans-
ferred Russell from mill sweeper to "skid wrapper," "a more strenuous
and monotonous job."'156 Russell claimed that "he was transferred to
make room for a young white man who wanted to be 'downgraded' from
assistant miller to mill sweeper."' 157 Soon after Russell was transferred,
he applied for the vacant assistant miller position, "but was turned down
in favor of a young white man."' 158 In 1993, Russell applied to work
"overtime as a member of the blow-down crew,"' a four person group
that cleans the grain elevator. 59 Again, Acme declined Russell's applica-
tion, "giving the opportunity for overtime work to a younger white
man."IN
Russell contended that the denial of the blow-down opportunity, his
transfer to skid wrapper, and the denial of his application for the assistant
miller position were motivated by race and age discrimination.1 61 Acme
offered several nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 62 First, Acme
contended that Russell was transferred to skid wrapper because, "in light
of his disciplinary infractions, he required closer supervision than was
feasible for a sweeper."'' 63 Second, he "had been turned down for the
assistant miller job because he was not trained for it and the white man
who was given the job 'demonstrated mechanical aptitude' and 'worked
well with others. '' 164 Further, Acme noted that they offered the assistant
miller job to a black man "before the white man, but [he] had turned it
down."' 65 Finally, Acme contended that Russell was turned down for the
blow-down crew because Russell was already working a substantial
amount of overtime and "because at 190 pounds he was too heavy" for
one of the crew's critical positions. 66 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Acme. 167
b. Decision
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the only evidence
submitted in opposition to the employer's motion for summary judgment
is the plaintiffs own testimony,"'' 68 and that the evidence "required to
contradict the employer's evidence is rarely within the plaintiff s compe-
155. Id.












168. Id. at 68.
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tence to give."169 Russell insisted that his claim should go to a jury, hop-
ing that a jury would infer discriminatory animus from the employer's
pretextual reasons for its actions. 7 ° The Seventh Circuit, however, af-
firmed the district court, concluding that a jury trial was not necessary
because "[ifn the face of Acme-Evans' uncontested grounds for transfer-
ring Russell, and with no evidence that Acme-Evans' true motivation
was racial, no reasonable jury could infer from doubt ... that the true
motivation was indeed race." 171 The circuit court went on to state: "There
is no basis for confidence that the defendant did not discriminate against
Russell on account of his race and age; it is simply that Russell has not
presented enough evidence ... to withstand the company's motion.' 72
Finally, the court stated, "[T]here is nothing in our power to do that
would lighten the burden of the employee without depriving the em-
ployer of procedural rights."'
173
4. Seventh Circuit: Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc. 1
74
a. Facts
In this case, the plaintiff, Sandra Hill, was fired from her position as
Director of Print Production at Burrell Communications Group.
7 5
Burrell contended that the reason it fired Hill was "decline in print pro-
duction volume" and necessary "personnel cutbacks."' 176 However, Hill, a
white woman, contended that Burrell, an advertising agency with a focus
on minority markets and primarily minority employees, fired her based
on reverse discrimination. 77 Hill filed suit.' 78 To back her contention,
Hill introduced evidence at trial that shortly after her departure, Burrell
hired Roxanne Hubbard, a black woman, for the position of Print Pro-
duction, Supervisor, with substantially the same responsibilities as Hill,
even though Burrell said that it had eliminated her position.179 Hill also
introduced evidence of a conversation in which her supervisor stated to





171. Id. at 70.
172. Id. at 70-71.
173. Id. at 71.
174. 67 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1995).




179. See id. at 667.
180. See id. This is a situation where the plaintiff did introduce some direct evidence (what the
supervisor said). However, this case falls under the indirect or circumstantial evidence rubric, and is
an example of why the "circumstantial evidence," rather than "indirect evidence" label, is more
appropriate and less confusing.
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The district court granted Burrell's motion for summary judgment
"on the ground that plaintiffs position was eliminated and her employ-
ment was terminated because of a steady decline in print production
business. '18 1 "[T]he district Judge stated that Hill had not presented suf-
ficient evidence to demonstrate that Burrell's proffered legitimate reason
for firing her was pretextual."'
' 82
b. Decision
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 83 The court concluded, first, that the
supervisor's ambiguous statement to Burrell's personnel administrator
could not lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the statement
"reveals a discriminatory intent."'' 84 Second, the court did not find
Burrell's hiring of Roxanne Hubbard convincing because "the evidence
shows that Hubbard's duties as supervisor were not identical to Hill's
duties as director."' 85 Therefore, "Hubbard was not given Hill's position
but instead received the lesser title and duties of Print Production Super-
visor with a lower salary than Hill."' 86 The Seventh Circuit concluded,
despite circumstantial evidence to the contrary, that Hill had "presented
no evidence to contradict defendant's showing that the desire to reduce
costs motivated Hill's termination."'
' 87
5. Eighth Circuit: Moore v. Robertson Fire Protection District
88
a. Facts
The Robertson Fire District was seeking a fire chief. 89 A total of
nineteen individuals submitted applications, and, after reviewing re-
sumes, the fire district selected a few individuals for interviews, one of
whom was black. 90 Cornelius Moore, a black man, was not selected for
an interview.' 9' Moore initiated an action "after discovering that the
board had hired David Tilley, a white man who did not meet many of the
requirements placed in the ad."'
192
The jury instructions submitted by the district court were as follows:
"Your verdict must be for Plaintiff . . . and against Defendant . . . on
Plaintiff s claim of race discrimination if all the following elements have
been proved by the greater weight of the evidence: [fjirst, Defendant
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 670.
184. Id. at 669.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 670.
187. Id.
188. 249 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2001).
189. Moore, 249 F.3d at 787.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 788.
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failed to hire plaintiff; and [s]econd, Plaintiffs race was a motivating
factor in Defendant's decision. 193 Moore requested that a pretext in-
struction be added to "motivating factor."' 94 His suggested instruction
read: "You may find that Plaintiffs race was a motivating factor in de-
fendant's decision not to hire plaintiff, if it has been proved by a greater
weight of the evidence that Defendant's stated reasons for its decision
are not the true reason, but are a "pretext' [sic] to hide discriminatory
motivation."' 95 The district court rejected Moore's proposed instructions
and he appealed, claiming that the refusal was an error.' 96 Moore argued
"that the omission of this instruction impermissibly prevented the jury
from considering whether the Fire District's reasons for not interviewing





The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision because
"[t]he instructions provided by the District Court presented the proper
legal standard for the jury's consideration, namely, whether Moore's race
was a motivating factor in his non-selection."198 The Eighth Circuit,
however, is not averse to pretext in general.199 The court noted that "[i]n
deciding the 'motivating factor' question, the jury was free to consider
Moore's evidence of pretext,' '200 and "although the District Court elected
not to submit a pretext instruction, it in no way prevented Moore from
presenting his pretext arguments to the jury. '2°
6. Eleventh Circuit: Palmer v. Board of Regents
202
a. Facts
Judy Palmer was a temporary assistant professor at Kennesaw State
203University. She applied for a permanent position in the foreign lan-
guage department, but was not selected.2° Palmer then filed suit, con-
tending that the University did not hire her because she was Jewish.20 5
Palmer sought to introduce evidence tending to show that the Univer-
sity's proffered reasons were pretextual; specifically, she wanted a wit-
ness to testify that "two members of the search committee had stated that
hiring [Palmer] could be problematic because she was Jewish and her
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 788-89.
197. Id. at 789.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 791.
200. Id. at 789.
201. Id. at 791.
202. 208 F.3d 969 (11 th Cir. 2000).
203. Palmer, 208 F.3d at 971.
204. Id. at 971-72.
205. Id. at 972.
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husband was a lawyer. ' 2°6 The district court did not allow this testi-
mony.2 °7
At trial, Palmer submitted a jury instruction that "specifically expli-
cated that if the jury found that the reasons offered by the University
System to justify its hiring decision were pretextual, it would be author-
ized to find intentional religious discrimination on the part of the Univer-
sity System., 208 The court declined to give Palmer's instruction, and the
209jury found in favor of the University.
b. Decision
On appeal, Palmer argued that the jury instructions used by the dis-
trict court were "not properly balanced because 'the jury was not specifi-
cally informed that it was authorized to find for the Plaintiff without any
additional evidence of discrimination.' 2'0 The Eleventh Circuit did not
accept this contention, explaining:
The argument that the jury may draw a permissible inference of in-
tentional religious discrimination if it disbelieves the University Sys-
tem's stated reason for not hiring Palmer is a logical extension of our
prior decisions . . . that the jury is entitled to infer discrimination
from pretext.
However, in this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
its instructions to the jury.
211
C. Other Circuits: Pretext Jury Instruction Required
1. Second Circuit: Cabrera v. Jakabovitz
21 2
a. Facts
A landlord, Jakabovitz, was suspected of employing discriminatory
practices in evaluating applicants for his apartment complexes.2t 3 In sum,
white people inquiring about housing were given applications and tours,
while members of minority groups who inquired about the same apart-
ments were told there were no openings or, alternatively, were steered
towards neighborhoods composed primarily of minorities.1 4 The jury
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 972-73.
209. Id. at 973.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 974-75.
212. 24 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1994).
213. Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 378.
214. Id. at 377-79.
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found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that Jakabovitz discriminated
against two minority applicants in violation of Title VII.
215
b. Decision
The Second Circuit stated that if a defendant produces evidence to
rebut a plaintiff's prima facia case, the members of the jury must be in-
structed that they are entitled to infer that the plaintiff has met his burden
of proving discrimination if they disbelieve the defendant's rebuttal.2 6
On appeal, Jakabovitz argued that "the [c]ourt erred in instructing the
jury that he bore the burden of establishing that race played no role in his
decision not to show an apartment to the African-American or Latino
tester.,217 The district court had given the following jury instruction:
[A] defendant must establish that his decision not to offer an avail-
able apartment to plaintiff was based completely on considerations
other than race or national origin, that is[,] the defendant must show
that race played no role whatsoever in his decision not to afford the
plaintiff access to an available apartment.
218
The Second Circuit concluded that the lower court's instruction was er-
roneous.2 9 The Second Circuit found, however, that "[b]ecause of the
[district] [clourt's extensive and repeated instructions that the plaintiff
bore the burden of proving discrimination ...the jury could not have
been led astray by the [c]ourt's brief comment to the contrary.
' 220




Associates Financial Services Company ("AFSC") hired Deborah
222Zimmermann in 1996 as a Business Development Director. During her
employment, Zimmermann "worked out of her home, faxing weekly
progress reports" to her supervisor.2 3 In April 1997, ASFC hired
Stephen Haslam to be Zimmermann's new supervisor.224 Haslam ex-
pected a different, "more proactive," work product, and Zimmermann's
duties became more involved and less independent.225 Zimmermann
worked for Haslam for less than two months, and "[o]n Haslam's fifty-
215. Id. at 379.
216. Id. at 382.
217. Id. at 383.
218. Id. (alterations in original).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 384.
221. 251 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2001).
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first day, he fired Zimmermann. 226 She "testified that when she asked
Haslam to explain why she was being fired, he insisted that it 'had noth-
ing to do with [her] performance,' but explained instead that she 'didn't
have a good relationship' with .. one of her supervisors." 227 However,
that supervisor "did not speak with Haslam about Zimmermann prior to
her firing., 228 Further, Haslam entered "inferior performance" as the rea-
son for Zimmermann's firing on her last payroll entry.229
Zimmermann, however, "had exceeded her goals for the second
quarter of 1997" by about six percent. 230 Additionally, the first time
Zimmermann met Haslam face-to-face was when she was fired, and she
"had never received any warnings or criticism of her performance from
Haslam or any other supervisors prior to being fired.",23' Further,
Zimmermann was 49 when she was fired and she "was replaced by
Stephen Mitchell, a slightly younger male. 232 Then, "a week after firing
Zimmermann, Haslam recommended the termination of another of the
three female Business Development Directors. 233 During that same time
period, no male Business Development Directors were fired.234
"Zimmermann filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that she was
terminated because of her sex and age. 235 The jury, after receiving a
pretext jury instruction, returned a verdict for Zimmermann on her gen-
der discrimination claim, "awarding $165,000 in back pay, $50,000 in
compensatory damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.2 36 The
district court reduced the damages and entered judgment for
Zimmermann "in a total amount of $452,979. '237
b. Decision
The Second Circuit framed the issue this way:
The evidence in this case plainly permitted the jury to infer that
the Defendant's proffered reason for her discharge--deficient work
performance--was pretextual. Therefore, the issue as to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence is whether the record as a whole, including
whatever reasonable inference the jury could draw from the proffer









235. Id. at 380.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 383.
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of a false reason for the discharge, permitted the required ultimate
finding of discrimination.
238
The court also noted that "only occasionally will a prima facie case plus
pretext fall short of the burden a plaintiff carries to reach a jury on the
ultimate question of discrimination. 239 In this light, the court affirmed
the jury's finding of discrimination based on pretext.2 4°
Zimmerman presented evidence that she was fired for reasons that
Haslam could not explain.241 She further showed that Haslam had dem-
onstrated discriminatory animus against other female employees by rec-
ommending their termination. 242 There was only circumstantial evidence
of discrimination in this case. However, in the Second Circuit, this was
deemed sufficient to support a finding of discrimination.243
3. Third Circuit: Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg
244
a. Facts
Edward Smith alleged that his age, 61, was the dispositive factor in
his employer's decision not to renew his employment contract.245 In
1989, Smith was hired as Borough Manager of Wilkinsburg under a five-
246year employment contract. At the expiration of that contract, the Bor-
ough informed Smith that it would not renew his contract, "but that he
,,247was welcome to reapply for the job along with other applicants.
Smith informed "several council members that he was interested in re-
taining his position, [but] he did not formally submit an application." 248
After the Borough hired Thomas Leach, age 37, Smith applied in writing
for the Borough Manager position.249
When Smith brought suit, the Borough first defended itself by con-
tending that Smith's "performance on the job had been inadequate. '25 °
However, the Borough changed its position after Smith introduced evi-
dence that the Borough had never previously criticized Smith's job per-
formance and Smith showed that "the fiscal health of the Borough had
improved markedly during his tenure., 251 Instead, the Borough explained
238. Id. at 381.
239. Id. at 382 (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.
2001).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 379-80.
242. See id. at 379.
243. See id. at 381-82.
244. 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998).
245. Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d at 274.








"that it did not renew Smith's contract because Smith had not timely
applied for the position. 252
At trial, Smith "requested that the court instruct the jury that it could
infer intentional discrimination if it found the Borough's reasons for not
renewing the contract to be false or not credible. 253 The district judge
"denied Smith's request... stating: '[I]t is error for me to instruct on that
. ..for me to give a pretext instruction would be an error, simple as
that."' 254 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Borough.
255
b. Decision
On appeal, the Third Circuit engaged in an extensive analysis of the
necessity of a pretext jury instruction.256 The court noted that "a finding
,,257
of pretext was a permissible basis for a verdict of discrimination.
Based on this foundation, the Third Circuit stated:
[W]e join the Second Circuit in holding that the jurors must be in-
structed that they are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's
ultimate burden of demonstrating intentional discrimination by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence can be met if they find that the facts
needed to make up the prima facie case have been established and
they disbelieve the employer's explanation for its decision.
258
In addition, the Third Circuit explained that under the district court's jury
instruction:
[T]he juror's who found no evidence fitting the examples of circum-
stantial evidence .... but who disbelieved the employer's explana-
tion[,] could reasonably conclude that there was no evidence on
which they would be permitted to base a plaintiff's verdict. This con-
clusion would.., be incorrect as a matter of law.
Without a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's delibera-
tions will depend on whether the jurors are smart enough or intuitive
enough to realize that inferences of discrimination may be drawn
from the evidence establishing plaintiffs prima facie case and the
pretextual nature of the employer's proffered reasons for its action. It





256. See id. at 278-8 1.
257. Id. at 279.
258. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
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need some instruction in the permissibility of drawing that infer-
259ence.
III. ANALYSIS: A JURY WILL NOT INFER DISCRIMINATION FROM
PRETEXT IF IT Is NOT INSTRUCTED THAT IT Is ALLOWED TO Do So
A pretext jury instruction is important for two reasons. First, the
importance of the pretext jury instruction lies in the rationale for em-
ployment law itself. Employment law is designed, in part, to protect em-
ployees from arbitrary and capricious treatment by their employers. 260 A
pretext jury instruction furthers this rationale. Discharged employees are
generally in a position where they are unable to produce direct evidence
of discrimination.26'The only evidence an employee is likely to have is
circumstantial, as when the circumstances of the firing, combined with
prior treatment of the employee, indicate that the employer had an im-
262proper motive. As such, a pretext instruction to the jury puts a disad-
vantaged employee on equal footing with the employer-filling in gaps
that the employee is simply unable to produce evidence to fill.
Second, only employers are in the position to know the true reasons
an employee was fired. Employers generally do not arbitrarily fire their
employees.263 Their motivation to avoid precisely these types of lawsuits
is the impetus behind keeping extensive performance records, recording
meetings and phone calls, and constantly informing the employee of her
status. When a frivolous employment discrimination case arises, employ-
ers should have more than the necessary evidence to show legitimate
reasons for firing the employee. It is in the cases where the employer
cannot produce such evidence that an air of suspicion arises. When an
employer is faced with an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by
an employee that has little or no direct evidence, and the employer is
unable to convince a jury of legitimate reasons for firing the employee,
259. Id. at 280-81.
260. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2000), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), are examples of
federal laws that prevent discriminatory practices by employers.
261. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of discrimina-
tion is hard to come by"). In Wilkinsburg, the plaintiffs evidence consisted of improved fiscal health
of the Borough during his term as Borough Manager, the absence of negative job performance
ratings, and the fact that plaintiff's replacement was nearly half plaintiff's age. Wilkinsburg, 147
F.3d at 275.
262. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
263. An employer should be thoroughly aware of the repercussions of discriminatory activity
in their firing of employees. An aggrieved employee can resort to Title VII, ADA, and ADEA if they
feel they have been wrongfully discharged. Facing such ammunition, an employer has ample impe-
tus to defend himself against an employment discrimination lawsuit. Therefore, an intelligent em-




the logical inference is that the employer had illegitimate motives. A
pretext instruction is an extension of that logical inference.
That logical inference is why pretext instructions have such a criti-
cal effect. When a jury is wary of an employer's proffered reasons for
firing the plaintiff, it is likely that those proffered reasons are illegiti-
mate. A pretext instruction to the jury is critical because, without it, the
members of a jury may be unaware that they are allowed to find for the
plaintiff where the plaintiff's evidence is circumstantial, even though the
employer's evidence is suspicious or unconvincing. Pretext instructions
will help a plaintiff where it is likely that the plaintiff was discriminated
against. Conversely, the pretext instruction will have no effect where the
employer had a legitimate reason to fire the employee, backed by direct
evidence, which is within the employer's competence to give.
The cases in this survey show the critical effect of a pretext jury in-
struction. When a jury is informed that it is permissible to make an infer-
ence of discrimination based on pretext, it finds for the plaintiff.264 In
similar factual situations in other circuits where the jury is not given a
pretext instruction, the jury finds for the defendant.265 The logical infer-
ence is that plaintiffs will prevail in circumstantial evidence cases in the
Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit where they would not in the First, Sev-
enth, Eighth, or Eleventh Circuit. Thus, whether a pretext jury instruction
is given is critical in determining the outcome of circumstantial evidence
employment discrimination cases. This is in light of the fact that the bur-
den-shifting framework in employment discrimination cases is uniform
throughout the circuits.266
The following are two jury instructions used in employment dis-
crimination cases involving circumstantial evidence. The instruction be-
low was used in the Eighth Circuit, which disfavors giving pretext jury
instructions:
2 67
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff .. and against defendant...
on plaintiffs claim of race discrimination if all of the following ele-
ments are proved by the greater weight of the evidence: [f]irst, de-
264. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas., Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2002);
Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 383-84 (2d Cir. 2001); Wilkinsburg, 147
F.3d at 281; Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 383-84 (2d Cit. 1994).
265. Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2001); Palmer v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys., 208 F.3d 969, 975 (11 th Cir. 2000); Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d
64, 70 (7th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Burrell Comm. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); Gehring
v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994).
266. When and how the burden-shifting framework is used is subject to some controversy. The
Seventh Circuit relegates the framework exclusively to pretrial proceedings. Gehring, 43 F.3d at
343. The majority of the circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, utilize the burden-shifting framework
throughout the employment discrimination trial. See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1240. The framework
itself, however, is uniform throughout the Circuits because the Supreme Court set forth the frame-
work in St. Mary's and Reeves.
267. See Moore, 249 F.3d at 789.
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fendant failed to hire plaintiff; and [slecond, Plaintiffs race was a
motivating factor in Defendant's decision. If either of the above ele-
ments has not been proved by the greater weight of the evidence,
your verdict must be for defendant and you need not proceed further
in considering this claim.
268
Compare the above instruction to the following instruction that was
given by the Tenth Circuit in Townsend, and is a standard pretext instruc-
tion:
You may find that plaintiffs race was a motivating factor in defen-
dant's decision to demote or discharge plaintiff if it has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's stated reason(s)
for its decision are not the true reasons, but are a "pretext" to hide
discriminatory motivation.
269
Both of these instructions are legally correct. 270 They are both adequate
representations of the law under Reeves and St. Mary's. However, for the
cases that follow, imagine the result had the opposite instruction been
given. 271
Recall Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., discussed above.272 In that case,
had a jury been allowed to decide whether Russell had been discrimi-
nated against, it would have been faced with three different situations
where Russell had been transferred or denied a position in favor of a
younger white man.273 The jury would also have considered Acme's
proffered reasons for its treatment of Russell in light of the racial trend.
Had this case been tried in the Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit, and had
the jury been instructed on an allowed inference of pretext, Russell might
have prevailed.
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that Russell had not produced
sufficient evidence to show discriminatory animus.274 The court also
stated that the evidence required to rebut an employer's proffered rea-
275sons is not within a plaintiffs competence to give.  From this paradox
the Seventh Circuit concluded that "there [was] nothing in their power"
268. Id.
269. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1236-37. This was the jury instruction that Townsend proposed,
and that was rejected by the District Court, but found sufficient by the Tenth Circuit. Id.
270. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Reeves, it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer
discrimination based on pretext, but such inference is not compulsory. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-
ing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000). Thus, instructing the jury about pretext or refraining
from giving the instruction both adhere to the Reeves precedent.
271. The jury in Moore was given the first example instruction and found for the defendant.
Moore, 249 F.3d at 789. The Tenth Circuit was convinced that had the jury been given the second
instruction in Townsend that the jury would have found in favor of the plaintiff. Townsend, 294 F.3d
at 1236-37.
272. 51 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995).
273. Russell, 51 F.3d at 67.
274. See id. at 71.
275. See id. at 68.
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to alleviate this burden on a plaintiff.276 There is a resolution to this prob-
lem: give the case to a jury and let a jury decide whether an employer
discriminated against an employee.
277Compare Zimmerman v. Associates First Capital Corp., a Second
Circuit case, to Russell. In Zimmerman, the plaintiff, Zimmerman, pre-
vailed using exclusively circumstantial evidence. She showed a pattern
of sex discrimination by her employer and ambiguous and contradictory
statements made by her immediate supervisor.278 The evidence Russell
presented against Acme was at least as probative as what was presented
by Zimmermann. While there are factual differences between the cases,
it appears that the determinative factor in the divergent results is whether
the jury was given a pretext instruction. 279 Russell probably would have
prevailed had he been able to remove his case from the Seventh Circuit
to the Second, Third, or Tenth Circuit.
Next, recall Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc., another
Seventh Circuit decision. The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Hill is
precisely why the issue of pretext must be given to a jury. Hill introduced
circumstantial evidence that Burrell's actions were discriminatory. Hill
showed that she, a white woman, was fired in a general downsizing
scheme, but was replaced by a member of a minority group to do sub-281
stantially the same job. She next introduced a statement by her super-
visor that showed she was to be replaced by a minority candidate.282 Fi-
nally, the type of work Burrell engaged in, advertising in minority mar-
283kets, provided a motive for firing Hill. Burrell responded by offering a
reason why Hill was fired.28 In the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuit, the
jury would have been allowed to judge the credibility of each party's
explanation. Further, the jury would have been instructed that if it found
that the plaintiff satisfied her prima facie burden, and if it disbelieved
Burrell's proffered reasons, it would be allowed to find for the plaintiff.
This is why the outcome of the case probably would have been different
had it been brought in one of those circuits.
Finally, recall Palmer v. Board of Regents.285 Again, imagine the re-
sult had Palmer's claim been brought in the Tenth Circuit. Palmer ap-
276. Id. at 71.
277. 251 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2001).
278. Zimmerman, 251 F.3d at 379.
279. Compare Russell, 51 F.3d at 67-8, with Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 379. In Russell's case
the district court did not allow the claim to even reach the jury; the court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer. Russell, 51 F.3d at 67.
280. 67 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 1995).
281. Hill, 67 F.3d at 667.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 666.
284. See id.
285. 208 F.3d 969 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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plied for a permanent position at the University, but was denied.286
Palmer had circumstantial evidence that the University's proffered rea-
sons for its employment decision were pretextual,287 yet "the jury was not
specifically informed that it was authorized to find for the Plaintiff with-
out any additional evidence of discrimination. 288 Because the jury was
not specifically informed of the allowed inference, the defendant pre-
vailed.
CONCLUSION
The cases in this survey have shown the critical effect of a pretext
jury instruction. In factually similar circumstances, whether the jury was
given a pretext instruction determined the outcome. In the Second, Third,
and Tenth Circuit, where pretext instructions are given, plaintiffs tend to
prevail where they probably would not have in the First, Seventh, Eighth,
or Eleventh Circuit. Because Townsend is such a recent case, Townsend's
implication and impact in the Tenth Circuit has not yet been fully real-
ized. However, because of the effect a pretext instruction has on the out-
come of employment discrimination cases, it is likely that a pro-plaintiff
trend will soon evolve in the Tenth Circuit in circumstantial evidence
employment discrimination cases.
Tom DeVine, Jr.*
286. Palmer, 208 F.3d at 971-72.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 973.
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Denver University College of Law. I would like to take this oppor-
tunity to thank Professor Roberto Corrada for all of his help in the process of putting this paper
together.
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INTERPRETING THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING OF THE
SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD
LITIGATION: THE TENTH CIRCUIT TAKES THE MIDDLE
GROUND
INRODUCTION
You can't get discovery unless you have strong evidence of fraud,
and you can't get strong evidence offraud without discovery. 
1
Recent revelations of corporate and individual malfeasance, fraud,
and accounting irregularities2 suggest that Congress may revisit, and
possibly revise,3 certain provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). 4 While private securities litigation ac-
tions augment the enforcement activities of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"),5 critics of private securities actions claim that the
threat of strike suits6 creates enormous, unfair burdens on targeted com-
panies. 7 Congress enacted the PSLRA, in large part, to rein in what it, as
1. Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning the Books: Panel, in Enron 's Wake, to Review Law-
suit Curbs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8 (quoting Columbia University law professor Jack
Coffee).
2. See Eugene Spector, Fraud Made Easy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A17 ("The equity
bubble has burst, revealing vast accounting fraud, falsified profits, inflated assets and shyster execu-
tives the likes of which this country has rarely seen"); see also Carl M. Cannon, Letterfrom Wash-
ington; Suits vs. Suits. Learning to Love Those "Legal Leeches," FORBES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 18 ("[A]
few of us ... warned that underneath this veneer of prosperity and profit actually lay widespread
accounting rot, falsified profits, inflated asset values, and executive chicanery which would collapse
the system" (quoting from an address that securities litigator William S. Lerach gave at Stanford
Law School)), available at 2002 WL 23192442.
3. See Spector, supra note 2 (arguing for repeal of the Private Securities litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA)). But see Charles H. Dick, Jr., Going Overboard on Securities Law Reform,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 19, 2002, at B7 (arguing that additional legislation is unnecessary and
will impose economic burdens on "America's honest businesses"), available at 2002 WL 4615199;
Patricia J. Villareal, Enron's Impact on the PSLRA, TEx. LAW., Apr. 29, 2002, at 31 (arguing that
even with the many Enron-inspired bills before it, Congress should not change the PSLRA). Con-
gress responded to public outcries in the wake of the collapse of Enron by enacting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). See Barton S. Sacher et al., The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Protection Act, The Changing Landscape of Public Corporations and the Accounting
and Law Firms who Provide Them Services, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002, at 24, for a discussion of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's provisions. "The new law is designed to crack down on corporate crimi-
nals and to help restore confidence in the honesty, integrity, and fundamental strength of the Ameri-
can economy and.., marketplace." Id.
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. See Spector, supra note 2 ("Securities litigation is a powerful deterrent against corporate
fraud."); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
6. The term "strike suit" is defined as "a suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no
valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settle-
ment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999).
7. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
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well as many members of the business and legal communities, believed
to be abusive or unfounded securities lawsuits.
In order to protect defendants from the costs associated with frivo-
lous suits, the PSLRA halts any discovery during the pendency of a mo-
tion to dismiss.9 To survive such a motion, the PSLRA places plaintiffs
in the unenviable position of having to present a very strong and compel-
ling case at the pleading stage, without the benefit of discovery.10 On the
other hand, the PSLRA arguably provides corporations and other defen-
dants with better protection from "vexatious litigation""I because a mo-
tion to dismiss will likely defeat a weak or poorly pled case.
During the survey period, September 2001 to August 2002, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in City of Philadel-
phia v. Fleming Cos., 12 interpreted the PSLRA's new "strong inference"
standard for pleading scienter 13 under the anti-fraud provisions.' 4 The
Tenth Circuit's holding in Fleming is significant. In a well-reasoned and
common sense analysis, the court aligned itself with other "middle
ground" circuits when it held that, in the Tenth Circuit, courts will apply
a "totality of the pleadings" test. 15 A plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant possessed information, the intentional or reckless nondisclosure of
which likely misled investors. 16 Motive and opportunity to commit fraud
are relevant to proving scienter, but not sufficient alone. 17 The court will
examine the plaintiff's allegations in their entirety to determine whether,
8. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. Among the abuses noted by Congress
were: 1) strike suits; 2) targeting "deep pocket" defendants; 3) abuse of discovery to try to force
settlement; 4) filing of "cookie-cutter" lawsuits whenever a company's share price dropped; and 5)
attorney manipulation of clients in class action suits. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-44 (1975) (discussing
"vexatious litigation" under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). Unless a stay would create "undue prejudice," or the
plaintiffs can convince the court that "particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence,"
the filing of a motion to dismiss automatically stays "all discovery and other proceedings." Id.; see
also Dan Camey, Why the Little Guy Can't Win, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 132 (noting that three
months prior to WorldCom, Inc.'s disclosure of accounting irregularities, a Mississippi federal judge
dismissed a fraud class action against the company, and that a court dismissed thirty-eight suits
against Tyco International, Ltd. in February of 2002).
10. But see, e.g., Alan R. Friedman & Michael Tremonte, Halting Discovery in Securities
Cases Rulings Explore Potential Exceptions to Mandatory Stays Under the Reform Act, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 15, 2002 (exploring recent decisions interpreting the PSLRA stay provision).
11. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.
12. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001). In addition to Fleming, the focus of this article, the Tenth
Circuit also addressed certain aspects of materiality and the duty to disclose in McDonald v. Kinder-
Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2002).
13. The word "scienter" is defined as "a degree of knowledge that makes a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347
(7th ed. 1999). Scienter in the context of securities fraud includes a requirement that the act was
intentional. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining scienter in the
securities fraud context as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud").
14. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1248-49.
15. Id. at 1261-62.
16. Id. at 1261.
17. Id. at 1263.
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taken as a whole, the pleadings "give rise to a strong inference of sci-
enter."'
18
This survey focuses on the Tenth Circuit's "middle ground" analy-
sis of the scienter pleading requirement of the PSLRA. Part I gives a
brief history of securities law prior to the enactment of the PSLRA and
the subsequent apparent split among the United States courts of appeals
in the way that courts in different circuits implement the scienter plead-
ing requirement. Part II presents the Tenth Circuit's decision in Fleming
and discusses Fleming's impact as evidenced by two current district
court cases decided in the Tenth Circuit. Part 111 reviews selected recent
cases from other circuits. Part IV compares the Tenth Circuit's analysis
with the analyses of the other circuits. The Tenth Circuit's "middle
ground" approach appears to represent an emerging consensus for all of
the circuits, diminishing the significance of the previous "circuit split."
1. BACKGROUND
A. The Securities Acts
Congress enacted the securities laws 19 in response to the market
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.2 ° Collapsed share prices and
disclosures of fraud and stock price manipulations seriously eroded in-
vestor confidence.2' Congress sought to restore faith in the exchanges,
thereby stimulating wealth formation, creating jobs, and enhancing eco-
22nomic growth. The Securities Act of 1933 regulated the registration and
offering of securities and imposed civil and criminal penalties for viola-
tions. 23 In addition, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulated sec-
ondary trading, and instituted reporting requirements for corporations
listing stock on the national exchanges and the over-the-counter mar-
kets.2
The Exchange Act contained strong prohibitions on fraud. Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act made it "unlawful for any person... [t]o use
18. Id.
19. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
77a-77aa); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78mm).
20. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (discussing the rationale
behind federal securities regulation). See generally Janine C. Guido, Seeking Enlightenment from
Above: Circuit Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act's Heightened Pleading Require-
ment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 501, 503-13 (2000) (providing historical and legislative background of
securities law).
21. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194-95.
22. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1995)
(discussing the rationale for the Securities Act of 1933).
23. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195; see also 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] (4th ed. 2002).
24. See 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 9.2. Section 12g, which covers over-the-counter markets,
was added to the Exchange Act in 1964. See id. at n.8.
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or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
[the rules prescribed by the SEC].25 The SEC implemented this prohibi-
tion in Rule lOb-5, making it unlawful to disseminate untrue statements
of material fact, or to fail to disclose material facts, if, by so doing, inves-
26tors might be misled as to the value of a company's stock. Even though
§ 10(b) does not explicitly create any private right of action (nor did the
SEC or Congress necessarily intend such a remedy), 7 the courts have
determined that litigants may pursue a private right of action when they
allege that they have been the victims of securities fraud.
28
B. Standard for Pleading Prior to the PSRLA
Courts adopted a wide variety of interpretations of the substantive
and procedural foundations of actions under Rule lOb-5.29 In order to
bring a Rule lOb-5 or § 10(b) action in the Tenth Circuit, "a plaintiff
[had to] allege: (1) a misleading statement or omission of a material fact;
(2) made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (3) with
intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages.,, 30 The
pleading of the third element, intent, has engendered much controversy.
The Supreme Court defined scienter in the securities fraud context as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' 1 Al-
though this definition covered intentional behavior, the Court did not
specifically address whether scienter also included recklessness.32 All of
the circuit courts, however, accepted a showing of recklessness to sup-
port scienter.33
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
27. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
28. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
29. Compare Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994), and In
re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993), with In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir. 1994), and Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 284-85 (3d
Cir. 1992). See also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
("The lack of congressional involvement has left judges free to develop conflicting legal stan-
dards.").
30. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997) (govemed by pre-PSLRA
law). To survive either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff had to
allege facts that supported these five elements. See Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1118.
31. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12.
32. Id. at 193. The Court disallowed negligence as a basis for liability. See id.
33. Scott H. Moss, Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The Scienter
Debacle, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2000). The Tenth Circuit defined recklessness as
"conduct that is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it." City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos. 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996)). This is
also the Seventh Circuit articulation of recklessness, see Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), and it is used by the majority of circuit courts, see Fleming, 264
F.3d at 1259.
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Prior to the PSLRA, the circuits divided over the degree of factual
support needed in the pleadings to support allegations of scienter.34 The
Ninth Circuit employed a lenient pleading standard.35 In contrast, the
Second Circuit, considered the most stringent, required plaintiffs to pro-
vide a "strong inference" of scienter by either (1) sufficiently alleging
facts showing "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness," or (2) alleging facts sufficient to infer the defendant's
36opportunity and motive to commit securities fraud.
C. New Pleading Standard After Passage of the PSLRA and the Circuit
"Split"
Reacting to this lack of uniformity in the circuits' application of
Rule 9(b), and in response to the intense criticism by participants in the
industry and others regarding perceived abuse by litigants of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, Congress revised the securities laws by passing the
PSLRA.3 7 The PSLRA did a number of things. The more important
changes included the addition of statutory "safe harbor" provisions;
38
substitution of proportionate liability for joint and several liability in
cases where the defendants acted non-knowingly; 39 as well as various
provisions governing lead plaintiffs and counsel in class action suits.
40
In addition, the PSLRA included a new, heightened, statutory plead-
ing requirement regarding a defendant's state of mind.4' Specifically,
34. See generally Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b),
97 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1984) (discussing the courts' inability to "resolve the conflict between the
philosophy of notice pleading... and the heightened pleading standard of rule 9(b).").
35. See, e.g., GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1545-47. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires
plaintiffs to plead the factual circumstances surrounding any alleged fraud with particularity in order
to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See id. at 1545. "[Rule] 9(b)... states, 'In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."' Id.
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Because Rule 9(b) only requires general allegations of intent, "[in
the Tenth Circuit, [such] general averments of intent or other conditions of mind, unaccompanied by
supporting facts, [were] adequate" to satisfy the particularity requirement. In re Storage Tech. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (D. Colo. 1992) (citing Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886
F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989)); see also In re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1421
(D. Colo. 1995); In re Exabyte Corp. Sec. Litig., 823 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Colo. 1993).
36. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the
Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA pleading standard).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
Congress enacted the PSLRA over President Clinton's veto. Dick, supra note 3.
38. The PSLRA added section 27A to the 1933 Act and section 21E to the 1934 Act, which
codified the "bespeaks caution" doctrine whereby "sufficient cautionary language may preclude
misstatements from being actionable." 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 12.9[8].
39. See id. § 7.1211].
40. See id. § 12.15[1][A]-[B].
41. See Brent Wilson, Comment, Pleading Versus Proving Scienter Under the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in the Ninth Circuit After In re Silicon Graphics and Howard v.
Everex: Meet the Pleading Standard and the Fat Lady has Already Sung, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
321, 324-25 (2002). See generally Moss, supra note 33 ("[Alnalyzing the various interpretations of
the PSLRA's scienter standard.").
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Congress attempted in the PSLRA to insure a uniform and heightened
42pleading standard, requiring that:
[iln any private action arising under this title ... in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defen-
dant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title ... , state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind.
43
Should the plaintiff fail to satisfy this requirement, the court may dismiss
her claim."a
The PSLRA neither defined "required state of mind' 45 nor pre-
scribed any particular method for showing a strong inference of sci-
46enter. The legislative history does not clearly indicate what Congress
47 48intended.47 Congress declined to enunciate an unambiguous standard.
Unfortunately, contrary to Congress' intent, passage of the Reform Act
has not significantly affected the number of securities fraud cases filed
each year.49 Its enactment fueled a firestorm of litigation to resolve vari-
ous ambiguities in the statute and clarify many of the Act's procedural
requirements. 50 In particular, the circuits have struggled in the seven
42. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740 (Rule 9(b) "ha[d]
not prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants.").
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
45. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
46. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, 267 F.3d 400, 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
47. See, e.g., Greebel v. FIP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The legisla-
tive history is inconclusive on whether the Act was meant to either embody or to reject the Second
Circuit's pleading standards.").
48. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192 ("[A]II sides find ... some support for their positions....
[Tihere was agreement [in Congress] on the words of the statute and little else."). The PSLRA
explicitly uses the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA language of "strong inference;" however, the Con-
ference Committee stated that it did not intend to "codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting
this pleading standard." H.R. REP. No.104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
49. Since Congress passed the PSLRA, over 1,700 class action securities fraud cases have
been filed in federal district courts. See Stanford Law School & Cornerstone Research, Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
Class Action Litigation] (showing 1,703 federal cases since 1996). Of the roughly 1,300 shareholder
class action suits filed between December of 1995 and May of 2002, approximately one-fourth were
dismissed, with another one-fourth settled. Kevin P. Roddy, Seven Years of Practice and Procedure
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SH013 AI-ABA 397, 499, 502 (2002).
In the five years preceding the enactment of the PSLRA, approximately 200 cases per year were
filed. See Class Action Litigation, supra. The dollar amount of settlement has greatly increased over
the years, averaging $16 million in 2001. See Stanford Law School & Cornerstone Research, Federal
Securities Class Action Cases Filed and Defendant Market Cap Losses Surge in 2001 (Mar. 15,2002),
at http://securities.stanford.edu/scac-press/20020315 CR -SCAC.pdf.
50. See Roddy, supra note 49, at 405 ("[lIt cannot be disputed that since [the PSLRA was
passed] the procedural skirmishing ... has been more intense and time-consuming than that experi-
enced under the prior statutory scheme").
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years since the passage of the PSLRA with the interpretation and appli-
cation of the heightened pleading standard.5
Three potentially divergent approaches arose as to exactly what a
plaintiff must allege in order to support a "strong inference" of scienter.52
Courts generally agree that recklessness will suffice.5 3 The basic dis-
agreement concerns whether a showing of motive and opportunity by
itself remains sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirements of the
PSLRA.
1. The Second Circuit's Motive and Opportunity Test
The Second and Third Circuits have held that a showing of motive
and opportunity remains sufficient to prove scienter after the passage of
the PSLRA.54 Motive entails a showing of "concrete benefits that could
be realized by one or more ... false statements. ' 5 Opportunity requires
pleading facts showing "the means and likely prospect of achieving con-
crete benefits by the means alleged. 56 In other words, the defendants
must have had the ability to profit from the alleged fraud.
The Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation,57
reviewed both the legislative history and the plain language of the
PSLRA.58 After finding the legislative history contradictory and incon-
clusive, the court held that to plead scienter sufficiently, plaintiffs need
51. Cf Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1257-63 (discussing the circuit court split over the pleading
standard). See generally Moss, supra note 33 (discussing the courts' varying interpretations of the
PSLRA's effect on the scienter pleading requirements).
52. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1259-63; see also Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Elizabeth Ybarra, Test-
ing a Complaint Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1320 PLI CORP. 135 (2002);
Lewis J. Liman, Selected Topics Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
Pleading Scienter, Pleading Particularity (Anonymous Sources) and Document Preservation, 1320
PLI CORP. 35, 37-40 (2002); Moss, supra note 33; Roddy, supra note 49, at 435-57; Tower C.
Snow, Jr. & Stephen M. Knaster, The Diverging Circuit Court Standards for Pleading Scienter
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1332 PLI CORP. 261 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, "Wharf," the Reform Act and Scienter, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26,
2001, at 3 ("[A]II of the circuits have gleaned the idea that recklessness can constitute the necessary
intent to violate § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5"); see also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,
535 (3d Cir. 1999) (reaffirming that recklessness "remains a sufficient basis for liability"). This
might not be true in the Ninth Circuit. See discussion infra Part IV.
54. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming that previous Second
Circuit case law remains the standard by which scienter must be pled); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35;
Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38.
55. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
56. Id.
57. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). Advanta, a credit card issuer, used aggressive "teaser rates"
to attract new customers, and would, after a limited time, raise the cards' interest rate to a higher,
permanent level. Advanta, 180 F.3d at 528. Investors alleged the company and its officers knowingly
made false and misleading statements and omissions regarding the company's earnings potential and
stock value. Id. The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint because it determined that several state-
ments were "forward-looking" within the safe harbor provision of the PSLRA; that the plaintiffs had
failed to plead specific facts supporting an inference that the company had actual knowledge of its
statements' falsity; and that optimistic statements characterized as "puffery" are generally not mate-
rial. See id. at 535-36, 538. According to the court, stock sales by some officers did not rise to the
level permitting an inference of fraudulent intent. See id. at 540-41.
58. Id. at 531.
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only allege facts establishing a motive and opportunity to commit fraud
or "facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or con-
scious behavior., 59 The court emphasized, however, that plaintiffs must
support such allegations with particular facts allowing a strong inference
of scienter.6
2. The Ninth Circuit: In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion 61
The Ninth Circuit held that allegations of "mere 'motive and oppor-
tunity' or 'recklessness"' fail to meet the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standard, stating that "the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead, at a mini-
mum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or
conscious recklessness."62 The Ninth Circuit's pronouncement of an ap-
parently new recklessness standard, "deliberate recklessness," elicited
much criticism; however, its actual application has been comparable to
63the recklessness standards of the other circuits.
3. Other Circuits: Emergence of "The Middle Ground"
64
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that while allega-
tions of motive and opportunity alone will not meet the scienter require-
ment, the courts will consider these allegations relevant to the scienter
analysis when based upon supporting facts. 65 In re Comshare, Inc. Secu-
rities Litigation66 illustrates this principle. In that case, the plaintiffs al-
leged that -they were induced to purchase Comshare stock at an artifi-
cially inflated price by the defendants' public misrepresentations of
revenue, which resulted from a knowing or reckless disregard of ac-
67counting errors. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants violated
"Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ('GAAP')," as well as the
company's established accounting standards, because they claimed that
Comshare prematurely recognized revenue based upon conditional
68sales. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' allegations that theemployment compensation of individual defendants were tied to the
59. See id. at 534-35.
60. Id. at 535.
61. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
62. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added).
63. See discussion infra Part I.B.
64. Besides the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits should
likely also be considered "middle ground." See infra Parts IM., IV.
65. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (reaffirming
the proposition that the PSLRA requires particularized pleadings that raise a "strong inference of
scienter"), cert. dismissed, 536 U.S. 935 (2002); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-
87 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that "severe recklessness" satisfies the scienter requirement and requir-
ing plaintiffs to plead scienter with particularity); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188 (holding that the PSLRA
requires particularized pleadings that "raise a 'strong' inference of scienter").
66. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).




price of the company's stock and that individual defendants benefited by
selling personally held stock at the inflated prices provided the motive
and opportunity of the defendants to commit fraud.69 The court, however,
held that, without more, this did not give rise to a strong inference that
the defendants acted with recklessness. 70 Because the complaint did not
allege any facts that showed that the defendants knew, or could of
known, of the accounting errors, the court held that a mere "failure to
follow GAAP," even if knowing or reckless, could not alone support
scienter.71
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with what it viewed as the Sixth Cir-
cuit's position in Comshare; specifically, that pleading motive and op-
portunity could not alone sustain a complaint of fraud.72 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, in a later case, stated that the Eleventh Circuit's "reading
of Comshare [was] unduly rigid" and that "[w]hile it is true that motive
and opportunity are not substitutes for a showing of recklessness, they
can be catalysts to fraud and so serve as external markers to the required
state of mind., 73 The Sixth Circuit reiterated that plaintiffs must plead
74
facts and not rely on the "mantra" of motive and opportunity. Assertin
that "Congress was concerned with the quantum, not type, of proof,"W
the Sixth Circuit went on to endorse the First Circuit's "fact-specific"
approach, whereby "inferences of scienter survive a motion to dismiss
only if they are both reasonable and strong inferences. 76 In order to cre-
ate a strong inference, plaintiffs must propose facts that most plausibly
support a conclusion that misconduct occurred in the face of competing
inferences. 77 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, the PSLRA signifi-
cantly strengthened the prior standard, which had given plaintiffs "the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. 78
Against this backdrop of confusion about implementing the new
PSLRA pleading requirements, the Tenth Circuit weighed in.
69. Id. at 553.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283.
73. Helwig, 251 F.3d. at 550.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 551.
76. Id. (quoting Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-96).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 553 (quoting Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir. 1994)).
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II. PLEADING SCIENTER IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.
7 9
1. Facts
Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of
Fleming Companies, Inc. ("Fleming") stock.80 The plaintiffs alleged that
defendant Fleming and four current or former executives of the company
violated federal securities laws by issuing materially misleading state-
ments and omitting material information in filings with the SEC and in
81communications with investors.
Fleming, a publicly traded company, specialized in the food distri-
bution business and supplied food to more than 10,000 supermarkets and
retail food stores. 2 In addition, Fleming owned and operated approxi-
mately 335 supermarkets.8 3 Fleming's pricing arrangements included a
"cost-plus" contract under which Fleming purportedly charged customers
its actual cost for the items it supplied plus an agreed percentage
markup.8 Customers could expect to receive lower prices through this
arrangement due to Fleming's volume discounts from its own suppliers.85
David's Supermarkets, Inc. ("David's"), a chain of Texas grocery stores,
filed suit against Fleming in August 1993, alleging that, contrary to the
companies' "cost-plus" contract, Fleming kept for itself the incentives86
and other discounts given by its suppliers. David's sought damages of
approximately $110 million, an amount it eventually raised to almost
$450 million.87 In 1993 and 1994, $110 million represented approxi-
mately 10% of Fleming's total net worth and about 3% of its total as-
sets.88
Fleming did not disclose the lawsuit until March 14, 1996, when it
filed its 1995 Annual Report, the same day the jury announced its "ver-
79. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
80. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1248-49.
81. Id. For the purposes of § 10b and Rule lOb-5, materiality is established by showing "a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the information] important."
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the materiality standard defined for
proxy-solicitation issues in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). To be
materially misleading, the statement or information must be significantly inaccurate or obfuscating.
See 2 HAZEN, supra note 23, § 12.9.
82. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1249.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1250.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1250-51.
88. Id. at 1250. The court found troubling the fact that it could not ascertain from the facts
given in the Fleming pleadings what percentage of Fleming's total net worth or total assets was
represented by the later, amended damage claims. See id. at 1251, 1266. The court's decision about
whether to consider the David's litigation material was based in part on these percentages. See infra
text accompanying notes 105, 115.
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dict of liability against Fleming. '' 89 Following this disclosure, Fleming's
stock suffered a substantial drop in value.9° Even though the court set
aside the verdict for David's in May 1996 and Fleming eventually settled
the dispute for approximately $20 million, the plaintiffs in the instant
case alleged that Fleming's stock price never recovered.9' The plaintiffs
alleged (1) that the individual defendants, as senior officers of Fleming,
either had actual knowledge of the David's litigation and its signifi-
cance 92 or acted with reckless indifference to the significance of the liti-
gation; (2) that the defendants had an "affirmative duty" to stay informed
of any "potentially material litigation against the company" and a duty to
disclose such litigation to the public; and (3) that the defendants had ex-
plicitly disclosed pending litigation involving equivalent damage claims
while not disclosing the David's litigation. 93 The plaintiffs also noted that
several internal company memoranda supported their claim that the de-
fendants must have known of the Fleming pricing policies at the heart of
the David's lawsuit.94
The complaint gave five possible motives for the defendants not to
disclose the David's litigation, which the defendants allegedly knew to
be material: (1) to insure the success of notes offered for sale during the
class period; (2) to avoid hampering the success of the new "cost-plus"
sales marketing plan; (3) to avoid future, similar lawsuits; (4) to protect
their positions and reputations within the company; and (5) to increase
the value of their personal investments in Fleming stock.95 The trial court
found these allegations of scienter insufficient to meet the pleading re-
quirements of Rule lOb-5, and that they supported, at most, "a finding of
simple negligence., 96 The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
97
2. Decision
Since this was the first case that required the Tenth Circuit to inter-
pret the scienter pleading requirements of the PSLRA, the court first re-
viewed the legislative history of the Act, and then examined other cir-
98cuits' interpretations of the PSLRA. The court agreed with the position
five other circuits took, and stated, "[P]laintiffs can adequately plead
scienter by setting forth facts raising a 'strong inference' of intentional or
89. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1251, 1253-54. Four days later, the jury assessed punitive damages,
increasing the damage award to "approximately $200 million plus attorney's fees and costs." Id. at
1251.
90. Id. at 1251-52.
91. See id. at 1252.
92. Several of the defendants had previously been deposed as part of the David's litigation.
See id. at 1255 & n.14.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1256-57.
96. Id. at 1257.
97. Id. at 1248-49.
98. Id. at 1258-63.
20031
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reckless misconduct." 99 The court enunciated a two-part test applicable
to allegations of nondisclosure of material facts. 1°° The plaintiff must
first show that "the defendant knew of the potentially material fact[(s)],"
and second, that the defendant knew that investors would likely be mis-
led by "the failure to reveal the potentially material fact[(s)]."' 0 ' The
court then explicitly stated its adoption of the "middle ground" standard
whereby "motive and opportunity pleadings are relevant to a finding of
scienter, but... do not constitute a separate, alternative method of plead-
ing scienter."'' 0 2 Courts in the Tenth Circuit must examine a plaintiffs'
allegations of scienter to see if, "taken as a whole," they support "a
strong inference of scienter.
°
103
The court reviewed the plaintiffs' complaint using this newly enun-
ciated standard and upheld the trial court's dismissal. 1 4 The court found
that the plaintiffs had failed to plead particular facts sufficient to infer
that the individual defendants knew of the David's litigation, or the rele-
vant business practices regarding "cost-plus" contracts, or even the po-
tential materiality of the lawsuit: "[T]he mere fact that the individual
Defendants occupied senior positions in the company, and that two of
them knew of the litigation at least by early 1995 is not sufficient to im-
ply knowledge of the specific fact of materiality."'10 5 Even if the court
accepted as true the plaintiff s allegations that the defendants knew of the
David's litigation, the court emphasized that knowledge of the underly-
ing facts does not establish scienter; rather, defendants must have actual
knowledge of the potentially harmful effects of misleading investors by
nondisclosure. °6 Alternatively, plaintiffs may plead facts that show that
it would be obvious to reasonable people that harm was likely. 0 7 The
court also rejected as merely conclusory the plaintiffs' claims that the
defendants acted with reckless disregard of the "true facts misrepresented
or omitted in Fleming's public statements and filings."' 0 8 The simple fact
that the defendants held senior positions in the company did not justify a
finding that they had actual knowledge of the facts: "Plaintiffs ... never
99. Id. at 1259.
100. Id. at 1261. See supra note 81, for the definition of "materiality."
101. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1261.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1263.
104. Id. at 1249.
105. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). Commentators have faulted Fleming for possibly
"creat[ing] a more difficult barrier than other circuits in pleading state of mind." 3C HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 16:37.1 (2d ed.
2002). They argue that the Tenth Circuit, in focusing on whether the defendants knew or should have
known of the materiality of the David's litigation, changed the yardstick of materiality into a subjec-
tive standard. Id.
106. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1264.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1254-55.
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name any specific report defendants may have received or identify spe-
cific advice defendants may have given or received .... ,,109
The court next evaluated the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants
should have known, or actually knew, of the importance to investors of
the David's lawsuit because of the large damages claims and because it
had the potential to engender additional, similar lawsuits." 0 The plain-
tiffs had failed to provide financial data that would allow the court to
evaluate the percentage of Fleming's assets that were actually at risk in
the David's litigation.' 1' In addition, the plaintiffs failed to plead specific
facts as to other potential lawsuits, such as the number of customers or
volume attributable to the "cost-plus" contracts at issue.11 Without a
showing of additional threatened or pending lawsuits, the court found
that such suits were merely "potential risks."'' 3
Furthermore, even assuming that the defendants knew they might be
subjected to an adverse judgment in the David's litigation, the court
could not find the possibility of this event significant enough to consider
the defendants reckless for not disclosing the litigation.1 4 The court re-
ferred to various SEC reporting requirements relating to the materiality
of suits against a company, noting that it "could not impute knowledge of
the higher damage claims to Defendants ... and.. . [it] could not deter-
mine the potential materiality under [17 C.F.R.] § 229.103 ... because
Plaintiffs [did] not provide[] the [necessary] financial information."" 5
The court pointed to both the likelihood that plaintiffs seeking to force a
settlement would make inflated claims and the fact that Fleming dis-
closed the David's litigation within one month of the amended damages
claim requesting approximately $450 million as further indications that
the defendants did not act recklessly or negligently.''
6
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1264.
111. Id. at 1264-65.
112. Id. at 1265.
113. Id. at 1267.
114. Id. at 1265-66.
115. Id. at 1266. Instruction number two to 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 states: "No information need
be given with respect to any proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount
involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis." 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2003). Some have
criticized the Fleming Court's apparent acceptance of the SEC's reporting requirements as determi-
native of materiality. See 3C BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 105, § 16:37.1. By accepting the
10 percent current asset test, the court essentially foreclosed the plaintiffs' allegations that the defen-
dants should have disclosed the pending David's litigation. Id. Nevertheless, even if one takes the
position that the court should not have considered this SEC requirement, the plaintiffs still did not
provide facts supporting an inference that the defendants knew investors might be misled by nondis-
closure. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1264. The Tenth Circuit standard does not differ appreciably from that
of the other "middle ground" circuits. See discussion infra Part IV.
116. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1268.
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Of the five motives that the plaintiffs alleged," 7 the court concluded
that four represented "generalized motives shared by all companies" and,
as such, could not alone provide a strong inference of scienter. 1 18 In order
to support an assertion that a defendant had a motive predicated on a
desire to increase the value of stock holdings or otherwise profit from a
relationship with a company, a plaintiff must show that a defendant bene-
fited from insider trading or sold stock that the defendant held person-
ally.119 Here, however, the plaintiffs made no concrete showing of such
activities.1 20 Since all companies and executives presumably desire to
keep a high bond rating or stock price and to avoid potential lawsuits,
allegations of such motives alone "cannot ... sustain a claim of securi-
ties fraud."'
2'
The court agreed that the plaintiffs' second alleged motive, Flem-
ing' s desire to convert all of its customers to "cost-plus" contracts, might
have suffered harm if customers learned of the David's litigation.1
22
Nevertheless, because of the alleged history of customer complaints that
Fleming did not pass on discounts, the court found that disclosure of the
David's litigation would likely have had little impact on the success of
the "cost-plus" marketing plan. 23 Thus, Fleming's desire for the plan to
succeed could not provide a sufficient motive to demonstrate either reck-
lessness or intent to defraud. 24 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
pleadings "taken as a whole" failed to provide, with enough particularity,
facts sufficient to support a "strong inference" that the defendants acted
with the necessary scienter. 125
B. Recent District Court Cases in the Tenth Circuit
Two recent decisions highlight the impact of Fleming on the plead-
ing of securities fraud complaints in the Tenth Circuit. 1
26
117. See supra text accompanying note 95.
118. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1269-70.
119. Id. at 1270.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1269-70.
122. Id. at 1268. The court noted that such a motive would not normally support an inference
of fraud because a "desire not to jeopardize a company's business plan is a motive shared by most
companies." Id. Here, however, the alleged motive was "specifically and directly related to the
underlying facts." Id.
123. Id. at 1269.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1270. Fleming now faces an "uncertain future." Ann Zimmerman, Fleming Has
Doubts About Financing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at B8, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3963305.
The SEC is investigating the company's accounting practices and one of its largest customers, Kmart
Corp., has ended its contract with Fleming. Id. News of Fleming's likely restatement of earnings
caused its stock to drop 46% on Friday, March 28, 2003, to 61 cents. Id. This was in addition to the
more than 90% loss in share value suffered over the previous year. See id.
126. Other cases also demonstrate the effect that Fleming has had. See In re Sprint Corp. Sec.
Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1224-25 (D. Kan. 2002) (distinguishing Fleming and finding plaintiffs'
allegations of motive compelling where defendants stood to exercise $1.7 billion in stock options;
other motives as to optimistic statements failed to raise strong inference of scienter); Precision
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1. In re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. Securities Litigation'
27
Plaintiffs claimed that Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. ("Sun"), a large
healthcare provider, made false representations in many public state-
ments and financial disclosures concerning its capacity to react to immi-
nent Medicare reimbursement decreases. 128 The plaintiffs alleged that
Sun should have known it could not combat the negative impact of the
new reimbursement schedule because of Sun's experiences in operating
nursing home facilities reimbursed under a similar payment regime.1
9
Sun experienced a marked decrease in its reimbursement revenues and
petitioned for bankruptcy in 1999.130
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the effects of the new reim-
bursement schedule, Sun claimed it would offset any negative effects
through its "early and intensive preparation[s]" for cost reductions and
through the efficiency of Sun's operating model. 3 ' Because Sun made
these allegedly misleading statements prior to the government actually
implementing the new payment arrangements, the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico viewed the plaintiffs' claims as
assertions of "fraud by hindsight"-a type of claim specifically disal-
lowed in Fleming.132 The court found that the "Defendants could not
possibly have known the transition's effect on the company with cer-
tainty before [the government's conversion to the new reimbursement
regime].' 33 In particular, the plaintiffs failed to provide any specific
evidence of possible financial harm to Sun that the defendants did not
disclose in their public statements. 34 The court faulted the plaintiffs for
not providing details that would allow the court to make a meaningful
comparison and to "discern Defendants' alleged scienter."1 35
The court also stated that it found "it particularly noteworthy that
[the plaintiffs] . .. utterly failed to present a logical motive for Defen-
Vascular Sys., Inc. v. Sarcos L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (D. Utah 2002) (finding a lack of
specific facts that would allow a strong inference of scienter in allegations of misrepresentations that
allegedly induced investors to transfer five million shares to an affiliated corporation); Pirraglia v.
Novell, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (D. Utah 2002) (dismissing a complaint alleging that defendants
issued materially false financial statements and business performance and prospect statements due to
the lack of particularity and failure to allege requisite scienter); Gower v. IKON Office Solutions,
Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing Fleming for rules on the sufficiency of
evidence to satisfy the scienter requirement in state wrongful discharge and breach of contract suit).
127. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. N.M. 2002).
128. Sun Healthcare, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. Passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
spurred the Health Care Financing Administration to issue new reimbursement rates for Medicare
services. Id. at 1285.
129. Id. at 1295-96.
130. Id. at 1286.
131. See id. at 1295.
132. Id. (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1260).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1296.
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dants' alleged fraud."'136 The court rejected as "baseless" the plaintiffs'
allegations that the defendants were motivated by insider trading and by
Sun's desire to successfully acquire another company as a subsidiary.
7
The plaintiffs provided no facts to support an inference that insiders had
engaged in "unusual" stock activity. 38In addition, the court found the
second motive totally illogical because it wondered why the defendants
would seek to acquire a company that would only cause Sun to suffer
increased losses under the new payment schedule. 39 Thus, the plaintiffs
failed to establish Sun's motive to commit the alleged fraud.'" Finally,
relying on Fleming, the court also viewed the plaintiffs' allegations that
the defendants violated GAAP, without more, as insufficient to support
their claims that the defendants intended to mislead investors.141
2. Spiegel v. Tenfold Corp. 1
42
Tenfold Corporation ("Tenfold") and several of its directors alleg-
edly published materially false statements regarding Tenfold's ability to
perform certain of its contractual obligations. 4 3 These statements in-
cluded repeated "on time guarantees" while the defendants knew that the
company had missed several similar previous deadlines,'" along with
knowing misstatements of Tenfold's technological capabilities. 4 Also,
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants improperly recognized revenues
in violation of GAAP.146 The complaint asserted that the defendants
knew or should have known of the company's inability to successfully
meet its obligations, and further, that the defendants must have known
that their statements would likely mislead investors. 1
47
The United States District Court for the District of Utah faulted the
complaint for not providing facts that would allow an inference that the
defendants had actual knowledge of the company's inability to per-
form. 48 Nor did the complaint show that the defendants knew that the
statements "posed a substantial likelihood of misleading a reasonable
investor in light of the total mix of information." 149 The court applied
Fleming's "totality of the pleadings" test to find that the complaint,
viewed "as a whole," failed "to give rise to a strong inference... [of] the
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995)).
139. Id. at 1296-97.
140. Id. at 1297.
141. Id.
142. 192 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Utah 2002).
143. Spiegel, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
144. Id. at 1264.
145. Id. at 1267.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1265.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1265).
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requisite mental state."'' 50 Also, as in Sun Healthcare,151 the court noted
that the plaintiffs' allegations of accounting irregularities, without more,
did not create the necessary strong inference of scienter.
1 2
I. SCIENTER IN OTHER CIRCUITS
As discussed in Part I, several circuits had already addressed the
PSLRA's scienter requirement prior to the Tenth Circuit's Fleming deci-
sion.153 In order to facilitate the comparison given in Part IV between the
different circuits' views of the requirements for pleading scienter, this
section presents recent cases from the First, Second, and Ninth Cir-
cuits--circuits that had already expressed their opinions. This section
will also briefly review the positions presently taken by the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits. 1
54
A. First Circuit: Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp.
155
1. Facts
The A.T. Cross Corporation ("Cross"), a maker of writing utensils,
began selling a new product line in early 1998.156 Cross had "high hopes"
for its personal electronic devices, the CrossPad and CrossPad XP, hav-
ing publicly stated in September 1997 that it expected at least "$25 mil-
lion in profitable sales."' 157 Instead, Cross suffered a $24.3 million loss in
1999 and subsequently discontinued sales of its pen-based computing
products. 1
58
Aldridge, a shareholder, filed a putative class action in April 2000
on behalf of people who purchased stock in Cross during the class pe-
riod, September 17, 1997, to April 22, 1999.159 Aldridge specifically
alleged that Cross employed various sales strategies including "channel
em60ye sae1taeie nldn 162
stuffing,"' take backs,' 61 and extending price protection to retailers.
Aldridge contended that these practices affected the company's reported
150. Id. at 1266.
151. Sun Healthcare, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
152. Id. at 1267 (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1261).
153. See discussion supra Part I.C.
154. See Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 Bus. LAW. 747, 820-89 (2003)
[hereinafter Annual Review], for a review and analysis of recent PSLRA-related cases.
155. 284 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002).




160. Id. at 81 ("'Channel stuffing' means inducing purchasers to increase substantially their
purchases before they would, in the normal course, otherwise purchase products from the company.
It has the result of shifting earnings into earlier quarters, quite likely to the detriment of earnings in
later quarters." (quoting Greebel v. FrP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 (1st Cir. 1999))).
161. Id. ("A 'take back' is a promise to take back goods from customers who have been unable
to sell them.").
162. Id. at 80 ("Price protection is a retailer's or distributor's right to reimbursement in the
event of post-sale price reductions.").
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sales of CrossPads and, thus, constituted material information 63 that
Cross failed to disclose to investors despite its obligation to do so.1
64
Also, in light of these sales tactics and resulting accounting practices,
Aldridge alleged that Cross's management made certain fraudulent and
misleading statements. 65 In the period from September 1997 to June
1988, Cross made various optimistic statements in press releases, in its
10-K report with the SEC, in Barron's, and in Value Line that sales of
the CrossPad would significantly add to the company's profitability.'
66
Aldridge contended that subsequent statements by company officials in
1999 showed that Cross had in fact offered its customers price protection
as early as 1998.167 In a February article in the Providence Journal, a
company official claimed that the February 1999 price cut of up to 30%
in CrossPad products had been planned from the "get go" and that retail-
ers were aware of these planned price reductions. 68 Company officials
also seemed to indicate in a conference call with investors and analysts
on April 22, 1999, that the price protection program was part of the com-
pany's original strategy.169 The district court dismissed Aldridge's
claims, finding no support for the allegations that the defendants know-
ingly made misleading statements. 70
2. Decision
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's dis-
missal, holding that Aldridge had sufficiently supported his allegations of
fraud, and that his pleadings allowed a strong inference that Cross and its
management "consciously intended to defraud, or ... acted with a high
degree of recklessness," when making the allegedly false statements.1
71
Three facts and circumstances alleged in the complaint, taken together,
established a strong inference of scienter: (1) evidence indicated that the
Defendants knowingly published arguably inaccurate or misleading
statements regarding Cross's price protection and take back policies; (2)
evidence showed that Cross did not properly account for the contingent
nature of sales in company reports and financial statements; and
(3) Cross's corporate officers had particular financial incentives to exag-
gerate earnings that were different from other firms' standard corporate
compensation methods.172 The court emphasized that the PSLRA did not
change the standard of review for a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), and "[t]he district court did not 'giv[e] plaintiff[] the
163. Id. at 82. See supra note 81, for the definition of "materiality."
164. Aldridge, 284 F.3d. at 77.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 76.
167. See id. at 79.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 80.
170. Id. at 77.
171. See id. at 82 (citing Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198-201).
172. See id. at 82-84.
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benefit of all reasonable inferences' as it should have on a motion to
dismiss."'
173
B. Second Circuit: In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation
74
1. Facts
In December 1996, Scholastic Corporation ("Scholastic"), a book
publisher and distributor, changed its sales strategy by expanding distri-
bution of its best-selling product, the "Goosebumps" series of children's
books, to include mass merchandisers. 175 Scholastic publicly described
this expansion of distribution "as a significant positive development."'
176
The complaint alleged that Scholastic did not communicate to investors
that sales of Goosebumps significantly decreased in the fall of 1996, and
that Scholastic afforded retailers and distributors a full right of return. 1
77
In December 1996, Scholastic announced a 24% increase in net
second quarter income over the previous year.178 While Scholastic had
earlier expressed "comfort" with security analysts' third quarter income
estimates of 64 to 73 cents per share, Scholastic announced an expected
third quarter loss of 70 to 80 cents per share in February 1997.179 Scho-
lastic then announced that it "would take a $13 million pre-tax special
charge" to create "a reserve for anticipated additional book returns,"
which triggered an immediate 40% decline in Scholastic's stock price. 180
The plaintiffs alleged that one of Scholastic's vice presidents, de-
fendant Raymond Marchuk, had a motive to influence Scholastic's dis-
semination of false and misleading statements in order to keep the price
of Scholastic stock high, since he realized $1.25 million from the sale of
his personal stock.' 81 The plaintiffs also identified several other purport-
edly false and misleading material statements made to securities analysts
and published in a supplement to a company prospectus.
82
2. Decision
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs
had alleged facts in sufficient detail to support an inference that the de-
fendants knew of the potentially material sales declines, and next turned
to the plaintiffs' allegations of scienter. 183 Since the complaint listed only
173. Id. at 78-79 (alterations in original) (quoting Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201).
174. 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001).
175. Scholastic, 252 F.3d. at 68.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 68-69.
178. Id. at 68.
179. Id. at 68-69.
180. Id. at 69.
181. Id. at 74.
182. Id. at 70.
183. Id. at 70-74.
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one individual defendant, Marchuk, the court considered motive with
respect to Marchuk alone and did not examine whether other Scholastic
officers had sold any stock during the class period.' 84 The complaint al-
leged that Marchuck had not sold any Scholastic shares since 1995, yet
starting in late 1996, he "sold [80%] of his holdings within a matter of
days for a not insignificant profit."' 185 Because of his access to private
company information, Marchuk was in a position to manipulate the re-
lease of information to the public.' 86 Thus, the plaintiffs sufficiently pled
motive and opportunity to commit fraud. 1
87
The court also found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that
the defendants had knowledge of information that contradicted their pub-
lic statements such as to constitute "an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care" and allow an inference that the defendants exhib-
ited conscious misbehavior or recklessness. 88 In particular, the plaintiffs
pled that the defendant (1) knew investors relied on information pertain-
ing to sales and returns of Goosebumps books; (2) publicly represented,
contrary to Scholastic's own data, "that returns were not increasing;"
(3) told stock analysts that returns remained at normal levels;
(4) disregarded retailers' warnings that "the newer Goosebump books
were too 'scary;"' and (5) failed to follow Scholastic's own announced
policy regarding book return accounting procedures.
189
C. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has not yet ruled on the new pleading standards
of the PSLRA, 19° but it appears from various dicta that the court would
likely agree with the middle ground courts. In Phillips v. LCI Interna-
tional, Inc.,' 91 the court discussed the other circuits' PSLRA strong infer-
ence standards, but found that it did not have to select a standard because
the plaintiffs in that case had failed to meet even what it characterized as
the "most lenient standard possible under the PSLRA, the two-pronged
Second Circuit test."'' 92 More recently, in In re Trex Co. Securities
Litigation,193 one district court within the Fourth Circuit stated that it was
persuaded by reasoning that "reject[s] the mechanical application of any
judicial test, ' 194 and instead applied a "totality of the circumstances" test
to decide whether allegations supported a "cogent and persuasive . . .
184. Id. at 75.
185. Id. at 69, 75.
186. Id. at 75-76.
187. Id. at 76.
188. See id. (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
189. See id. at 76-77.
190. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).
191. 190 F.3d 609.
192. Id. at 620-21.
193. 212 F. Supp. 2d 596 (W.D. Va. 2002).
194. Trex, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 607 n.7.
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inference" of scienter.195 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that several
officers of a manufacturer of non-wood decking material sought to in-
crease their year-end bonuses by issuing misleading sales statements and
engaging in channel stuffing.196 The court cited Fleming, among other
cases, for the proposition that motivations common to company officials
do not substantiate motive for securities fraud. 197 It also distinguished the
facts before it regarding channel stuffing from those in Aldridge because
the plaintiffs did not make specific allegations that would show how the
purported sales practice affected revenues and, thus, the officers' bo-
nuses. 198
D. Fifth Circuit
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Fleming, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the PSLRA pleading requirements. 99 The court agreed with
other circuits that "[iut seems clear . . . the PSLRA has not generally al-
tered the substantive scienter requirement ... and therefore severe reck-
lessness ... remains a basis for such liability. 200 Pointing out that "[t]he
PSLRA neither mandated nor prohibited any particular method of estab-
lishing a strong inference of scienter, ''20 1 the court cited with approval the
approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare.20 2 Most importantly,
the court stated: "What must be alleged is not motive and opportunity as
such but particularized facts," but "[aippropriate allegations of motive




The Eighth Circuit "[v]iew[s] [a plaintiff's] ... complaint to deter-
mine whether [the plaintiff] set forth facts that give a strong reason to
believe there was reckless or intentional wrongdoing," yet it does not
impose any particular criteria or method for meeting this standard. 204 In
Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corp. ,205
195. Id. (quoting In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 633-34 (E.D. Va.
2000)).
196. See id. at 599-600.
197. Id. at 607-08 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1268-70 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
198. See id. at 608-12.
199. Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing allegations of false
and misleading statements regarding extent of company's patent coverage to support a strong infer-
ence of scienter but cautioning that they might be "barely" sufficient).
200. Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408.
201. Id. at 411.
202. Id. at 410 ("The most sensible approach [to pleading a strong inference of scienter] ap-
pears to us to be the one first generally articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare.").
203. Id. at 412.
204. In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir.), vacated by 2002 WL
1760770 (8th Cir. July 31, 2002).
205. 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding a heightened showing of motive to commit fraud
where the magnitude and timing of an executive's compensation was unusual, and that a strong
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the court stated that sufficient complaints typically include a showing of
"unusual or heightened" motive, and a plaintiff's showing of motive and
opportunity can support a belief that a defendant made knowing or reck-
less misrepresentations.2 6 If a complaint makes neither of these show-
ings, then it must include other particularly strong allegations in order for
the court to infer scienter. 1°7
F. Does the Ninth Circuit Stand Alone? Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp.
20 8
1. Facts
PathoGenesis Corporation ("PathoGenesis") developed TOBI (to-
bramycin solution for inhalation), an inhaled antibiotic used to treat cys-
tic fibrosis.2°9 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration granted Patho-
Genesis approval to market TOBI in December 1997.21 ° After one year
of sales to wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies, PathoGenesis an-
nounced a 7% price increase, but told its wholesalers, in a letter, that
"they could purchase TOBI at the lower pre-increase price during a two-
week 'buy-in' period.",21' The "buy-in" period began December 11, 1998,
and generated a large volume of sales, which gave rise to a strong fourth
quarter with sales of $17.8 million.21 2 These fourth quarter sales repre-
sented a 20% growth from the previous quarter, and corporate statements
allegedly led investors to expect increased sales of TOBI during the first
quarter of 1999.213 Instead, PathoGenesis announced near the end of the
214first quarter of 1999 that TOBI sales would be closer to $10 million.
Since sales of TOBI accounted for almost 98% of PathoGenesis' annual
sales, value of its stock dropped sharply. 1 5 The plaintiffs brought a secu-
rities fraud suit on behalf of all purchasers of PathoGenesis stock during
the class period of January 15, 1989, to March 22, 1999.16
The plaintiffs claimed that PathoGenesis sought to create an impres-
sion of increasing patient demand for TOBI, specifically listing three
allegedly false or misleading statements made by the company or its of-
ficers. 21 The plaintiffs further alleged that in December 1998, Patho-
inference of scienter was supported when the facts pled showed knowledge of or access to informa-
tion contradicting public statements).
206. Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 660.
207. Id. The Eighth Circuit recently reinforced these holdings in In re K-Tel International, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 300 F.3d 881, 893 (8th Cir. 2002), where it confirmed that general allegations
of GAAP violations are insufficient to support scienter as are motives common to corporations or
corporate officers.
208. 284 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2002).
209. PathoGenesis, 284 F.3d at 1030.
210. Id. at 1031.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1031-32.
214. Id. at 1031.
215. See id. at 1031 & n.2.




Genesis knew that demand for TOBI had leveled and developed the
"buy-in" program to artificially boost fourth quarter sales. 218 PathoGene-
sis purportedly wanted to show strong sales because it sought to expand
foreign distribution and needed to obtain favorable financing arrange-
ments.219 Finally, the plaintiffs pointed to two stock sales made by
PathoGenesis' Chairman and C.E.O. during the class period as another
motive to mislead investors. 220 The district court judge dismissed the
complaint, holding, in part, that the "plaintiffs had not pleaded detailed
and particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter."
221
2. Decision
Because the plaintiffs failed to identify any internal company
documents or reports that showed a decline in sales of TOBI, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals could not infer that PathoGenesis officers had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of flat or declining patient de-
mand.222 The court explained that the plaintiffs needed to provide spe-
cific references to the contents of any reports purportedly utilized by the
defendants in order to support their allegations that the company had
consciously made misleading representations.223 The court also dis-
224counted the insider stock transactions as not probative of scienter.
Here, the court noted that (1) the sales constituted a small percentage of
the Chairman's holdings; (2) the timing of the sales, even considering
that they followed announcement of positive earnings, was not suspi-
cious; and (3) no other insiders sold stock during this period. 22 Further-
more, the court characterized the allegations that PathoGenesis sought to
conceal knowledge of moderating patient demand while seeking a line of
credit and increased foreign sales as "ordinary and appropriate corporate
business objectives., 226 Without more, the court could not consider such
227motives fraudulent. Finally, the court considered whether, even though
individually insufficient, the allegations taken as a whole could give rise
228to a strong inference of conscious or deliberate recklessness. Because
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1032. The CEO sold 10,000 personally held shares within two weeks of the com-
pany's fourth quarter earnings announcement. See id. Prior to this time, he had not sold any of his
PathoGenesis stock. Id. The complaint further alleged that the CEO had planned to sell up to 50,000
shares. Id.
221. Id. at 1034.
222. Id. at 1035-36 (citing In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir.
1999)).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 1036-38.
225. See id. at 1037. The 10,000 shares represented only 1.4% of the CEO's holdings. Id.
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of what it viewed as a lack of critical details and particularized facts, the
court affirmed the lower court's dismissal . 29
IV. ANALYSIS
As circuit courts have considered the issue, a common standard is
emerging. 230
A. Commonality of the Middle Ground
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and arguably the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits appear to share a common "middle ground" 231 approach
in their analysis of the PSLRA's heightened pleading of scienter. These
courts view plaintiffs' claims in their "entirety" to determine whether the
232allegations "taken as a whole" compel a strong inference of scienter.
They place emphasis on three factors when addressing the sufficiency of
the pleading of scienter.
First, plaintiffs must support allegations that defendants made, or
failed to make, statements of material fact with fact-based reasons that
233the statements were misleading at the time they were made. General
claims such as allegations of misleading sales practices or GAAP or
other accounting violations will not suffice.234 Second, plaintiffs must
provide particular facts that constitute compelling circumstantial evi-
dence of defendants' knowing or reckless misbehavior.235 Plaintiffs can-
not make claims characterized as "fraud-by-hindsight. ', 236 Third, while
motive and opportunity are important considerations, generalized allega-
tions of motive common to many corporations or corporate officers will
not prevail. 7 In addition, since a court will evaluate each securities
fraud case based on its specific facts, plaintiffs cannot rely on a magic
pleading formula.238
229. Id.
230. Gerard Pecht & Glen Banks, Standard for Scienter, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A19; see
also Karmel, supra note 53 ("[T]he gap in interpretations of PSLRA in the circuits has been narrow-
ing.").
231. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001).
232. See Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1263.
233. See id. at 1260.
234. See id. at 1261.
235. See id. at 1260.
236. See id. (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000)).
237. See id. at 1262.
238. See Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 31 COLO. LAW. 39, 43 (2002) ("[A] case specific analysis is always necessary"). See
generally S. Michael Pack, Jr., Securities Law- Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.: Determining Pleading
Standards in Securities Fraud Case Under the PSLRA, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 671 (2002) (dis-
cussing the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the PSLRA pleading standard).
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B. An Emerging Consensus
1. What is "Deliberate Recklessness?"
When the Ninth Circuit first announced its interpretation of the
PSLRA pleading requirements in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities
239Litigation, commentators and other courts viewed the holding as
evincing a particularly stringent and unique take on the scienter stan-
dard.24 Many understood the court's "deliberate recklessness" as implic-
241itly changing the substantive level of proof needed to show scienter.
Additionally, critics took issue with the court's seemingly categorical
denial of the sufficiency of motive and opportunity to support allegations
242of scienter.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has retreated from this so-called ex-
treme interpretation in recent cases and there may very well be less to
these perceived changes to the standard than commentators have argued.
The Ninth Circuit's "deliberate recklessness" standard is arguably essen-
tially the same as the Sixth Circuit's "akin to conscious disregard, 243
which both the First and Eleventh Circuits adopted. 2" Similarly, it is
difficult to discern where the Tenth Circuit's "extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care ... known to the defendant'"2 45 test would
lead to a different result than the Ninth Circuit's test.
Interestingly, in both Lipton v. PathoGenesis Corp., and in another
Ninth Circuit case, Gompper v. VISX, Inc.,246 the Ninth Circuit appeared
to downplay any differences between its interpretation of the PSLRA and
that of its sister circuits. In particular, the court emphasized the need to
view a complaint in its "entirety," directing district courts to apply a bal-
ancing test in considering an allegation, "together with any reasonable
inferences. 2 47 Thus, it would seem that the Ninth Circuit views motive
and opportunity as useful indicators for ascertaining a defendant's intent.
239. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 1999).
240. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 33, at 1316-19 ("In addition to forming a new and uncertain
standard of scienter under the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit established a seemingly impossible barrier
to private individuals bringing a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.").
241. See id. at 1317-18.
242. See, e.g., Guido, supra note 20, at 534-46.
243. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
245. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1258.
246. 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs in Gompper alleged that VISX, a maker of
laser vision-correction devices, knew, or should have known, that its patents were invalid. Gompper,
298 F.3d at 895. The complaint further alleged that the defendants' optimistic growth and earnings
statements were thus recklessly or intentionally misleading. Id. The circuit court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead facts showing that the defendants had knowledge, at the time the state-
ments were made, of the likelihood of the patents' invalidity. Id. at 896.
247. Id. at 897. But see Annual Review, supra note 154, at 844 (stating that one aspect of the
First Circuit's analysis in Aldridge was "almost directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gompper").
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2. Are the Second and Third Circuits Less Strict?
Though both the Second Circuit, in Press v. Chemical Investment
Services Corp. ,248 and the Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Securities Liti-
gation,249 held that allegations of motive and'opportunity alone may es-
tablish scienter, subsequent cases suggest otherwise. Cases that have
survived a motion to dismiss have had further elements constituting
250strong evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness. In Novak v.
Kasaks, the Second Circuit emphasized that plaintiffs must allege with
sufficient particularity the facts that support their claim. 251 In another
Second Circuit case, In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation,252 the
court determined that those Plaintiffs had adequately pled both motive
and opportunity and conscious misbehavior.2 5  The allegations in the
Scholastic pleadings likely would also be sufficient under Fleming's
"taken as a whole" test.
25 4
Despite their rhetoric, the Second and Third Circuits actually apply
a fact-specific "taken as a whole" test. As in the Tenth Circuit, not all
motives matter. Certain motives are more indicative of scienter than are
others. Plaintiffs must supplement or support the "opportunity" portion




All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have incorporated
the "strong inference" requirement in scienter pleading mandated by the
PSLRA. Irrespective of the exact details of the pleading standard they
claim to have adopted, the preceding anlaysis shows the courts apply
some form of heightened scrutiny test to allegations of scienter in plead-
ings under Rule lOb-5. None of these tests appears to differ in any sub-
stantial way from that used by the Tenth Circuit in Fleming.256
248. 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
249. 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
250. See Ann Morales Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground:" Towards a Harmonized
Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 153, 167-74 (2001).
251. Novak, 216F.3dat311.
252. 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2001).
253. Scholastic, 252 F.3d at 76.
254. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1263.
255. See id. at 1261-63.
256. Many commentators have argued that the Supreme Court needs to resolve what these
commentators see as a circuit split. See Guido, supra note 20, at 502; Erin Brady, Comment, Deter-
mining the Proper Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
After In re Silicon Graphics, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 510-12 (2001); Karmel, supra note 53 (speculat-
ing that the Supreme Court would likely maintain severe or deliberate recklessness as a basis for
scienter); David E. Rovella, Securities Reform Spawns Discord, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2001, at Al.
The Eighth Circuit noted that the split may be "more apparent than real." Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001). Some differences still exist between the




1. Criticism of the Scienter Pleading Requirement
The dissent in a recent Eighth Circuit case articulated a major point
of contention257 that applies to the approaches of all the circuits. The
dissent disagreed with the majority's application of its scienter standard
because "[m]any relevant facts in securities cases may not be discover-
able at the pleading stage because they are known only by key insid-
ers. ' 258 Even though the PSLRA strengthened pleading standards, "it
does not require that a case be proven in the complaint. ' 259 This prob-
lematic requirement that plaintiffs provide particular facts in their com-
plaints, however, should not be attributed to the PSLRA's scienter stan-
dard. The heightened scienter standard arguably deters poorly pled, boi-
lerplate complaints and forces plaintiffs to present and factually-support
a cogent and well thought out argument in their pleadings. Because of
this deterrence, even should Congress choose to revisit the PSLRA, it
appears doubtful that Congress will revise the scienter requirement. It
seems more likely that Congress might change other PSLRA provisions,
such as the mandatory stay of discovery, or possibly include some type
of fee-shifting mechanism in an effort to further discourage unfounded
securities fraud suits. 260
2. Indicators of Fraud
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' counsel must put
together a detailed and highly specific recitation of facts in the pleadings
that support a strong inference that a defendant had both motive and op-
portunity, as well as indicia of either conscious behavior or recklessness.
The following factors represent some of the strongest indicators of poten-
tial fraud: (1) sudden, large drops in stock price; (2) suspicious restate-
ments of revenue, announcements about financial irregularities, or
changes in, or replacement of, management or accounting firms;
(3) unusual insider trading or executive compensation strongly impacted
amount and kind of factual detail required at the pleading stage. However, the Supreme Court may
agree with the Eighth Circuit because it has, to date, declined to address these perceived discrepan-
cies. See In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071
(2001); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 122 S. Ct.
2616 (2002); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
257. See In re K-Tel Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 900 (8th Cir. 2002) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
258. K-Tel, 300 F.3d at 900 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting); see Wilson, supra note 41, at 334-36 (arguing that the
PSLRA does not contain a provision that controls motions for summary judgment and that in the
Ninth Circuit, if a plaintiff manages to survive a motion to dismiss, he is very likely to have substan-
tially proven his case).
260. See Lyle Roberts, Reforming Litigation Reform Act Bush Should Back Fee-Shifting Plan
that Targets Meritless Class Actions, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 8, 2001, at 7 ("Plaintiffs
law firms appear to be offsetting the effect of having a higher percentage of their cases dismissed
under the Reform Act's stricter pleading standards by filing more cases.").
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When the Tenth Circuit decided City of Philadelphia v. Fleming
Cos.,262 a case of first impression in the circuit, the court made its stance
on the PSLRA's heightened pleading of scienter quite clear. Since the
court joined the other "middle ground" circuits, plaintiffs in the Tenth
Circuit cannot plead motive and opportunity alone.26 3 The court categori-
cally held that allegations of motives attributable to most companies or
corporate officers are not sufficient.264 To survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiffs allegations, "taken as a whole" and in the context of the total-
ity of the pleadings, must support a strong inference of scienter.265 This
"totality" of the pleadings test requires a highly individualized and fact-
specific analysis.
Plaintiffs' attorneys practicing within the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction
must endeavor to structure the totality of their pleadings so as to tell a
compelling story that will convince the court that hears the case that the
defendants likely perpetrated fraud. Most importantly, the plaintiffs must
provide persuasive factual support for their allegations. On the other
hand, defendants' attorneys, in a motion to dismiss, should focus on any
factual weaknesses, inadequacies, or lack of support in plaintiffs' plead-
ings. A defendant's attorney should explore any opportunity to character-
ize those pleadings as merely conclusory. Because the circuits employ
similar tests, attorneys should carefully scrutinize relevant court deci-
sions from all circuits.
Charles F. Hart*
261. Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiffs Per-
spective, SG091 ALI-ABA 459, 491-97 (2002). See Elliot J. Weiss, Complex Litigation at the Mil-
lennium: Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001), for a cogent analysis of
the requirements for pleading a strong inference of scienter.
262. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
263. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1262-63.
264. Id. at 1269.
265. Id. at 1261-63.
266. See id. at 1263.
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AFTER APPRENDI:
RECENT CASES IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Criminal defendants in this country enjoy a constitutional protection
that requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element that defines the crime with which the defendant is charged.' In
calling what appears to be an element of a crime something else, such as
a "rebuttable presumption" or "affirmative defense," legislatures have
evaded the burden of submitting these issues to a jury to be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.2 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, such
elements are referred to as "sentencing factors.",3 Under the guidelines a
sentencing judge need only find such sentencing factors by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.4
In June 2000, the landmark decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey
5
sharply curtailed this use of sentence enhancers. The Supreme Court held
in Apprendi, that the Constitution requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.",6 This ruling effectively shifted the
burden of proving sentencing factors that increase the statutory maxi-
mum penalty away from the sentencing judge and the preponderance of
the evidence standard.7 Instead, the burden was placed back on the
prosecutor, with the attendant burden of proving the sentencing factor as
an element to the jury under the more rigorous beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.8
Although the ruling in Apprendi produced a broad range of effects
on sentencing, 9 this paper focuses on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit's interpretation and application of the Apprendi rule
in certain cases decided between September 1, 2001, and August 31,
2002. Specifically, this paper examines how the Tenth Circuit has ap-
plied the Apprendi rule where a defendant's minimum, rather than
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970).




5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
7. See Olsen, supra note 2, at 812.
8. Id.
9. See Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing; Changes in Guide-
lines, Raft of Appeals Feared After Justices' Decision, WASH. POST, July 23, 2000, at Al.
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maximum, sentence is increased by sentencing factors that were never
alleged or proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part I of this survey reviews several landmark cases decided by the
Supreme Court from 1970 to the present. Part II of this survey then ana-
lyzes two cases from the Tenth Circuit decided in 2001 and 2002, exam-
ining how the Tenth Circuit court interpreted and applied the ruling in
Apprendi. Finally, Part UI of this survey suggests that the Apprendi ra-
tionale be extended to cover increased statutory minimum sentencing, as
well as maximum as was prescribed in Apprendi.
I. BACKGROUND
To appreciate how the Apprendi rule arrived at the Tenth Circuit, it
is important to examine some of the key decisions that laid the ground-
work for Apprendi.
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided the landmark In re Winship l°
case. Therein, the Court addressed the question of whether the reasonable
doubt standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard,
is required during the adjudication of a juvenile case where the juvenile
is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult." The case involved a twelve-year-old boy who entered a locker
and stole $112 from a woman's purse.' 2 If an adult had committed the
act, the crime of larceny could be charged.' 3 After acknowledging that
the evidence against the defendant might not amount to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the trial judge stated that such proof was not required
under the Fourteenth Amendment, relying instead on a preponderance of
the evidence standard.' 4 After the trial court's decision was affirmed on
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.15
In Winship, the Court codified the principle that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."' 6 Although the Winship Court clearly established
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "all essential elements of guilt"' 7
was a requirement of due process of law, the Court left open the question
of how to define an essential element. 8 Plainly favoring the more rigor-ous reasonable doubt standard, the Court stated that due process requires
10. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359.
12. Id. at 360.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 360-61.
16. Id. at 364.
17. See id. at 361.
18. Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land:" Statutory Mini-
mums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 Am. J. CRIM. L. 377, 391 (2002).
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that no one should lose his or her liberty unless the government has
"'borne the burden of... convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this
end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable.... ."19
A. Clarifying Winship
The Supreme Court upheld the rationale of Winship when it decided
the 1975 case of Mullaney v. Wilbur. At issue in Mullaney was a Maine
murder statute which included "malice aforethought, either express or
implied," as an element of the crime of murder. The trial court in-
structed the jury that "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensa-
ble element of the crime of murder., 22 Further, the jury was instructed
that "if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional
and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied, unless
the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation., 23 The Court con-
cluded that shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove an element of
the crime charged violates the Due Process Clause under Winship, and
the burden was on the prosecution to prove absence of the heat of pas-
24sion on sudden provocation under the Maine statute. In Mullaney, the
district court and initially the First Circuit held that "malice afore-
thought" was an essential element of the crime charged.25 The Court, in
upholding Winship, would not allow the legislature to require the defen-
dant to prove the absence of malice aforethought rather than requiring
26the prosecution to prove its presence.
If the decision in Mullaney removed some of the power of the legis-
lature to define what constitutes an essential element of a crime, Patter-
son v. New York,27 decided two years later in 1977,28 perhaps gave some
of that power back. In Patterson, the defendant was charged with murder
under a New York statute similar to Maine's, except the New York stat-
ute did not require "malice aforethought, either express or implied.,
29
Under the New York statute, a defendant could instead reduce his or her
sentence by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was
committed while the defendant experienced an "extreme emotional dis-
19. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958)).
20. 421 U.S. 684, 684 (1975).
21. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 687 n.3 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed
1976)).
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 703-04.
25. Id. at 690.
26. Id. at 700-01.
27. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
28. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197.
29. Id. at 198.
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turbance." 30 The defendant in the case argued this violated his due proc-
ess rights, in much the same way the Maine statute had violated Mul-
laney's, because proving extreme emotional disturbance operated as an
affirmative defense.
The Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeals' re-
jection of the defendant's argument and distinguished Patterson from
Mullaney on the ground that the statute did not shift the burden to the
defendant to disprove an essential element of the crime. 32 The Patterson
Court emphasized its position by stating that if an intentional killing is
shown by proving each element of the crime, "the State intends to deal
with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates the mitigating
circumstances. 33
Under both the Maine and New York statutes, a defendant would be
guilty of murder where the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally killed another. 34 Under both stat-
utes, the defendant can reduce a murder charge to one of manslaughter
by proving mitigating circumstances, either by rebutting a "presumption"
in Maine, or by asserting an "affirmative defense" in New York.35 How-
36ever, in Mullaney the sentence was found unconstitutional, while in
Patterson it was affirmed.37 The Court effectively reached opposite con-
38
clusions in these cases under similar statutes. The important difference
between the New York and Maine statutes, however, is that the language
of the New York statute does not specifically allow the jury to presume
an essential element of the crime charged.39
B. What is an "Element?"
After Patterson, there remained the question of how far legislatures
might go in redefining elements of a crime as sentencing factors.40 The
core issue presented in Mullaney and Patterson, of exactly what aspects
of a crime are required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, was fur-
ther addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1986 case of McMillan v.
41Pennsylvania. In this case, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
30. Levine, supra note 18, at 392 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney
1975)).
31. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 206.
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)
(McKinney 1975).
35. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)
(McKinney 1975).
36. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703.
37. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
38. See Levine, supra note 18, at 392.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 393.
41. 477 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).
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a legislature enacting a statute requiring sentencing judges to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence based on "sentencing factors" presented to
the judge at sentencing and found only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.4 Under the Pennsylvania statute, such sentencing factors were
specifically distinguished from elements of the crime.43 The Court as-
serted that the rationale from Patterson, that legislatures have great free-
dom to characterize elements of crimes, controlled the present case.44
Applying this rationale, the Court concluded that Pennsylvania was free
to define what might otherwise appear to be elements of a crime as "sen-
tencing factors," thereby alleviatinf the State from the burden of proving
them beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 "Patterson teaches that we should
hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its
chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties.
46
The specific sentencing scheme addressed in McMillan was Penn-
sylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,47 which provided that
after a jury had convicted a defendant of certain enumerated felonies, a
48sentencing judge could increase the sentence within the statutory range.
Under this act, if a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant committed the felony he or she was convicted of while "visi-
bly possess[ing] a firearm," that judge could impose a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of five years. 49 The Court noted bluntly that the statute
acted to "divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less
than five years. '50 The Court outlined five reasons for finding this
sentencing scheme constitutional. 5' First, the statute did not transgress
52the limits set forth in Patterson. Second, the statute did not create a
presumption against the defendant, thereby divesting the prosecution of
its burden of proving guilt.5 3 Third, the statute did not increase the maxi-
mum penalty afforded the sentencing judge.54 Fourth, the statute created
no separate offense with a separate penalty. 55 Finally, the statute did not
42. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-81.
43. Id. at 82 n. 1.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Id. at 85-86.
46. Id. at 86.
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
48. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81; see Analisa Swan, Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Scaling Back of
the Sentencing Factor Revolution and the Resurrection of Criminal Defendant Rights, How Far is
Too Far?, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 729, 739 (2002) (stating that under the statute applied in McMillan, after
a defendant was convicted, a judge could extend the defendant's sentence if the judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm).
49. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (a)).
50. Id. at 81-82.
51. Id. at 86-88.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 87.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 88.
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have the effect of allowing the sentencing factor to be the "tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense. '56
Although the McMillan holding may appear to be a blow against the
rights of criminal defendants, the Court stressed that the freedom of the
legislature to pursue this course was not without limits. 57 For instance,
the Court pointed out that the Due Process Clause prevents states from
"discarding the presumption of innocence" and the burden of proving
guilt.58 In fact, the Court stressed, the statute at issue only became effec-
tive after the defendant was convicted of the crime charged. 59 Therefore,
the fact that the legislature categorized an aspect of a crime as a "sen-
tencing factor," rather than an actual element of the underlying offense,
was constitutional because it was within the states established power to
define the elements of its crimes. 6° The McMillan Court similarly failed
to delineate the extent to which legislatures may go in defining, or rede-
fining, elements of crimes as sentencing factors, despite the five-part
"test" the Court outlined.61
In 1998, in the case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States,62 a 5-4
decision, the Court held that every factor of the McMillan five-part test
63need not be met, even where a sentencing factor increases the statutory
penalty, because the judge may determine the presence or absence of
facts with respect to sentencing factors.64 Under the statute at issue in
Almendarez-Torres, a deported alien, who illegally re-entered the United
States, faced a prison sentence of up to two years. 65 However, if the sen-
tencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the previous
deportation was for the commission of an aggravated felony, the judge
could impose a sentence of as much as twenty years. 66 The Court recog-
nized that because neither Winship, nor Mullaney, nor Patterson pro-
vided the necessary guidance to determine whether a sentencing factor,
here, recidivism, should be an element, it was necessary to apply the
McMillan five part test.67 In doing so, the Court listed the five parts of
the test and concluded that the statute at issue
56. Id.
57. Id. at 85-86.
58. Id. at 87.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 86.
61. See Swan, supra note 48, at 741.
62. 523 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1998).
63. Almandarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244-46.
64. Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Ele-
ments" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1059
(1999).
65. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
66. Id. at 226 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)).
67. See id. at 239-43.
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failed only the third prong because the sentencing factor increased the
maximum allowable penalty.
68
The Court's reasoning focused on both a careful reading of the stat-
ute as well as recidivism's typical role as a sentencing factor. 69 In charac-
terizing recidivism as a sentencing factor, the Court stated that the "rele-
vant statutory subject matter is recidivism," and that it "is as typical a
sentencing factor as one might imagine., 70 Despite the potential for an
increased maximum penalty under this statute due to a finding of recidi-
vism by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the Court "express[ed] no
view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sen-
tencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of the sen-
tence.",7' The Court based this statement on the fact that the defendant
had admitted his recidivism when he pled guilty, and it would therefore
be difficult to show that a heightened standard of proof would make any
difference in his case.72 Although the Almendarez-Torres opinion ap-
peared to embrace the legislature's power to define the difference be-
tween an element and a sentencing factor, the Court's emphasis seemed
to shift once again, just one year later.
C. Drawing the Line on Elements: Jones v. United States
73
In 1999, the Court decided the case of Jones v. United States.74 The
Jones opinion clarified the Court's position on the issue of what aspects
of crimes can properly be classified as elements or sentencing factors,
which had been hinted at in earlier decisions in this area.75 At issue in
Jones was a federal carjacking statute76 that provided a maximum sen-
tence of fifteen years.77 However, if serious bodily injury or death re-
sulted, the maximum penalty increased to twenty-five years or life, re-
spectively. 78 The Court held that injury and death were in fact not sen-
tence enhancers, but were essential elements.79 In doing so, however, the
Court recognized the possibility of the opposite view.80 The Court rea-
soned that "[any doubt that might be prompted by the arguments for that
other reading should, however, be resolved against it under the rule, re-
peatedly affirmed, that 'where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
68. Id. at 242-43.
69. Id. at 228, 230.
70. Id. at 230.
71. Id. at 248.
72. Id. at 247-48.
73. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
74. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
75. Id. at 251 n. II ("[Ojur decision today does not announce any new principle of constitu-
tional law, but merely interprets a particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns
that have emerged through a series of our decisions over the past quarter century.").
76. Id. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988)).
77. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
78. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
79. Id. at 239.
80. Id.
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tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter."'
8'
In language that perhaps foretold the later Apprendi rule, the Court
stated: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.,
82
In response to the dissent's concern that the holding would interfere
with the states' efforts to bring uniformity to their sentencing guidelines
and practices, the Court emphasized that "our decision today does not
announce any new principle of constitutional law, but merely interprets a
particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns that
have emerged through a series of our decisions over the past quarter cen-
tury.' 83 This narrow holding was restricted to facts that increase the
maximum penalty and did not directly address the issue raised when a
sentencing factor increases the minimum sentence imposed.
84
In 2000, the Court decided the case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.
85
The Court addressed the issue of "whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing
an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20
years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
,,86doubt. In Apprendi, the defendant was charged with several counts,
including first-degree murder, after firing shots into the house of an Afri-
can-American couple.87 The defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful pos-
session of a firearm in the second degree, which carried a sentence of
five to ten years.88 At sentencing, if the judge found this crime was not
motivated by racial bias, the maximum penalty for this count would be
ten years.8 9 However, if the judge found the crime was motivated by ra-
cial bias, the allowable penalty would increase to thirty years, with a
maximum penalty of twenty years on the weapons charge.90 At sentenc-
ing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crimes
Apprendi was convicted of committing were motivated by racial bias,
81. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
82. Id. at 243 n.6.
83. Id. at 252 n. 11.
84. See id. at 243 n.6.
85. 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000).
86. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 469-70.




and the sentence enhancer therefore applied. 91 The defendant was sen-
tenced to twelve years on the weapons possession charge.92 Effectively,
the defendant had been sentenced to twelve years for a crime that carried
a maximum penalty of ten years.93 After the state supreme court affirmed
the sentence,94 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed in a 5-4 decision.
95
After examining its cases in this area, the Court confirmed the opin-
ion expressed in Jones that other than prior convictions, facts that in-
crease penalties beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.96 The Court further endorsed
the rule proposed in a concurring opinion in Jones that, "'[it is unconsti-
tutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts
that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defen-
dant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 97 In light of this, the Court held that
use of the hate-crime sentence enhancer, which had been found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and which had effectively raised the maxi-
mum penalty from ten to twenty years against the defendant, was uncon-
stitutional.98
The principal dissent accused the Apprendi majority of overruling
McMillan, which upheld an increased mandatory minimum sentencing
scheme based on sentencing factors. 99 Justice Stevens, writing for the
Apprendi majority, specifically denied this claim in a footnote,'0° instead
limiting the McMillan holding to "cases that do not involve the imposi-
tion of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the of-
fense established by the jury's verdict."' 0'1 Stopping short of overturning
McMillan, the Court "reserve[d] for another day the question whether
stare decisis considerations preclude reconsideration of its [McMillan]
narrower holding." 102
After Apprendi, the question of whether McMillan still stood was
presented to the court in Harris v. United States.10 3 In Harris, the defen-
dant was charged with selling illegal narcotics while carrying an uncon-
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 470, 471.
94. Id. at 472.
95. Id. at 468,474, 497.
96. Id. at 490.
97. Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
98. See id. at 470, 491-93.
99. Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is incumbent on the Court... to admit that it is
overruling McMillan.").
100. Id. at 487 n.13.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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cealed semiautomatic pistol at his side. °4 The defendant was charged
under a federal statute that provided a person convicted of carrying a
firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime a minimum
sentence of no less than seven years, in addition to the punishment for
the crime of drug trafficking. 105 The defendant pleaded guilty and was
convicted of the drug trafficking charge. 106 The government assumed that
the statutory provision defined a single crime and that brandishing a fire-
arm was, therefore, a sentencing factor; thus, the indictment mentioned
nothing about brandishing. 0 7 The district court found that the defendant
had brandished a gun and, pursuant to the statute, imposed the mandatory
minimum sentence of seven years.108
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that
brandishing a gun was an element of a separate offense that must be in-
cluded in the indictment and conviction. °9 The court relied on the rea-
soning that McMillan foreclosed his argument "that if brandishing is a
sentencing factor, as a statutory matter the statute is unconstitutional in
light of Apprendi."'10
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant in Harris argued
that the constitutional concerns evident in Apprendi applied to sentencing
factors that increase a defendant's minimum penalty. In affirming the
Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court rejected the defendant's argument in
another 5-4 decision. 1 2 The Court began its analysis with a construction
of the challenged statute. 1 3 The Court drew a clear distinction between
the elements of the crime listed in the statute and the sentencing factors
listed after the elements.' 14 The majority reasoned that sentencing factors
do not become elements merely because legislatures require the judge to
impose a minimum sentence when those facts are found. 15 The Court
noted that there is no reason, when viewed from a historical context, that
the framers of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would have considered
sentencing factors as elements of a crime, even though they may be
stigmatizing and punitive.'16 The Court added, "[T]his conclusion mightbe questioned if there were extensive historical evidence showing that
104. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550.
105. Id. at 550-51 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a)(ii) (1994)).
106. Id. at 571-73.




111. Id. at 564-65.
112. See id. at 548, 551-52.
113. Id. at 551-52.
114. Id. at 555-56.




facts increasing the defendant's minimum sentence (but not affecting the
maximum) have, as a matter of course, been treated as elements."
' 17
Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, recognized that McMillan
and Apprendi were in conflict, and that the "Court's holding today there-
fore rests on either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the very princi-
ples that animated Apprendi."" 8 He added that his decision would be to
reaffirm Apprendi and reverse the Fourth Circuit, thereby overruling the
McMillan holding. 119
Interestingly, on the same day the Court decided Harris, it also af-
firmed the limits on increased statutory maximum penalties set forth in
Apprendi when it decided Ring v. Arizona.120 The Ring Court invalidated
capital sentencing schemes that allow judges to find "aggravating fac-
tors" by a preponderance of the evidence, where such factors can lead to
imposition of the death penalty.
121
In this discussion, it is also important to note the Tenth Circuit's
2000 decision of United States v. Hishaw.122 The defendant in Hishaw
was indicted for intending to distribute "approximately two... ounces of
cocaine base."' 123 Two ounces of cocaine base was enough to trigger a
sentence of ten-years to life under the relevant statute. 24 However, the
term "approximately two ounces" could just as easily be interpreted as
actually requiring less than the two ounces to trigger the ten-year to life
sentence. Additionally, there was no indication that the jury actually
determined what quantity of cocaine the defendant possessed. 126 The
Hishaw Court concluded that because of the "ambiguous allegation as to
the quantity of cocaine base involved, and because of Apprendi,. . . the
failure to require specific findings regarding the quantity of cocaine con-
stitutes a 'plain or obvious' error."'
127
As evidenced by the disagreement found in Harris128 and
McMillan,129 the Supreme Court decisions in many of these cases are
strongly divided. At present, facts regarded by the legislature as sentenc-
ing factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
unless they affect the sentence imposed by increasing the maximum al-
117. id.
118. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607-08.
122. 235 F.3d 565, 571-72 (10th Cir. 2000).
123. Hishaw, 235 F.3d at 575.




128. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 548.
129. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80.
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lowable penalty.' 30 Furthermore, sentencing factors that increase the
minimum sentence, even substantially, are outside the purview of Ap-
prendi.13 However, the state of the law in this area appears uncertain and
the decisions continue to be volatile. Indeed, even the circuit courts have
not been entirely consistent in interpreting and applying Apprendi.
32
IH. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
A. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Lujan
133
a. Facts
Defendant Joseph Lujan, along with a co-defendant, set up a sale of
one pound of methamphetamine to an undercover law enforcement
agent. 134 After he met with the agent, provided a sample, and discussed
price and payment, Lujan agreed to supply more methamphetamine.1
35
When Lujan brought more of the drug for the agent to purchase, the
agent left the scene, purportedly to get more money for the purchase .
36
Officers then apprehended Lujan and seized three pounds of metham-
phetamine from the scene. 137 Lujan admitted he had originally delivered
the methamphetamine to a co-defendant's house, that he knew what the
drug was, and that he was to receive compensation for his part in the
sale. 138 The defendant was indicted on three counts arising from this at-
tempt to sell approximately three pounds of methamphetamine to the
agent 139 The defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he
pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiring with his co-defendants to
possess and distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine.1
40
The sentencing judge calculated Lujan's sentence under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to be between 108 and 135 months, and then said that
Lujan would be sentenced to 108 months. 141 The probation officer then
130. See Criminal Law and Procedure-Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 230, 234-35 (2002)
[hereinafter Criminal Law and Procedure].
131. See United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1171 (10th Cir. 2002).
132. Compare United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (extending Apprendi to
mandatory minimum sentences), overruled by Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), with
United States v. Mazzio, 2002 WL 31164256 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Harris overruled the
Circuit's previous decisions that applied Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the Sixth
Circuit also recognized that Harris overruled Strayhorn in United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377
(6th Cir. 2002)).
133. 268 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001).
134. Lujan, 268 F.3d at 966.
135. Id. at 966-67.
136. Id. at 967.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 966.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 967.
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pointed out that under the statute the defendant was charged with violat-
ing, he was subject to a mandatory minimum of ten years, which the
judge then imposed.' 42 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant
argued that his sentence violated the principle enunciated in Apprendi,
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'143 The de-
fendant's contention was that because of ambiguity in the indictment, its
language could be interpreted to mean either fifty grams of pure
methamphetamine or fifty grams of a mixture containing only a trace
amount of methamphetamine.' 44 If the indictment were interpreted to
mean a mixture, the defendant's minimum sentence would be five years
instead of ten. 1
45
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit at once recognized that the defendant's case, on
the facts, did not reveal an Apprendi error, 46 since the drug quantity that
the defendant pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced for, was specified in
the indictment. 47 For the defendant to prevail, therefore, the court ac-
knowledged that he had to "convince [the court] first to modify the rule
of Apprendi by making it applicable to the mandatory minimum sentence
established by a particular statute."' 148 The court recognized the Sixth
Circuit opinion in United States v. Strayhorn,149 which interpreted Ap-
prendi as mandating that a drug quantity that triggers a mandatory mini-
mum sentence must be included in an indictment and submitted to a
jury.' 50 The court said, however, that this was not enough: "Even if we
were to follow Strayhorn and extend the rationale of Apprendi to manda-
tory minimum sentences, however, that alone would not entitle Lujan to
relief." 151 Again, this was because the government's indictment did al-
lege possession of a quantity of the drug sufficient to trigger the manda-
tory minimum, to which the defendant had pled guilty.1
The defendant's argument, however, depended on the specific lan-
guage contained in the statute. 53 If the fifty grams of methamphetamine
referred to in the indictment could actually mean fifty grams of a mixture
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
144. Id. at 969.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 967-68.
147. ld. at 968.
148. Id.
149. 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001).
150. Lujan, 268 F.3d at 969 (citing United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462, 468-71 (6th Cir.
2001) (extending Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the Sixth Circuit recognized that
Harris overruled this extension in Mazzio and Leachman).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 966-67.
153. Id. at 969.
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containing a trace amount of methamphetamine, then the minimum sen-
tence would be five years instead of ten. 154 Reviewing only for plain er-
ror, the court concluded that the indictment meant fifty grams of
methamphetamine, not a mixture. 155 The court concluded that the manda-
tory minimum sentence was therefore proper under the statute. 56 Be-
cause of this, the defendant's sentence would not have changed even if
the court had adopted the rule urged by the defendant. 157 In reaching this
conclusion, the court declined to actually investigate whether Apprendi
should be applied to mandatory minimum sentences, and affirmed the
sentence imposed by the district court.
58
2. United States v. Avery'
59
a. Facts
On January 30, 2000, a confidential informant notified drug en-
forcement agents that a man identified as John Avery, the defendant, was
selling crack cocaine from his home, and that the informant had person-
ally seen four ounces of cocaine at the defendant's residence.' Based on
this information, the agents arranged for the informant to buy cocaine
from the defendant at the defendant's residence.' 61 Thereafter the agents
searched the home and recovered, among other items, more than twenty
ounces of cocaine and several firearms, including a Colt AR 15 .223
caliber rifle with a high capacity magazine.16 Avery admitted that he
owned the weapons and acknowledged that he sold cocaine from the
residence.1
63
On March 7, 2000, an eight-count indictment was issued against the
defendant.164 The defendant was later convicted on all counts, 16and sub-
sequently appealed the convictions and sentences on count six and count
one, which alleged the possession of firearms and cocaine, respec-
tively. 166 With respect to count six, the defendant argued that the indict-
ment failed to allege the rifle he was charged with possessing during a
trafficking crime was a "semi-automatic assault weapon."' 167 Under the
applicable statute, "semi-automatic assault weapons" are defined as
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 970.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 295 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2002).
160. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1165.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1165-66.
163. Id. at 1166.
164. Id. at 1163.
165. Id. at 1164.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1169.
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weapons "known as ... Colt AR 15." 168 The defendant was sentenced to
a statutory minimum of five years, but the district court increased this
sentence to ten years because the firearm that the jury found the defen-
dant possessed was a "semi-automatic assault weapon."' 69 Yet neither the
indictment nor the jury instructions discussed whether the firearm was a
"semiautomatic assault weapon."'170 The defendant argued that even if
weapon type was a sentencing factor, the weapon type still had to be
"alleged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" in order for the court to invoke the mandatory minimum
sentence. 171
Additionally, the defendant appealed count one of the indictment,
which charged him with possessing thirteen grams of cocaine. 72 Accord-
ing to the statute the defendant was charged under, this amount of co-
caine would raise the statutory maximum penalty from twenty to forty.
years. 173 The defendant argued, therefore, that the district court's failure




As to count six, the Tenth Circuit began its response to the defen-
dant's argument by referring to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Harris, and its own ruling in Lujan.175 The court noted that under those
cases, Apprendi's rationale does not apply "where a fact increases a de-
fendant's mandatory minimum sentence but does not increase the maxi-
mum statutory penalty facing a defendant.' 76 The court did not stop
there, however. Even if the defendant's argument was not foreclosed by
the court's interpretation of Harris, the argument would still fail due to
the wording of the statute under which he was charged. 177 When the jury
convicted the defendant on count six of the indictment, it found the de-
fendant guilty of possessing a "Colt AR 15 .223 Caliber rifle" beyond a
reasonable doubt.178 The court called this fact dispositive because in the
statute the defendant was convicted of violating, "semi-automatic assault
weapons" are defined as weapons "known as ... Colt AR 15. ' The
fact that was necessary to apply the mandatory minimum sentence had
168. Id. at 1171-72.
169. Id. at 1169.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1171.
172. Id. at 1181-82.
173. Id. at 1182.
174. Id. at 1181.




179. Id. at 1171-72.
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been charged and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 180 There-
fore, the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence was properly invoked
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction on count six.,
81
As to the defendant's appeal of his sentence on count one, the court
began by recognizing that the thirteen grams of cocaine charged in the
indictment was enough to raise the statutory maximum penalty from
twenty to forty years.' 82 The jury, however, was never instructed on the
quantity issue.'8 3 Therefore, there would be an Apprendi violation if the
defendant was sentenced to more than the statutory maximum.' 84 The
court recognized that on this point its own decisions had been inconsis-
tent. 185 In some cases, the Tenth Circuit found that failure to submit drug
quantity to the jury was not erroneous under Apprendi.186 In other cases,• . 187
the Tenth Circuit did find error in such a circumstance. However, in
this case, because the sentence imposed, seventy-eight months, fell be-
low the original twenty-year maximum, the court declined to find an
Apprendi violation, despite the increased maximum possible penalty. 18
The Tenth Circuit based its conclusion on the principle that no "substan-
tial right" was violated if the sentence imposed was below the maximum,
even assuming there was error in failing to submit drug quantity to the
jury. 189 The court affirmed the defendant's conviction on count one, aswell as the convictions on all other counts.190
B. Sixth Circuit
1. United States v. Strayhorn'
91
The rule from McMillan, that sentencing factors need only be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence where such findings increase
the statutory minimum penalty that can be imposed on a defendant, was
questioned after the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, almost fifteen
years after the Court's decision in McMillan.192 The Sixth Circuit ap-
peared to be alone in not following McMillan with respect to mandatory
180. Id. at 1172.
181. Id.




186. Id. (citing United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001)).
187. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1182 (citing United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir.
2001)); United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 575 (10th Cir. 2000).
188. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1182.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (extending Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the
Sixth Circuit recognized that Harris overruled this extension in Mazzio and Leachman).
192. Harris, 536 U.S. at 548.
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minimum sentences, 193 and ignored the Court's holding in deciding thecase of United States v. Strayhorn. 194
a. Facts
In Strayhorn, an informant notified the Drug Enforcement Admini-
stration ("DEA") that the defendant regularly supplied him with mari-
juana. 195 Upon executing a search warrant at the defendant's residence,
agents recovered 48 pounds of marijuana, three thousand dollars in cash,
and a handgun. 196 The defendant was indicted and count one charged him
with conspiracy to possess and "distribute 'a measurable quantity of
marijuana."' 1 97 The defendant pled guilty to this count, but reserved the
right to challenge the quantity of marijuana attributed to him and relevant
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). 98 The
United States Probation Office's pre-sentence report attributed a total of
414 pounds of marijuana to the defendant, yet gave no indication of how
it reached this figure. 199 Taking the defendant's prior criminal history and
the fact that he accepted responsibility for the acts charged into account,
the defendant was eligible for a sentence of between 57 and 71 months
under the Guidelines.20 The probation officer insisted, however, that the
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to possess 414 pounds by a defen-
dant with a prior felony drug conviction was ten years.20 1 The defendant
reiterated that he wished to plead guilty only to possession of a total of
22 20348 pounds. °2 The defendant was sentenced to ten years.
b. Decision
On appeal the defendant asserted that the district court violated his
due process rights by finding the drug quantity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 204 The Sixth Circuit noted that pursuant to Apprendi, "the gov-
ernment must name in the indictment the quantity of drugs for which it
seeks to hold the defendant responsible, ' 2°5 and that if the drug quantity
subjects the defendant to an enhanced sentence, it must be considered an
element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor.206 The court then
vacated and remanded the defendant's case on the rationale that the find-
ing of drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence raised the sen-
193. United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 921 (6th Cir. 2001).
194. 250 F.3d at 470.








203. Id. at 466.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 467-68.
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tence from a maximum of ten years to a minimum of ten years. 20 7 In do-
ing so, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
208Amendment rights had been violated.
In deciding Strayhorn, the Sixth Circuit never acknowledged the
Supreme Court's holding in McMillan, which would have required a
different conclusion under these facts. Additionally, the Supreme Court's
decision in Harris clearly refuses to apply the Apprendi analysis to situa-
tions involving increased mandatory minimum sentences. 2°
2. United States v. Mazzio
210
a. Facts
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit court decided United States v. Mazzio,2 '
wherein it concluded that Harris overruled its earlier holding in Stray-
horn.212 In April 1999, the defendant, Anthony Mazzio, was stopped by
members of a drug task force in Wayne County, Michigan, on the suspi-
cion that he was involved in narcotics activity.213 When members of the
task force searched the vehicle the defendant was driving, they discov-
ered ten kilograms of cocaine. 1 4 A ury convicted the defendant, and a
judge sentenced him to 240 months. The judge determined the quantity
of cocaine by only a preponderance of the evidence.216 The defendant
217
moved for a new trial but the district court denied the motion.
b. Decision
The Defendant appealed on several grounds, including Apprendi
218violations. He claimed that Apprendi required that the government
charge the quantity of cocaine the indictment and prove the amount to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, because this fact increased the
minimum penalty that the judge could impose on the Defendant. 2' 9 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court, and noted that the government had
conceded that an Apprendi error occurred in this case.2 However, the
Government made its concession before the Supreme Court decided
Harris.221 The Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier position on whether Ap-
207. Id. at 471.
208. Id.
209. Harris, 536 U.S. at 556.
210. 2002 WL 31164256 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2002).
211. Mazzio, 2002 WL 31164256, at * 1.
212. Id. at *7.
213. Id. at *1.
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *3, *6.
216. Id. at *6.
217. Id. at *3.






prendi applies to facts that affect mandatory minimum sentences, stating:
"[T]he decision in Harris leaves little doubt that ... Strayhorn [is] over-
ruled to the extent [it applies] Apprendi to enhancements of mandatory
minimum sentences. 222 After Harris, the majority of circuit courts re-
fuse to extend Apprendi to cases that increase mandatory minimum sen-
tences based on sentencing factors.223
Ill. ANALYSIS
It is logical for courts to extend the rationale of Apprendi to manda-
tory minimum sentencing.224 The prosecution should be required to sub-
mit any fact that increases a defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise
legislatively mandated range for the offense of conviction to a jury and to
prove such a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule would address
some of the ambiguity of the Harris decision.225 Certainly it would clar-
ify the extent to which legislatures can redefine crimes in order to avoid
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof required by Apprendi.
The loss of liberty a defendant experiences and the stigma that society
attaches to a criminal offense are increased where a sentence is raised
226beyond the prescribed statutory maximum penalty. But as Justice
Thomas noted in his dissent in Harris, the results are the same when a
227defendant is subject to a higher mandatory minimum sentence.
"Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dis-
pute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is other-
wise prescribed. 228
The concern that defendants have notice of the specific penalties
they face in a criminal proceeding likewise compels an extension of Ap-
prendi to mandatory minimum sentences. 229 When a legislature defines a
crime, the penalties it attaches to that crime serve as notice to the public
230
of what punishment a person may face if he or she commits the crime.
Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes do not provide this notice be-
cause they expose defendants to increased penalties for the same crime,
based on factors not listed as part of the crime or even provided in the
indictment when the defendant is charged.23t
222. Id. at *7.
223. Leachman, 309 F.3d at 383; Avery, 295 F.3d at 1171; United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d
806, 809 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2001); United States
v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Gelgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934
(8th Cir. 2000).
224. Levine, supra note 18, at 382-83
225. Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note 130, at 242.
226. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 560 (2002).
227. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 608-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 579-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Finally, even the dissenting justices in Apprendi acknowledged that
the majority's reasoning in that case extended to mandatory minimum
sentences.232 Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor stated, "[T]he
Court appears to hold that any fact that increases or alters the range of
penalties to which a defendant is exposed -- which, by definition, must
include increases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum pen-
alties -- must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 233
CONCLUSION
"To allow a fact to effect the punishment prescribed by law without
treating that fact as an element of the crime thus offends the historic 'in-
variable linkage of punishment with crime.' ' 234 Considering the princi-
ples of fairness and due process inherent in our legal system, extending
this principle to mandatory minimum sentencing is a natural and logical
step. The decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on this issue,
though bound by Supreme Court holdings, indicate that the court is will-
ing to consider this step, yet unwilling to take it. There is no doubt, given
the constitutional significance of Apprendi issues, that courts will be
faced with these situations repeatedly in the future. Given the right fac-
tual circumstances, and in light of the volatility of the decisions in this
area, the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court may reconsider their re-
luctance to take this logical step and require that any fact that increases a
defendant's sentence beyond the legislatively mandated range for the
offense of conviction be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Steven Josephy*
232. Id. at 836.
233. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 533 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
234. Olsen, supra note 2, at 835 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478).
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law. I would like to give special
thanks to Professor Stephen Cribari for his insight, to Tenth Circuit Survey Editor Gillian Bidgood
for her editorial guidance, and to the rest of the editorial team for their expertise and hard work.
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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AS
QuI TAM PLAINTIFFS IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
The federal government's chief weapon in battling fraud is the False
Claims Act ("FCA").' Under the FCA, private citizens can bring a civil
suit known as a qui tam action 2 against any person or entity that has filed
a false claim "for payment or approval' 3 with the federal government.4
Upon a favorable judgment, the qui tam plaintiff, also known as the rela-
tor,5 is entitled to a portion of the damages recovered from the defen-
dant.6 Commentators have argued that the FCA is a useful deterrent
against fraud and an excellent tool by which the government can recoup
fraudulently appropriated funds with the help of private citizens. 7 Con-
versely, some have noted that qui tam suits reduce the government's re-
covery of misappropriated funds and may actually interfere with other
efforts to inhibit fraud.8
When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it enlarged the potential
recovery for private plaintiffs, which in turn resulted in a dramatic in-
crease of qui tam actions.9 With this rise came a proliferation in disputes
over the proper interpretation of the FCA.10 In the period covered by this
survey, September 1, 2001, to August 31, 2002, the Tenth Circuit de-
cided a number of cases interpreting the FCA.t" This survey specifically
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); see Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui
Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (2001).
2. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur, which translated is: who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, SECOND POCKET EDITION 578 (2d ed. 2001).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
4. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
5. Susan G. Fentin, The False Claims Act - Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity
and Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 3J U.S.C. S 3730(E)(4), 17 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 255,259 (1995).
6. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
7. Fentin, supra note 5, at 255.
8. Id. at 255-56.
9. Virginia C. Theis, Government Employees as Qui Tam Plaintiffs: Subverting the Purposes
of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 226 (1999). In 1987, 33 qui tam actions were filed
while, in 1997, 533 qui tam suits were filed. Phillips & Cohen, Attorneys at Law, Qui Tam Statistics,
at http://www.whistleblowers.comVHTMIJBODY/Stats.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [herinafter
Qui Tam Statistics]. The amount recovered by the Department of Justice in qui tam suits in 1988
totaled $355,000 while, in the year 2001, the recoveries totaled over $1 billion. See id.
10. See Theis, supra note 9, at 231-39 (discussing different interpretations of FCA terms by
various courts).
11. See United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, 318
F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 265 F.3d
1157 (10th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., Inc., 264 F.3d 1271 (10th
Cir. 2001).
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examines the opinion in United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Insur-
ance Group ("Holmes F,),12 which addressed whether government em-
ployees were eligible to file a qui tam action under the FCA, 13 as well as
the recent en banc rehearing of that opinion, United States ex rel. Holmes
v. Consumer Insurance Group ("Holmes If). 
14
Part I of this survey describes the erratic history of the FCA, while
Part II discusses the pertinent portions of the Act itself. Part III examines
Tenth Circuit precedents on applying the FCA. Part IV then analyzes and
compares the Tenth Circuit's major decision concerning qui tam actions
within the survey period (Holmes 1), along with its subsequent en banc
decision (Holmes II), with the opinions of other circuits. Finally, Part V
argues that the Holmes II en banc decision was justified because it cor-
rectly followed Tenth Circuit precedents and appropriately interpreted
the FCA.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FCA
Qui tam legislation has been ubiquitous since Roman times. 15 Simi-
lar regulations have been part of America's legal code since colonial
times.' 6 Throughout the first century of our republic, the federal legisla-
ture passed several bills containing qui tam provisions.' 7 Congress en-
acted the original FCA in 1863,18 largely in response to both claims of
fraud against the Union Army during the Civil War' 9 and the requests of
President Abraham Lincoln.20
,,21IThe 1863 version of the FCA, also known as the "Lincoln Law,
proscribed conduct knowingly intended to fraudulently appropriate
money from the federal government. 22 The Act included civil and crimi-
nal penalties for those convicted of such acts.2 3 The civil penalties in-
cluded a $2,000 fine for each false claim a defendant made, plus twice
the amount of damages incurred by the government. 24 The criminal pen-
12. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1248.
14. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
15. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legisla-
tion, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 566 (2000).
16. Bales, supra note 1, at 387 ("Prior to the American Revolution, several colonies passed
statutes authorizing qui tam suits.").
17. Id. For example, Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 101, 102, allowed the informer to
collect half the amount of the applicable fine for information on a person failing to file a census
return. Id. at 387 n.37.
18. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99.
19. Beck, supra note 15, at 555 ("The Army had received small arms that inspection revealed
to be useless and artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than explosives.").
20. Theis, supra note 9, at 227.
21. Joan R. Bullock, The Pebble in the Shoe: Making the Case for the Government Employee,
60 TENN. L. REV. 365, 368 (1993).
22. Beck, supra note 15, at 555.
23. Fentin, supra note 5, at 258.
24. Bullock, supra note 21, at 369.
QUI TAM SUITS
alties allowed a court to fine a defendant between $1,000 and $5,000, or
to imprison him for between one and five years.25 To elicit more qui tam
actions, the Act awarded the informer half of the recovered damages,
plus an award for litigation costs upon successful conclusion of the ac-
tion. 6 Any person who possessed information about a fraudulent claim
filed with the government, whether a government employee or private
citizen, qualified to be a qui tam plaintiff.27 Furthermore, the Act pre-
vented anyone, including the government, from intervening once litiga-
tion commenced.28
Initially, the 1863 version of the FCA was seldom used due to the
general lack of knowledge about its existence 29 and the Union's cutbacks
in defense spending, which curtailed most opportunities for fraud.30 Dur-
ing the 1930s, however, the use and abuse of the FCA increased, 31
largely because the Act did not require a plaintiff to have "independ-
ently-acquired information. 32 Hence, anyone who heard about an accu-
sation through the media33 or copied the information from a government
file or indictment 34 could rush to the courthouse and file a qui tam suit
against the alleged perpetrator.35 The increase in qui tam actions was
further exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess,36 where the Court held that since "there [were] no
words of exception or qualification," any person, no matter how the in-
formation is gathered, qualified as a qui tam plaintiff.
37
In 1943, due to widespread "parasitic" suits and the Marcus deci-
sion, Congress revised the FCA to reduce the private sector's participa-
tion in qui tam litigation.38 In passing the new amendments, the House of
25. Id.
26. See Theis, supra note 9, at 227.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bales, supra note 1, at 389.
30. See id. Interestingly, many of the amendments to the FCA have occurred with the fluctua-
tions in defense spending by the federal government. See id. at 385-91 (outlining the history of qui
tam legislation).
31. Id. at 389. ("[Tjhe New Deal and World War I greatly expanded the role of the federal
government in the national economy, and commensurately expanded the opportunities for unscrupu-
lous contractors to defraud the government.").
32. Id.
33. Id. (noting that suits brought by people who learned of fraud through the media were
nicknamed "parasitic" suits).
34. Bullock, supra note 21, at 370.
35. Bales, supra note 1, at 389.
36. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See Beck, supra note 15, at 556-60, for an excellent discussion of
the Hess case.
37. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546. In Hess, contractors pled nolo contendere, and were fined
$54,000. Id. at 545. Subsequently, a qui tam plaintiff who brought suit against the contractors won a
judgment of $315,000. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court held the FCA did not prohibit qui tam suits
based upon information acquired from a prior indictment. Id. at 546-48. The Court declined to ex-
trapolate restrictions from the plain language of the statute, but rather gave Congress the opportunity
to provide "specifically for the amount of new information which the informer must produce to be
entitled to reward." Id. at 546 n.9.
38. Theis, supra note 9, at 229. The bill provided:
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Representatives attempted to repeal the entire qui tam provision.39 The
Senate, however, rejected such an extreme measure.4° After debate, the
final version of the 1943 amendments preserved the qui tam concept, but
prohibited plaintiffs from filing actions "based on evidence or informa-
tion in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or em-
ployee thereof, at the time such suit was brought. ' l Therefore, under the
new version, government employees were barred from suing under the
Act.42 The statute was further interpreted as disallowing private qui tam
suits when the government already possessed the information, regardless
of the source. 43 Unlike the 1863 version of the Act, the 1943 amend-
ments gave the government the right to intervene.44 Furthermore, under
the 1943 amendments, a qui tam plaintiff's recovery could not exceed
25% of the total damages, or 10% of the total when the government
chose to intervene.45 With such extreme restrictions, the use of the FCA
diminished significantly. 46 More than 40 years later, due to increasing
incidence of fraud perpetrated against the government, Congress found it
imperative to revise the Act again.47
In 1986, Congress amended the FCA to "encourage more private
enforcement suits" 8 by diminishing the Act's strict requirements and
increasing the incentives for potential qui tam plaintiffs to bring claims.49
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee for the 1986 amendments
to the FCA stated that the purpose of the modernized legislation was to
"encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that
information forward. 5° Importantly, Congress eliminated the 1943 pro-
vision that prohibited qui tam suits based upon information possessed by
the government at the time of filing.5 Moreover, Congress also removed
the language precluding government employees from filing suit under
the Act.52 Interestingly, although it increased the number of potential qui
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any [qui tam] suit . . . whenever it
shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the pos-
session of the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such
suit was brought....
Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (Supp. 1I 1943)).
39. Fentin, supra note 5, at 260.
40. Id.
41. Theis, supra note 9, at 229 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 229-30.
44. Id. at 229.
45. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C).
46. Bales, supra note 1, at 390.
47. Id.; see also Fentin, supra note 5, at 262 (noting that Congress amended the FCA in 1986
because of outcry over an appellate decision and "the growing pervasiveness of fraud against the
government").
48. United States ex rel. v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 23-24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89).
49. See Beck, supra note 15, at 561-62.
50. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67.
51. Theis, supra note 9, at 230.
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988).
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tam plaintiffs, Congress retained a jurisdictional bar against parasitical
suits in the 1986 amendments by excluding actions based upon "public
disclosure of allegations" unless the plaintiff was an "original source" of
that information. 53 Lastly, the 1986 amendments increased the minimum
penalty for each fraudulent act against the government.
54
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FCA
Under the current version of the FCA, private persons, or "relators,"
can sue any person or entity in the name of the federal government 55
who files a false claim with the United States as defined by the statute.56
When the relator files suit, she is required to provide the government "all
material evidence and information" she possesses at that time.57 The
complaint is kept under seal for a period of 60 days, during which time
the government decides if it will intervene.58 If the government does so,
"it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action."
59
The original plaintiff nevertheless maintains the right to be a party to the
action.60
A qui tam plaintiff is entitled to a portion of the proceeds from a
successful qui tam suit.6 1 The federal government, however, is the pri-
mary beneficiary of recovered damages in any qui tam action.62 If the
government chooses to intervene, the relator is eligible for between 15%
and 25% of the damages recovered in a successful action, "depending
upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action." 63 if the government chooses not to join the
action, however, the relator may recover an amount between 25% and
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
54. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
56. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Pertinent portions of the Act state:
Any person who--(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented... a false or fraudu-
lent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid; (4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully
to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount
for which the person receives a certificate or receipt; (5) authorized to make or deliver a
document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, in-
tending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely
knowing that the information on the receipt is true; (6) knowingly buys, or receives as a
pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Gov-
ernment, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the
property; ...
Id. § 3729(a).
57. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 3730(c).
60. Id.
61. See id. § 3730(d)-(d)(2).
62. See id. § 3729(a)(7).
63. Id. § 3730(d).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
30% of the proceeds upon a favorable decision, "which the court decides
is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages." 64 Damages
under the FCA are defined by 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which, if violated,
makes a defendant liable for "a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and
not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person." 65
The Act restricts the federal courts' jurisdiction for particular
claims.66 Courts may not hear suits brought by a member of the armed
forces nor against a member of the armed forces for actions arising out of
her service in the armed forces.67 Also, no suit can be brought against "a
member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive
branch official" if the government possesses the information upon which
the allegations are based.68
The provisions of the statute that have caused the most confusion,
however, are the "public disclosure" restriction and the "original source"
requirement.69 The FCA prohibits qui tam suits based "upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac-
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media," unless that person is an "original source of the information.
'70
"Original source" is defined as "an individual who has direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based
and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
filing [a qui tam action] based on the information.",71 The current version
of the FCA does not provide that government employees are disqualified
as original sources.72
Additionally, whether or not the provisions of the FCA are satisfied
"is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. 73 Since a federal court is a
court of limited jurisdiction, there is no presumption of jurisdiction "ab-
sent a showing of proof by the party asserting federal jurisdiction. 74
Hence, the qui tam plaintiff carries "the burden of alleging facts essential
64. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
65. Id. § 3729(a)(7).
66. See id. § 3730(e).
67. Id. § 3730(e)(1).
68. Id. § 3730(e)(2)(A).
69. These provisions are found in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
70. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
71. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
72. See id.
73. United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.
1996).




to show jurisdiction under the False Claims Act, as well as supporting
those allegations by competent proof.,
75
Finally, the current statute creates even more incentive for a person
with information about fraud on the government to come forward by
76providing protection from employer reprisal. The Act asserts that an
employee who is discharged or discriminated against by her employer for
participation in a qui tam suit "shall be entitled to all relief necessary to
make the employee whole. 77
Il1. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT
Since 1986, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the
newly enacted amendments to the FCA on several occasions.78 However,
two decisions are relevant to the primary opinions discussed in this sur-
vey.79 The first case deals with the Tenth Circuit's definition of "public
disclosure, 8° while the second case sets forth a test for determining
when a qui tam suit may proceed.81
In United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp.,82 a
former employee of Century Healthcare filed a qui tam action against her
former employer alleging it had repeatedly failed to comply with Medi-
caid requirements. 83 The plaintiff personally gathered information
against the defendant, while the Oklahoma Department of Human Ser-
vices ("DHS") simultaneously conducted an independent investigation.
84
The DHS investigation revealed the same deficiencies that the plaintiff
had uncovered, which were detailed in a report that the DHS provided to
the involved parties.85 Importantly, this report was available to the mem-
bers of the public only by "a written request for the specific record and
approval from the DHS legal department. 86 A district court, relying on
the "public disclosure" bar, held that since the general public could ob-
tain this report, the "'allegations or transactions' therein were 'publicly
disclosed' within the meaning" of the FCA.87
75. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1004.
76. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
77. id.
78. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir.
1996); United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1996); United States
ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Fine v.
Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. See Fine, 99 F.3d 1538; Ramseyer, 90F.3d 1514.
80. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1519.
81. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
82. 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir. 1996).
83. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1517.
84. id.
85. Id. The report was given to the administrator of DHS, the defendants, and one copy was
placed within the DHS files. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1518.
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The Tenth Circuit, finding the rulings of the District of Columbia
Circuit88 and the Ninth Circuit89 persuasive, rejected the district court's
conclusion 9° and held that "in order to be publicly disclosed, the allega-
tions or transactions upon which a qui tam suit is based must have been
made known to the public through some affirmative act of disclosure.'
91
Relying on the congressional objectives of the FCA,92 the court argued
that "mere possession by a person or an entity of information pertaining
to fraud, obtained through an independent investigation and not disclosed
to others, does not amount to 'public disclosure.' 93 Accordingly, the
court found that allowing the relator's suit to proceed concurred with
Congress's aim to encourage persons with "first-hand knowledge of
fraudulent misconduct to report fraud,, 94 since "defendants' fraudulent
activities may have gone undetected because the evidence essentially
was 'hidden in files."'
95
In United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co.,96 a former em-
ployee of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy who had
been in charge of financially related audits brought suit against MK-
Ferguson Company and Industrial Contractors Corporation.97 His com-
plaint alleged that the companies had filed false and fraudulent reim-
bursement claims with the Department of Energy. 98 A district court con-
cluded that although the plaintiff's allegations were based upon a report
from the Inspector General's Office, which the plaintiff oversaw, the
reports had been publicly disclosed because the office had forwarded
them to a third party.99 Since public disclosure had occurred, the district
court had to decide whether the plaintiff qualified as an "original
source."' ° Because the plaintiff did not conduct any actual investigation
on his own, but rather based his allegations primarily on the submitted
report of the Department of Energy, the district court determined that the
plaintiff could not have had "direct and independent knowledge" of the
information in the allegations and, therefore, he failed to qualify as an
"original source" under the FCA.10' Accordingly, the district court dis-
missed the plaintiff s action, and the plaintiff appealed.1
0 2
88. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
89. United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995).
90. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1518.
91. Id. at 1519 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1520 (referring to the FCA as meaning to discover fraud and deter "parasitic" suits).
93. Id. at 1521.
94. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991)).
95. Id. (quoting Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1161).
96. 99 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1996).
97. Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1540-42.
98. Id. at 1542.
99. Id. at 1543.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. id. at 1541.
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By analyzing the FCA and previous case law,10 3 the Tenth Circuit
developed a four-step inquiry to determine who could qualify as a qui
tam plaintiff. 104 First, a court must decide "whether the alleged public
disclosure contains allegations or transactions from one of the listed
sources." 10 5 Next, a court must determine "whether the alleged disclosure
has been made 'public' within the meaning of the" FCA. 1°6 Third, a court
must determine whether the plaintiff's complaint is "'based upon' this
'public disclosure. ' '107 If so, then the court must decide "whether the
relator qualifies as an 'original source. ' '' 108 The qui tam action proceeds
if there is a negative response to any of the first three inquiries. 1°9 A
court only undertakes a determination of whether the plaintiff qualifies as
an original source when there is an affirmative reply to each of the first
three queries."10
Concluding that the Department of Energy's audit report was one of
the sources of information precluded by the FCA, the Tenth Circuit an-
swered the first inquiry in the positive. 1 Next, the court concluded that
the audit report, which was sent to MK-Ferguson and the State of Ore-
gon, placed no limitations on the State of Oregon, a stranger to the fraud,
that would prevent its dissemination once the report was under their con-
trol. 112 The court found this to be an affirmative act of public disclosure,
thus, answering the second question of the test positively. 113 Next, the
court discussed whether the complaint was based on the allegations or
transactions publicly disclosed in the final audit report. 114 Using the stan-
dard of "whether 'substantial identity' exist[ed] between the publicly
disclosed allegations and the qui tam complaint,""15 the court stated that
the plaintiff's allegations were sufficiently identical to the audit report to
conclude that they were based upon the publicly disclosed allegations.
16
103. The Circuit Court analyzed United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries Inc.,
971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992). Fine, 99 F.3d at 1543-44.
104. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
105. Id.
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
106. Fine, 99 F.3d at 1545. ("[Tlhe court [in Ramseyer,] interpreted the False Claims Act to




110. Id. at 1544.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1544-45.
113. Id. at 1545.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1545 (quoting Precision, 971 F.2d at 553-54).
116. Id. at 1546-47.
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Lastly, since the first three inquiries were answered in the affirma-
tive, the court sought to determine if the plaintiff was an "original
source" within the meaning of the FCA.I17 The court noted that to qualify
as an "original source," the plaintiff must have "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and
[have] voluntarily provided the information to the government before
filing a qui tam action based on the information.'' 1 8 The plaintiff argued
that he qualified as an original source because he fixed the limits of the
investigatory audit, he recognized the equipment estimates as fraudulent,
and he personally notified the Inspector General of his findings." 9 How-
ever, the court found that the plaintiff did not actually perform the inves-
tigations that revealed the fraudulent activities.12 Instead, investigators
under the plaintiff's guidance were directly responsible for uncovering
the incriminating information. 21 Furthermore, the plaintiffs complaint
consisted only of the information the investigators gathered.1
22
The Tenth Circuit found that since the plaintiff "did not himself dis-
cover the allegedly fraudulent practices[,] ... was not an observer of the
purported fraud," and did not have "'direct and independent knowledge'
of the publicly disclosed allegations and transactions upon which his
Complaint [was] based," he could not qualify as an original source. 
23
Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims. 24 Interestingly, the
fact that the plaintiff utilized information that he learned of as a govern-
ment employee was not a stated factor in the court's determination of the
plaintiff's qualifications as a qui tam relator.
25
IV. CAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES BRING A QuI TAM ACTION WITH
INFORMATION GAINED IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT?




The Postmaster at the United States Post Office in Poncha Springs,
Colorado, discovered that the Consumer Insurance Group ("CIG") had
misinformed the Post Office about the weight of its mail, and that the
117. Id. at 1544, 1547. If the plaintiff was found to be an "original source" under the FCA, then
his suit could proceed. See id. at 1547. However, if the plaintiff was found not to be an "original
source" under the FCA, and the three preliminary inquiries in Fine have been answered in the af-
firmative, then the suit must be dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1544.
118. Id. at 1547.
119. Id. at 1547-48.




124. Id. at 1549.
125. See id. at 1547-48.
126. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
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true weight of its mail disqualified it from receiving the per-pound-rate
for bulk mailing that it had been utilizing.' 27 Upon this discovery, the
Postmaster alerted CIG that it could no longer employ the special rate.
28
A few years later, the Postmaster found that CIG had continued to em-
ploy the original rate and, therefore, had been defrauding the govern-
ment. 29 The Postal Inspection Service initiated an investigation that it
later turned over to the U.S. Attorney's Office.
130
The Postmaster filed a qui tam action under the FCA against CIG. 131
Upon its intervention, the United States moved to dismiss the Postmaster
from the litigation because, it claimed, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 132 The government argued that the government's disclosure
of the allegations to three individuals who were then or had been associ-
ated with CIG constituted "public disclosure."'133 Since there was public
disclosure, the government reasoned that the Postmaster would have to
qualify as an "original source" 134 to continue her claim.'35 The United
States further argued that the Postmaster was ineligible for the "original
source" exception and that her claim was jurisdictionally barred. 36 The
district court granted the government's motion, although it did not rely
on the public disclosure bar in doing SO. 137 Since the government was
still investigating CIG's alleged misconduct at the time, the district court
dismissed the Postmaster as a party after concluding that the ongoing




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Chief Judge Tacha writ-
ing for the majority 4° and Circuit Judge Briscoe dissenting, 141 affimed
the lower court's dismissal of the Postmaster, but based its decision on
different grounds than the district court.142 The Tenth Circuit held thatthe Postmaster could not qualify as a proper qui tam plaintiff under the
127. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1246-47.
128. Id. at 1247.
129. Id.




134. "'[Oiriginal source' means an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of
the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
135. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1247.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1247-48.
139. Id. at 1248.
140. Id. at 1246.
141. Id. at 1258.
142. Id. at 1248.
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FCA. 14 3 The court found the "public disclosure" bar inapplicable and
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that an ongoing govern-
ment investigation was a bar to a qui tam suit. 44 The court, observing
that the Fine four-step inquiry 45 was the appropriate test to judge the
appropriateness of a qui tam claim, decided that in "the specific circum-
stances of [that] case - where a government employee pursues a qui tam
action during an ongoing investigation - [gave] rise to a different in-
quiry."' 46 The court concluded that allowing a qui tam suit to proceed
where the plaintiff is a government employee who is participating in an
ongoing investigation "would destroy the statute's distinction between
the government and relator, would contravene the purpose of the FCA,
and would create impermissible conflicts of interest for federal employ-
ees pursuing such suits.' ' 147 However, the court was careful not to ex-
clude all government employees from pursuing a qui tam action.
148
Interestingly, the court also made a distinction between an "in-
sider's action" and a "non-insider's action."149 The court hinted that if an
action by a government employee is an insider's action, then it would
most likely be upheld. 150 An example of an insider suit would be where a
government employee brings a qui tam suit against his or her supervisor
for defrauding the government. 151 In the instant case, the court found the
Postmaster's suit a non-insider suit since the action was brought by a
government employee against a private company. 1
52
The court observed that the "concept of a qui tam action assumes a
distinction between the government and the individual qui tam plain-
tiff.' 53 However, this distinction between relator and government is lost
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1248-49.
145. Please note that in the Holmes I decision, the opinion referred to the Fine test as the MK-
Ferguson test. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1250. Contrarily, while Holmes H utilized the same test, the
decision called the inquiry the Fine test. United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318
F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003). This survey will follow the Holmes H decision and will refer to
the inquiry as the Fine test. The Fine test asks:
(1) [W]hether the alleged 'public disclosure' contains allegations or transactions from
one of the listed sources; (2) whether the alleged disclosure has been made 'public'
within the meaning of the False Claims Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is 'based
upon' this 'public disclosure'; and, if so, (4) whether the relator qualifies as an 'original
source' under [§] 3730(e)(4)(B). If the court were to answer 'no' to any of the first three
questions, its inquiry ends at that point and the qui tam action proceeds. The last inquiry,
whether the relator is an original source, is necessary only if the answers to each of the
first three questions is 'yes,' indicating the relator's complaint is based upon a specified
public disclosure.
Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
146. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1250.
147. Id. at 1252.
148. Id. ("It is our view, however, that while the Act does not explicitly authorize or preclude
all actions [brought by government employees], it may allow some and disallow others.").




153. Id. at 1252.
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when a government employee who obtains information about fraud in
accordance with her duties as an employee sues. 154 Hence, the potential
plaintiff "obtains the information as the government" and therefore can-
not file a qui tam suit under § 3730(b) of the FCA "for the person and for
the United States Government."' 155 In the instant case, the Postmaster was
found to have obtained all the information in accordance with her duties
as postmaster and, thus, was acting as the federal government. 156 The
court defended this reading of the FCA by asserting four main policy
arguments. 1
57
First, the court noted that the FCA was instituted to encourage pri-
vate citizens to "expose fraud that the government itself cannot easily
uncover."' 158 Since the Postmaster uncovered the fraudulent activities in
the course of her employment, the court found that the investigation was
easily within the government's capacity to pursue. 159 Next, the court ar-
gued that the 1986 amendments to the FCA reflected "Congress's 'con-
cern that the government was not pursuing known instances of fraud.' ' 16
The court believed that allowing the Postmaster's qui tam suit to proceed
would conflict with the purposes of the FCA 16 1 based on the fact that the
record revealed that the government was investigating CIG's miscon-
duct, coupled with the fact that the relator only brought suit after she was
"confident that the government was adequately investigating her infor-
mation."1
62
Third, the court observed that the FCA was intended to "encourage
private citizens with first-hand knowledge to expose fraud."'163 Here,
there was no need for the government to encourage a private citizen to
assist it in uncovering fraud since the government already possessed the
information provided by the Postmaster.' 64 Furthermore, the court stated
that allowing qui tam actions by federal employees based upon informa-
tion gathered in the course of their employment contradicts Congress's
intention of eliminating "parasitic" suits under the FCA. 165 Throughout
the opinion, the Tenth Circuit continually made a fundamental distinction
between information possessed by the federal government and the inde-
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
156. Id. at 1253.
157. Id. at 1255-56.
158. Id. at 1255 (quoting United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 572 (10th Cir.
1995)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1256 (quoting United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d
1514, 1520 (10th Cir. 1996)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1255 (quoting United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus. Inc., 971 F.2d 548,
552 (10th Cir. 1992)).
164. Id. at 1256.
165. Id.
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pendent knowledge of private citizens.' 66 When the government pos-
sesses information that has not been publicly disclosed, private citizens
are still allowed to pursue a qui tam action. 67 However, "[g]overnment
employees frequently have access to government information even
though it has not been 'publicly disclosed."'' 68 Thus, the court noted that
a potential exists for "parasitic qui tam suits by government employees
before 'public disclosure' occurs, just as there is a potential for such suits
by private persons following public disclosure."' 69
Lastly, the court argued that the statutory restrictions placed on fed-
eral employees to avoid conflicts of interest further supports the conclu-
sion that federal employees should not be able to act as qui tam plaintiffs
in circumstances like those presented in the case. 170 Citing the Code of
Federal Regulation, the court observed that federal employees are
prohibited from using "'nonpublic Government information' to 'further
any private interest. '""17' Furthermore, the court also cited other federal
statutes that prohibit a government employee from participating in
government matters when the employee has a financial interest, such as
"the use of public office for private gain, the use of government property
or time for personal purposes, and holding a financial interest that may
conflict with the impartial performance of government duties."'
172
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs action in the case
"directly reduce[d] the amount that the government may ultimately
collect," which would give the government employee a personal stake in
the outcome of the litigation. 73 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff was not a proper relator under the FCA and dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
74




In February 2003, sitting en banc, 176 with Circuit Judge Briscoe





170. Id. at 1257.
171. Id. (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(3) (2003)).
172. Id. (citations omitted) (referring to 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.402, 2635.501, 2635.502,
2635.101 (b)(7), 2635.702, 2635.704-5, 2635.403).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1258.
175. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003).
176. There is no source that explains the Tenth Circuit's decision to rehear Holmes I en banc.
177. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1200, 1215. Circuit Judges Seymour, Ebel, Henry, Murphy, Hartz




Circuit vacated its decision in Holmes 1178 and reversed the district
court.
17 9 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the
four-part inquiry defined in Fine'80 "is applicable only 'where the gov-
ernment is not actively investigating the alleged wrongdoing."", 181 Rather,
the Tenth Circuit found the Fine test "applicable in all cases filed by qui
tam relators. ' ' 82 The Tenth Circuit also held that because no "public dis-
closure" occurred, there was no need for it to address whether or not the
Postmaster qualified as an "original source" under the FCA. 183 Lastly, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the relator, even though she brought the qui
tam claim against CIG with information gained in her capacity as a
postmaster, was a "person" permitted to bring suit under the FCA. 84
The government initially argued that the Postmaster should be re-
moved from the litigation since a "public disclosure" occurred when
three former and present employees of CIG were interviewed and noti-
fied of the allegation that CIG had committed fraud. 85 However, the
court rejected this argument because the public disclosure bar was inap-
plicable since "all three individuals participated to some degree, in the
alleged fraudulent scheme" and were thus "previously informed."' 18 6 The
government further maintained that if the court did not accept its modi-
fied view of the "public disclosure" test, the government would "be
forced 'to make disclosures of relevant allegations to 'innocent' third
parties in order to satisfy the public disclosure bar - and ensure that op-
portunistic qui tam suits" would be barred. 87 The court refuted this con-
tention by questioning the government's "blanket characterization of qui
tam suits filed by government employees as 'opportunistic.""1 88 The
court asserted that the Postmaster's action was not opportunistic, since
she had "direct and independent knowledge of the fraud allegedly com-
mitted by CIG" and because she was the individual who first discovered
the fraudulent activities by CIG. 189 The court further rejected the gov-
ernment's position because it found the "public disclosure" test robust.19°
Lending to this conclusion was the court's determination that no other
test echoed the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) as accurately.' 91 Since the
178. Id. at 1245.
179. Id.
180. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1004, for a description of the inquiry.
181. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1203.
182. Id. at 1204.
183. Id. at 1204, 1208.
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1204-05. "[Pjublic disclosure occurs only when the allegations or fraudulent trans-
actions are affirmatively provided to others not previously informed thereof." Id. at 1205 (citing
Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1521).
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court found that no public disclosure had occurred, the court halted its
Fine four-step jurisdictional inquiry and it did not answer the question of
whether the qui tam plaintiff qualified as an "original source."'
192
The government next contended that a government employee who is
required to disclose information about fraudulent activities obtained in
the course of her occupational obligations does not qualify as a "person"
permitted to bring a qui tam action under § 3730(b)(l1). 93 In establishing
its framework for analyzing cases brought under the FCA, the court
stated that "in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting
point must be the language employed by Congress[ ]... and we assume
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used."' 94 Furthermore, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language [of the statute] must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."'' 95 The court examined the relevant portion of
the FCA, 196 and noted that nowhere in the statute is the word "person"
defined.197 The court found that the Dictionary Act t98 defined "person"
"for the purposes of 'determining the meaning of any Act of Congress'
as including 'individuals. '' 199 Hence, the court concluded that "person"
"unambiguously encompasses all individual human beings, including
[the Postmaster] .,200
The government further argued that the title of § 3730(b) of the
FCA, "Actions by private persons," demonstrated that Congress intended
to limit the ability of government employees to bring suit under the
FCA.20 1 The court, however, found that the title, which was part of the
1986 amendments, "was simply intended as an easy reference for the
reader of the statute, and not as a substantive amendment to [the
FCA]. ' '2°2 Furthermore, the court cited the Supreme Court's explanation
192. Id. at 1208.
193. Id. That section states:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [§] 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.
The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written con-
sent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
194. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68
(1982)).
195. Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
196. The relevant portion of the FCA was § 3730(b)(1). Id. That section provides:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [§] 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.
The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written con-
sent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
197. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1208.
198. The court used this term to refer to 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). See id.
199. Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1).
200. Id. at 1208-09.




that a title to a statutory provision may not "limit the plain meaning of
the text," and can only be utilized as a reference when "[it] shed[s] light
on some ambiguous word or phrase., 20 3 The court also noted that the title
could mean either that all government employees would were excluded
or that all government employees were included as persons capable of
filing a qui tam suit under the FCA. 204 However, the court found that the
potential total prohibition of government employees from being able to
file FCA claims "would render superfluous the specific exclusions
adopted by Congress in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1).
' 20 5
Next, the government asserted that Congress's intention to exclude
government employees from acting as qui tam plaintiffs under the FCA
was "inadequately expressed. ' '206 In rejecting this argument, the court
stated that it "appears clear that Congress did not consider the question of
whether government employees should be allowed to use information
obtained in the course of their employment as the basis for a qui tam
action."207 Hence, the court reasoned that if it were to follow the Gov-
ernment's plea to exclude government employees, it would actually re-
write the statute.20 8
Next, following Chief Judge Tacha's decision in Holmes I, the gov-
ernment averred that allowing a government employee to bring a qui tam
suit with information gained in the course of her employment would
eliminate "the critical distinction between the government and the indi-
vidual qui tam plaintiff. '' 209 The court answered by stating that it "fail[ed]
to see how the word ['person'] could rationally be construed to exclude
some, but not all, government employees, and under some, but not all,
conditions. 210 In addition, the court discussed how the principles of
agency law further controverted the government's position.211 The court
stated that "it is apparent that [the Postmaster], in filing her complaint in
this matter, was not acting within the scope of her employment and was
therefore not acting 'as the government' since she was not employed to
file suit under the FCA.' ,212 Therefore, although the Postmaster might
have gained the information used in the qui tam claim in the course of
203. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212
(1998)).
204. Id.
205. Id. Section 3730(e)(1) mandates that: "No court shall have jurisdiction over an action
brought by a former or present member of the armed forces under subsection (b) of this section
against a member of the armed forces arising out of such person's service in the armed forces." 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1).
206. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1209.
207. Id. at 1209-10.
208. Id. at 1210.
209. Id.; Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1252.
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her employment, the postmaster was acting "as a 'person,' i.e., in her
,,211
individual capacity, in filing and pursuing this qui tam action.
One of the dissent's primary arguments focused on the language of
the FCA that empowers a plaintiff to file a qui tam suit "for the person
and for the United States Government." 214 The dissent argued that this
phrase revealed "a fundamental assumption ' 2 5 about the qui tam plain-
tiffs, which "requires that there be some distinction between a potential
qui tam relator and the people acting as 'the government' with regard to
the fraud at issue. ' ' 6 The majority, however, maintained that "the dis-
sent read[] too much into the phrase., 21 7 The court found that the phrase
indicated "that the relator functions as the partial assignee of the United
States and [that the phrase] emphasize[d] that both the relator and the
government have an interest in the lawsuit and both will benefit should
any recovery occur. 21 8 Further, the court argued, if Congress had in-
tended "to exclude some or all federal government employees from the
class of' of possible qui tam plaintiffs, it was able to do so in a much
more obvious and definite manner.219 Additionally, the court noted that
since the FCA utilizes the term "person" numerous times, the dissent's
limitation of that term failed because it was contrary to the doctrine that
"identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning. '220 The majority found the interpretation of the
FCA by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess
22
1
persuasive.2 2 There, the Supreme Court found no exceptions or qualifi-
cation of the jurisdictional phrase "as well for himself as for the United
States," and it also noted that the original FCA allowed anyone to bring
suit under the FCA.223 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that al-
though Congress changed the language of the FCA to "for the person and
for the United States Government," it was difficult to find that "the
change was intended to override Marcus and implement new restrictions
on who could qualify as relator.,
224
Lastly, the government argued that allowing the Postmaster's suit to
continue would be contrary to numerous federal regulations, the purpose
of the FCA, and public policy.225 The Tenth Circuit replied by observing
that "nothing in the FCA expressly precludes federal employees from
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1217 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
215. Id.'(Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1210.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1211 (quoting Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)).
221. 31 U.S. 537 (1943).
222. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1211.
223. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696, 698).
224. Id. at 1211-12 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
225. Id. at 1212.
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filing qui tam suits. '226 Further, the court noted that it appeared that Con-
gress probably did not consider the possibility of government employees
bringing qui tam suits under the FCA.227 In addition, the court noted that
Congress's activity since the 1986 amendments implies that Congress
may see the FCA as allowing actions by government employees. 228 Spe-
cifically, the court cited two different bills introduced in Congress that
"would have established limitations on government employees who
file[d] qui tam suits based on information gained during the course of
their employment. 229 Nonetheless, Congress passed neither bill.23°
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit turned to the reasoning of the Eleventh
Circuit to justify why government employees can utilize information
gathered in the course of their employment as the basis of a qui tam
suit.231 Specifically the Tenth cited the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning from
United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.:232
We recognize that the concerns articulated by the United States
may be legitimate ones, and that the application of the False Claims
Act since its 1986 amendment may have revealed difficulties in the
administration of qui tam suits, particularly those brought by gov-
ernment employees .... Notwithstanding this recognition, however,
we are charged only with interpreting the statute before us and not
with amending it to eliminate administrative difficulties. The limits
upon the judicial prerogative in interpreting statutory language were
well articulated by the Supreme Court when it cautioned:
Legislation introducing a new system is at best empirical, and
not infrequently administration reveals gaps or inadequacies of one
sort or another that may call for amendatory legislation. But it is no
warrant for extending a statute that experience may disclose that it
should have been made more comprehensive. "The natural meaning
of words cannot be displaced be reference to difficulties in admini-
stration." . . .For the ultimate question is what has Congress com-
manded, when it has given no clue to its intentions except familiar
English words and no hint by the draftsmen of the words that they
meant to use them in any but an ordinary sense. The idea which is
now sought to be read into the [Act] ... is not so complicated nor is
English speech so poor that words were not easily available to ex-
press the idea or at least to suggest it.
233
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1212 (citing Major David Wallace, Government Employees as Qui Tam Relators,
ARMY LAW., Aug. 1996, at 14, 22 ("The sponsors of the 1986 FCA amendments simply did not
contemplate the issue of government employees using information they learned in the course of their
duties as the basis of lawsuits in their own names.")).
228. Id. at 1213.
229. Id. (quoting Theis, supra note 9, at 238-39).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 931 F.2d 1493 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
233. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d 1493, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944))).
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Congress could have certainly indicated its desire to prevent
government employees from filing qui tam suits based upon informa-
tion acquired in the course of their government employment.... The
False Claims Act is devoid of any statutory language that indicates a
jurisdictional bar against government employees as qui tam plaintiffs.
We also note an absence of any clear indication that Congress in-
tended such a bar to be implied in spite of the plain language of the
statute. Therefore, we decline to judicially create an exception where
none exists.
234
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and found that the Postmaster qualified to act
as a qui tam plaintiff and hence allowed her action to proceed.235
C. Other Circuits
1. First Circuit: United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.
236
a. Facts
A former employee for the United States Government Defense Con-
tract Administrative Service filed suit against Raytheon Company Inc.,
alleging that it had committed fraud in its administration of contracts
with the federal government.23' The district court held that all govern-
ment employees were excluded from bringing qui tam suits under the
FCA.238 The district court reasoned that since "government employees
maintain a dual status--arms of the government while at work, private
citizens while not a work--a 'public disclosure' necessarily occurs when-
ever a government employee uses government information he learned on
the job to file a qui tam suit in his private capacity." 239 Therefore, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
240 The plaintiff appealed.241
b. Decision
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, after studying the issue of
whether a government employee falls within one of the four excluded
groups within § 3730(e)(4), upheld the district court's decision, but upon
different grounds.242 Initially, the First Circuit found that 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)(A),243 contrary to the district court's findings, only barred
234. Id. (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d at 1504).
235. Id. at 1215.
236. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
237. LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 18.
238. Id. at 18, 19-20.
239. Id. at 19 (quoting United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 170,
175 (D. Mass. 1990)).
240. Id. at 18.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 19-20.
243. That section provides:
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suits "based on information made available to the public during the
course of a government hearing, investigation, or audit or from the news
media.",244 Moreover, the court rejected the notion that government em-
ployees "lead schizophrenic lives and can publicly disclose information
to themselves, 245 and found that the district court's analysis created an
exception to federal court jurisdiction not found within the language of
the FCA.246 Hence, the court concluded that § 3730 (e)(4)(A) "does not
prevent government employees from bringing qui tam actions based on
information acquired during the course of their employment.
', 247
The First Circuit held, however, that a government employee who,
as a condition of his employment, was responsible for exposing fraud
could not qualify as an "original source" under the FCA.248 The court
reasoned that the "fruits of [the plaintiff's] effort belonged to his em-
ployer--the government," therefore, he "was not someone with 'inde-
pendent knowledge of the information"' used in the allegations.249 Fi-
nally, the court limited its holding by concluding that its decision did
"not mean that.., no government employee.., could qualify to bring a
qui tam action under the original source exception.2 z0
2. Eleventh Circuit: United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.
251
a. Facts
The plaintiff, an attorney for the United States Air Force in charge
of the Contracts Law Division at Yokota Air Base, Japan, brought a qui
tam suit against NEC Corporation with information he had gained in the
course of his employment.252 He alleged that the company had commit-
ted fraud by participating in "bidrigging" while it sought telecommunica-
tions contracts with the federal government.253 The United States inter-
vened and moved to have a trail court remove the plaintiff for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.254 The government asserted that the plaintiff
had gathered all the information in the complaint while he was an em-
ployee of the government and, thus, was jurisdictionally barred by the
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).







251. 931 F.2d 1493 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
252. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1494-95.
253. Id. at 1495.
254. Id.
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FCA.255 The district court agreed with the United States and granted the
25625motion. The plaintiff appealed. 7
b. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling because it
found the FCA unambiguous and "devoid of any statutory language that
indicate[d] a jurisdictional bar against government employees as qui tam
plaintiffs.2 58 The United States argued that the plaintiffs qui tam claim
was precluded because when a "government employee uses official in-
formation as a private citizen, he has disclosed the information to himself
so that a 'public disclosure' occur[red]. ' ',59 On the other hand, if a gov-
ernment employee uses the information in an official capacity, then no
public disclosure has occurred. 260 The court rejected this contention by
noting that the acts that constitute public disclosure under the FCA are
"not qualified by words that would indicate that they are only examples
of the types of 'public disclosure' to which the jurisdictional bar would
apply."261 The court pointed to the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A), which
prohibits qui tam suits that are "based upon the public disclosure of alle-
gations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media., 262 Therefore,
the court refused to give the statute "a broader effect than that which
appears in its plain language.1
263
Interestingly, the court then refused to analyze whether the plaintiff
in the case before it was an original source according to the FCA. 264 The
court noted that "[tihe 'original source' inquiry only becomes necessary
once a court makes a factual determination that the particular qui tam suit
before it was based upon information that was publicly disclosed."
265
Hence, because the commencement of a qui tam action by a government
employee is not a public disclosure under the FCA, there was no need to
discuss whether the plaintiff was in fact an "original source. 266
255. Id. at 1494.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1495.
258. Id. at 1504.
259. Id. at 1499.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1499-1500.
262. Id. at 1499 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)). The court also stated that "[a] plain
reading of this language reveals that 'congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office' modifies 'report, hearing, audit, or investigation.' Any other reading of that phrase would be
illogical." Id. at 1500 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
263. Id. at 1449-1500.
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Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that "nothing in [§ 3730(e)(4)(A)
of the FCA] operates to preclude every government employee from
bringing a qui tam action based upon information acquired in the course
of his government employment" unless precluded by the "public disclo-
sure" bar.267 The court found the four limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)268 conclusive, and reasoned that if Congress had wished to pre-
clude government employee actions, it could have done so explicitly.
V. ANALYSIS
In Holmes 11,270 the Tenth Circuit properly reheard Holmes 1271and
reversed the district court's decision. The circuit's second determination
was justified for several reasons. Holmes I subverted Tenth Circuit
precedent. In addition, the FCA is devoid of any language that precludes
government employees from filing a qui tam suits. Furthermore, the
Postmaster's suit is congruent with the purposes of the FCA. Finally,
allowing government employees to bring these suits would aid tremen-
dously in recovering fraudulently appropriated assets.
In order for the Tenth Circuit to rehear a case en banc, there must be
a need for the entire court to focus "on an issue of exceptional public
importance or on a panel decision that conflicts with a decision ... of
[that] court. '272 Holmes I satisfied both of these requirements since it
conflicted with the precedents of United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Cen-
tury Healthcare Corp.273 and United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson
Co. 274 The question presented in that case "involve[d] a question of ex-
ceptional importance, i.e., whether and under what circumstances a dis-
trict court has jurisdiction over a qui tam complaint brought under the
267. Id. at 1501.
268. Subsections (1) through (4) of § 3730(e) bar actions when:
[(1)] brought by a former or present member of the armed forces... against a member of
the armed forces arising out of such person's service in the armed forces... [(2)] brought
. . . against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive
branch official if the action is based on evidence or information known to the Govern-
ment when the action was brought ... [(3)] based upon the allegations or transactions
which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding
in which the Government is already a party... [and (4)] based upon the public disclosure
of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or inves-
tigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(l)-(4).
269. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1502.
270. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003).
271. 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
272. 10TH CIR. R. 35.1(A).
273. 90 F.3d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since the qui tam plaintiff did not
have first hand knowledge of fraudulent misconduct, the lower court should have dismissed her
claim).
274. 99 F.3d 1538, 1548 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since the qui tam plaintiff was not
an original source, the lower court properly dismissed her complaint).
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False Claims Act by a government employee relator., 275 The Holmes I
decision improperly modified Tenth Circuit precedent and created a ju-
risdictional bar to certain potential qui tam plaintiffs276 despite the fact
that the test conceived in Fine was the result of a practical and logical
analysis of the FCA.277 Although the Fine court did not explicitly decide
whether a federal employee could bring a qui tam suit, the decision im-
plies that there are no specific limitations on the inquiry.278 The test an-
nounced in that case illustrates that the FCA lacks any express language
precluding government employees from filing qui tam suits. 279 The Tenth
Circuit's decision in Holmes II was proper since it followed this prece-
dent.
The 1986 amendments to the FCA removed the language precluding
government employees from filing qui tam suits. 280 To interpret a statute,
a court should "begin with the plain language of the law., 28' The plain
meaning of the words in a statute "must be construed in their 'ordinary,
everyday sense.' 282 In Holmes II, the court appropriately read the plain
meaning of the words into the FCA and found that nowhere were gov-
ernment employees excluded.283 Notwithstanding the fact that a different
version of the FCA was at issue, Holmes 1H correctly followed the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the FCA in United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess284 and found that since government employees are not expressly
precluded from filing suit under the FCA, the Postmaster's suit should
have been allowed to proceed.285
Additionally, as the Holmes II court noted, if the interpretation of
the term "person" in Holmes I was allowed to stand, its prohibition of
government employees bringing qui tam actions "would render superflu-
275. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States ex rel. Holmes v. Con-
sumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-1077).
276. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1251.
277. The Fine test involves four inquiries:
(1) whether the alleged 'public disclosure' contains allegations or transactions from one
of the listed sources; (2) whether the alleged disclosure has been made 'public' within the
meaning of the False Claims Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is 'based upon' this
'public disclosure'; and, if so, (4) whether the relator qualifies as an 'original source' un-
der [§] 3730(e)(4)(B). If the court were to answer 'no' to any of the first three questions,
its inquiry ends at that point and the qui tam action proceeds. The last inquiry, whether
the relator is an original source, is necessary only if the answers to each of the first three
questions is 'yes,' indicating the relator's complaint is based upon a specified public dis-
closure.
Fine, 99 F.3d at 1544.
278. See id. at 1544-49.
279. See id.
280. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
281. United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir. 1991).
282. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Julius M.
Israel Lodge of B'nai B'rith v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1996)).
283. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1212.
284. 317 U.S. 537, 546 (1943) (noting that since the statute did not include "words of excep-
tion" the Court would not read such words into the statute).
285. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1213, 1215.
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ous the specific exclusions adopted by Congress in 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(1)," which prohibit "former or present member[s] of the armed
forces' from filing qui tam actions 'against a member of the armed forces
arising out of such person's service in the armed forces. 286 Interestingly,
as Chief Judge Tacha, the author of the Holmes I decision, once wrote,
the Tenth Circuit "refrains from construing the words and phrases of a
statute - or entire statutory provisions - in a way that renders them su-
perfluous. 287
Furthermore, by creating an additional restriction on who can qual-
ify as a qui tam plaintiff, thereby making a portion of the FCA unneces-
sary, Holmes I effectively rewrote the FCA and invaded the legislative
function of Congress. 288 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, "Congress could
have certainly indicated its desire to prevent government employees from
filing qui tam suits based upon information acquired in the course of
their government employment," but in the "absence of any clear indica-
tion that Congress intended such a bar to be implied in spite of the plain
language of the statute," none should be incorporated.289 Furthermore, as
Holmes 1I stated, "[a]lthough there may be sound public policy reasons
for limiting government employees' ability to file qui tam actions, that is
Congress' prerogative, not [a court's],290
In 1993, the Department of Justice, which would have agreed with
the Holmes I decision, urged Congress to amend the Act to specifically
exclude government employees from such actions. 291 Holmes I found
Congress's decision not to accept these proposed amendments persua-
sive.292 The fact that Congress has taken no such action in nearly a dec-
ade further supports this contention. If Congress had accepted the view
of the Department of Justice, it could have easily taken the necessary
steps to expressly preclude federal employees from bringing qui tam
actions.293 However, Congress may simply be waiting to see how the
various circuits will resolve this issue. This argument is supported by the
fact that the three circuits that have addressed this issue, the First, Tenth
(Holmes 1), and Eleventh, have all come to their respective decisions
differently. 294 The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion, which Holmes II and
286. Id. at 1209 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)).
287. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998).
288. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("[l1t is for Congress, not ... [the Supreme]
Court, to rewrite the statute."); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 74 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Tihe Court's reduction of the statutory wording to equivalence in effect with the constitu-
tional immunity, nearly if not quite makes that wording redundant or meaningless; in any event, it
goes so far in rewriting the statutory language as to amount to invasion of the legislative function.").
289. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1267 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams
v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
290. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1214.
291. Bullock, supra note 21, at 368.
292. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1213.
293. Bullock, supra note 21, at 368.
294. See United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990);
Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1248; Williams, 931 F.2d at 1496 n.7, 1502.
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this survey advocate, was decided in 1991, while the First Circuit handed
down its decision in 1990.295 Therefore, Congress's silence may indicate
that it agrees with the Eleventh Circuit's decision since Congress, if it
disagreed with the court's conclusion, probably would not have allowed
that decision to stand for the past twelve years.296
Holmes I argued that allowing government employees to bring qui
tam suits is contrary to the purposes of the FCA.297 Citing United States
ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp.,298 the court stated that the purpose of the
FCA is "to encourage private citizens to expose fraud that the govern-
ment itself cannot easily uncover." 299 Holmes I averred that the informa-
tion the Postmaster uncovered did "not constitute information that the
government would not otherwise uncover. [Further,] [t]he duty to report
itself assures that [the Postmaster's] information is the government's
information.,, 300 This statement refers to the fact that once a government
employee has uncovered fraud in the course of her employment, the gov-
ernment does possess that information per se. The 1986 amendments to
the FCA, however, expanded the number of qui tam actions possible by
allowing suits even when the government possesses the information on
which the complaint is based, so long as there has been no public disclo-
sure.30 1 Hence, it is hard to justify why the court that decided Holmes I
did not allow the Postmaster's suit to proceed.
Interestingly, allowing the Postmaster's action can be considered
contrary to the FCA's purpose of enticing whistle-blowers, since the
302Postmaster was not a CIG employee. It was undisputed, however, that
employees of CIG knew of the company's fraud and failed to report it to
the appropriate authorities or file a qui tam suit. 30 3 It is possible that one
of the employees had considered such action; however, no one had taken
action two years after the fraud began.304 Hence, allowing a government
employee to file a qui tam suit would serve two purposes. First, it would
prevent opportunistic employees from allowing fraud to continue in or-
der to maximize their qui tam recovery. Secondly, it would force every
potential qui tam plaintiff, both government and private employees alike,
295. See Leblanc, 913 F.2d 17; Williams, 931 F.2d 1493.
296. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of
Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by Congress of
legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legisla-
tive recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one."); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) ("Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor have
any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpretation was
correct.").
297. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1255.
298. 70 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1995).
299. Holmes, 279 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Fine, 70 F.3d at 572).
300. Id.
301. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
302. See Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1251 n.5, 1256.
303. See id. at 1248.
304. See id. at 1247.
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to bring forth information about fraudulent activity as soon as possible.
Although government employees may not be considered whistle-blowers
in the traditional sense, their standing as potential qui tam plaintiffs
would enhance the effectiveness of the FCA.
The 1986 amendments to the FCA reflect Congress's intent to allow
qui tam actions even though the federal government possesses the infor-
mation that forms the basis of the claim, except where that information
has been publicly disclosed and the plaintiff is not an original source to
that information. °5 Those amendments are "Congress' attempt to find
'the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insid-
ers with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of
their own. ' ' '306 A government employee who discovers fraud perpetrated
against the government in the course of her work obligations is not an
opportunistic relator, she is simply using information that she has gath-
ered.3 °7
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit already decided how to determine
308when a governmental employee is acting in a parasitic manner in Fine.
There, a government employee attempted to bring a qui tam suit with
information gathered by individuals whose work he oversaw. 3° Using its
newly fashioned test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government
employee was simply using information discovered by others and thus
was precluded from acting as a qui tam plaintiff.310 In Holmes, however,
the Postmaster was the individual who discovered the information that
was used to recover the funds that were fraudulently appropriated from
the federal government. 31! Therefore, the Postmaster deserved to con-
tinue with her action.
Although the Tenth Circuit made a number of persuasive arguments
against allowing suits brought by government employees in Holmes /,312
several policy arguments support permitting the Postmaster's suit.313
First, in many instances the government may be completely incapable of
discovering fraudulent activities.31 4 Thus, in such circumstances, the ex-
tra time a diligent government employee spent investigating what she
305. Id. at 1260 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997)).
306. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994)).
307. See id. at 1270 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
308. See Fine, 99 F.3d at 1548.
309. Id. at 1543.
310. Id. at 1548.
311. Holmes, 279 F.3d at 1270 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1257.
313. See Bullock, supra note 21, at 366, for an in depth analysis of arguments from both sides
of this issue.
314. See id. at 386.
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believed was fraud would be extremely useful to the government.1 5
Taxpayers can only benefit from government employees having greater
incentive to report fraud in situations where that activity may never be
reported otherwise.31 6 Importantly, no distinction should be made be-
tween government employees who bring qui tam suits with information
gathered in the course of their duty and those who go above and beyond
their employment obligations since courts do not distinguish between
non-government employees that way.
Furthermore, many fraudulent actions are never discovered because
of budgetary problems.3t 7 Many investigations are cut short and never
completed.318 If government employees were given an incentive to ex-
plore such activities, taxpayers would not only benefit from the money
recovered, but would also benefit from the free investigations conducted
by these diligent employees. 319 Lastly, many people might be deterred
from committing fraud against the government "if they knew that they
could not rely on the ineptitude or malaise of government employees in
ferreting out illegal activity.
320
Clearly, allowing a federal employee, or any person for that matter,
to retain a portion of the proceeds recovered in a qui tam action reduces
the amount the federal government recoups, which indirectly affects tax-
payers. But, as § 3729(a)(7) of the FCA makes clear, a defendant can be
held liable for "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of
the act of that person.,, 32' Therefore, compensating a relator does not
prevent the government from recovering its true losses. Further, the fed-
eral government may recover a significantly greater amount of money
than it lost, so it is unclear why a federal employee who furnished the
federal government with the information it used to try the defendant
should be prohibited from enjoying a portion of the judgment.
Since Congress amended the FCA in 1986, the number of qui tam
suits has soared.322 In 1987, only 33 qui tam cases were filed, while 533
315. See id. at 384.
[Tihe United States Merit Systems Protection Board conducted a survey in 1983 that
found sixty-nine percent of government employees who believed they had direct knowl-
edge of illegalities failed to report the information. Those employees who chose not to
report fraud were then asked why they had failed to come forward. The most frequently
cited reason given ([fifty-three] percent) was the belief that nothing would be done to cor-
rect the activity even if reported.
Id.
316. Id. at 386.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 387.
320. Id.
321. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (emphasis added).
322. See Phillip & Cohen, Attorneys at Law, History of the Law, at
http://www.whistleblowers.com/HTML/BODY/history.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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were filed in 1997.323 Although the number of suits have tapered in re-
cent years, with only 300 qui tam suits filed in 2001, the amount recov-
ered in cases where the government decides to intervene has steadily
risen from $355,000 in 1988, to $1.07 billion in 2001.324 These numbers
demonstrate how important qui tam suits have become to conserving
federal resources. The Holmes I decision could have diminished the gov-
ernment's recovery of misappropriated funds. Holmes II, however, pre-
vented this potential from being realized and actually implemented an-
other deterrent against those who propose to defraud the government.
CONCLUSION
The FCA has had a long and curious existence. The ever-changing
interpretation of the statute recently took a difficult turn in the Tenth
Circuit, but the court's common sense en banc decision put the circuit
back on the correct course. There are many arguments why government
employees should not be able to utilize information gathered in the
course of employment to bring qui tam actions. However, the arguments
in favor of their allowance are superior.
In Holmes II, the Tenth Circuit properly followed precedent within
the jurisdiction. The Holmes II decision accurately interpreted the lan-
guage of the FCA and, unlike Holmes I, did not read a hidden limitation
on the ability of government employees to pursue a qui tam action into
the Act. It is unclear whether Congress intended the present version of
the FCA to proscribe or include governmental employees as qui tam
plaintiffs. 325 Arguably then, the Holmes II decision appropriately fol-
lowed the plain meaning of the statute and permitted the Postmaster's
claim to proceed. If Congress had intended to prohibit government em-
ployees from bringing a qui tam suit, it could have made its intentions
more clear. The Tenth Circuit took appropriate action in Holmes II by
not engaging in judicial legislation and allowing Congress the opportu-
nity to amend the FCA as it sees fit.
Miro Kovacevic*
323. Qui Tam Statistics, supra note 9.
324. Id.
325. United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245, 1265-66 (10th Cir.
2002) (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ("The sponsors of the 1986 FCA amendments simply did not contem-
plate the issue of government employees using information they learned in the course of their duties
as the basis of lawsuits in their own names." (quoting Wallace, supra note 227, at 22)).
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
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RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC GROUNDS: Two
APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution is one of the hallowed hallmarks of our democratic
form of government.' Indeed, although presently all democratic govern-
ments give some form of protection to expression, nowhere is the protec-
tion more fundamental or expansive than in the United States.2 Religious
expression in particular has found considerable protection in the form of
the First Amendment's two Religion Clauses.3 The Establishment Clause
provides that the government may not pass laws that establish a state
religion, while the Free Exercise Clause mandates that an individual's
right to freely practice her own faith may not be infringed upon by the
government.4
In the period covered by this survey, September 2001 to August
2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided two cases that substan-
tially involved the seminal First Amendment protections of speech and
religion. In Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 5 the court
had to determine whether or not a school district that was home to a hor-
rifying high school shooting was justified in refusing to include in a
school redecoration project certain decorative wall tiles because they
contained particular subject matter.6 In Summum v. City of Ogden,7 the
court considered whether a municipality had unconstitutionally infringed
upon a religious sect's First Amendment free speech rights when the
municipality refused to allow the sect to post a monument containing its
religious tenets on public property alongside an already-standing
"monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments."8
I. The First Amendment provides, in whole: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998).
3. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1711
(2000) (stating that the First Amendment's Religion Clauses are "the principal constitutional protec-
tions for religious liberty and the separation of church and state in a nation characterized by religious
pluralism").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
5. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
6. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920, 922.
7. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
8. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997-98.
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Although both of these cases involved crucial questions concerning
the expression of religious messages within publicly-owned spaces, it is
significant that they were both decided on free speech grounds, and the
Establishment Clause was given little attention in their adjudication. This
survey examines this perceived inattention of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals to the issues arising from the Establishment Clause, and argues
that the cases represent two starkly divergent, yet equally salient, views
of the proper relationship between church and state. Part I of the survey
focuses on the Fleming case. It reviews the United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence dealing with free speech in public schools over the past
three decades, analyzes the Fleming decision itself, and then examines
decisions of other circuits in relation to the particular free speech issues
that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals faced in Fleming. Part II outlines
a general history of the case law concerning efforts to erect religious
monuments on public grounds, examines the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Summum, and reviews decisions of other circuits regarding similar legal
issues. Finally, Part HI provides an overview of the import that the Flem-
ing and Summum decisions may have for the issues of religious expres-
sion that face the country today.
I. FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND THE
TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN FLEMING V. JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT R-19
A. Student and Private Individual Speech in Public Schools-A Histori-
cal Perspective and Legal Framework
1. Beginnings: Tinker and Its Aftermath
The belief that the First Amendment protects student and other pri-
vate individual expression within the public school setting has not always
been commonly held, nor has it been applied with ease by the courts.' °
Indeed, until the 1970s, the general presumption and view was that
school authorities retained a superior right and interest in controlling
both curriculum content and student behavior that overrode the students'
rights to freedom of expression." This presumption in favor of the au-
thority of school districts to curtail student and private individual expres-
sion in the public schools, however, met with a resounding turnabout in
the landmark United States Supreme Court case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.12
9. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
10. Edward T. Ramey, Article, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of
Columbine, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 699 (2000).
11. David L. Dagley, Trends in Judicial Analysis Since Hazelwood: Expressive Rights in the
Public Schools, 123 EDUc. L. REP. 1, 2 (1998).
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see Dagley, supra note 11, at 4.
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In Tinker, a young woman and her brother wore black armbands to
their school to peacefully protest the United States military's presence in
Vietnam. 13 After refusing to remove the armbands, the students were sent
home by the school principal.' 4 The Court found that the school did not
have the right to infringe on the students' right to express their anti-war
beliefs, even if those beliefs were potentially controversial.15 As Justice
Fortas so famously articulated, "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."'
' 6
Although by no means conferring an absolute right of free expres-
sion on public school students, 7 Tinker stands for the proposition that
public school students and private individuals do have certain fundamen-
tal rights of free speech in the school setting that are constitutionally pro-
tected and that thus have to be respected.'8 The ruling was "the highwater
mark for public school students' First Amendment rights."' 9 Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, perhaps as a result of a shift towards a more
conservative ideology, began to carve out exceptions to the general rec-
ognition of students' rights of expression.20
One of these exceptions was first articulated in Bethel School Dis-
trict No. 403 v. Fraser. In that case, a high school student named Mat-
thew N. Fraser gave a speech nominating a fellow student for student
elective office at an assembly attended by 600 other students. 22 Through-
out the speech, Fraser incoiporated an explicit sexual metaphor into his
references to the candidate. The student reaction to the speech ran the
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
14. Id.
15. d.at 505-06, 513-14.
16. Id. at 506.
17. The Court announced a test based on the degree to which the expression interfered with
normal school activities, i.e. student conduct that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 513. Thus, any conduct that fell under this "substantial and
material disruption" umbrella would not be protected. See id.
18. See Ramey, supra note 10, at 702 ("[T]he rhetoric of Tinker was a manifestation of re-
spect for and confidence in our nation's young people. The Supreme Court case was a ringing re-
fusal to demean them as second-class citizens, or worse.").
19. Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992).
20. Ramey, supra note 10, at 702-03.
21. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
22. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 677.
23. Id. at 678. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan provided some of the text of Fra-
ser's speech:
I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most.., of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it
to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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gamut from confusion and embarrassment to loud approval.24 Fraser was
subsequently suspended from school by the School District for three days
and his name was removed from a list of candidates for graduation
speaker at that year's commencement ceremony. 25 After he returned to
school, Fraser and his father, who was acting as guardian ad litem,
brought suit in federal district court alleging that the School District in-
26fringed upon Fraser's right to free speech under the First Amendment.
The district court ruled in favor of Fraser, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.27
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the School
District "acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanc-
tions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent
speech.28 The Court said that schools have a duty to expand their influ-
ence beyond books and curriculum and to "teach by example the shared
values of a civilized social order., 29 According to the Court, the School
District's actions were appropriate because they showed the students that
"vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'funda-
mental values' of public school education., 30 Thus, in Bethel, the excep-
tion that allows public schools to control "speech that is lewd, indecent,
or offensive" was born.3'
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,32 the Court established
another exception to students' rights of free speech based on the notion
that in some instances schools sponsor, and thus adopt, certain speech.33
In that case, a principal directed a teacher to remove two student-written
articles from a high school newspaper.34 The Tenth Circuit applied this
exception in Fleming.35 This survey will, therefore, examine the Hazel-
wood decision in greater detail below.
2. Public Forum Analysis: Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass 'n
3 6
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n,37 is possi-
bly the most important Supreme Court case involving the public forum
24. Id. at 678.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 679.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Id. at 683,
30. Id. at 685-86.
31. Dagley, supra note 11, at 8.
32. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
33. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
34. Id. at 262-64.
35. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923-26 (10th Cir. 2002).
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. 460 U.S. 37.
[Vol. 80:3
2003] RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC GROUNDS 659
doctrine. 38 In that case, a collective bargaining agreement between a
board of education and a teachers' union mandated that only that union,
and not a rival union, could use a school district's interschool mail deliv-
ery system. 39 A rival teachers' union was excluded from using the mail
system because under the collective bargaining agreement, it was not the
recognized bargaining agent for the district's teachers. 40 The rival union
consequently sued the school district and alleged that denying it access to
the mail system violated its free speech rights.4 '
The Supreme Court's analysis was based on the character of the fo-
rum in question.4 2 The Court separated the properties that fall under this
public forum doctrine into three different categories.43 Public fora are
public areas such as parks and streets "which 'have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions." '44 The government may not ban
all speech in these fora.45 The government can only implement a restric-
tive, content-based regulation when the "regulation is necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.46
At the other end of the public property spectrum is the nonpublic fo-
rum. 47 A nonpublic forum is one that is publicly owned but that has a
"governmental function other than the open and unfettered exchange of
ideas."" The government's power to regulate nonpublic fora is similar to
the power a private owner has to control his property.49 The government
may not only adopt reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and man-
ner of expression, but may also "reserve the forum for its intended pur-
poses, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view., 50 Nonpublic fora include
post offices, municipal buildings, and public schools.5 ' Thus, in a non-
public forum, the government retains its most expansive authority to
52
restrict expression on public premises.
38. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
39. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39.
40. Id. at 40-41.
41. Id. at41.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Id. at 44-46.
44. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
51. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5-6.
52. See id.
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The third type of public property, the limited access public forum,
falls somewhere between these two other categories. 3 The limited access
public forum is a forum that was previously nonpublic but has been
opened by the government for the public to use in expressive activity.54
The government has affirmatively changed the character of these fora to
allow for the expressive activity. 55 The government may restrict expres-
sion in the same manner and to the same degree as a traditional public
forum.56 Restrictions on speech in limited access public fora based on
content are prohibited unless the restriction is "narrowly drawn to effec-
tuate a compelling state interest.,
57
The Perry Court ultimately ruled that the interschool mail system at
issue was a nonpublic forum. 58 Thus, the School District had the right to
limit the activities carried on through the system to those that comport
with the purpose the government selected for the property.59
Public forum analysis has become a very useful tool for analyzing
restrictions on free speech in the public school setting.60 In addition, the
test set forth in Perry has become "the governing standard for regulation
of speech on public property."'6' Accordingly, the public forum method
of analysis was the starting point for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in its adjudication of the dispute in Fleming.62 However, the crux of the
court's analysis ultimately depended upon the doctrines set forth in an-
other Supreme Court case that involved free speech in public schools.
3. The Hazelwood Standard: School-Sponsored Speech
The fundamental holding of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier63 is that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercis-
ing editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 64 In Hazelwood,
three student staff members of a high school newspaper sued a School
District because their school principal decided to excise two articles from
an issue before it was printed.65 One of the omitted articles was about the
experiences students had with teen pregnancy and the other about the
53. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
54. id. at 45.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 50-51.
60. Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
61. FARBER, supra note 2, at 174.
62. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 929.
63. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
65. Id. at 262-64.
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impact of divorce on students at the school.66 The principal was con
cerned that the articles could harm the school's younger students. He
was also concerned that readers would be able to identify the students
referred to in the articles even though the authors used fictitious names.
68
In an opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme Court decided
that there was, as Professor Edward Ramey has put it, "an operative dis-
tinction between speech which a school must tolerate and speech which a
school must sponsor., 69 The Tinker decision mandates that schools must
abide most student speech that transpires on school premises. 70 However,
regarding school-sponsored speech, the Hazelwood court said:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not errone-
ously attributed to the school.
7 1
The Court's definition of school-sponsored speech was fairly ex-
pansive. 72 School-sponsored speech encompasses "school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. 7 3 These are activities that the Court
asserted could "fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as
they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 74 Thus, the
Hazelwood Court broadened the definition of curriculum to include any-
thing that someone might reasonably believe the school sponsored.7 5
Hazelwood placed greater limitations on students' rights of expres-
sion and deferred more to the educational aims and methods of school
officials than Tinker.7 6 This shift could be attributable to fall-out from the
rebellious student uprisings of the 1960s or to changes in the Court's
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Ramey, supra note 10, at 706.
70. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
71. Id. at 271.
72. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 9.
73. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Dagley, supra note 11, at 9.
76. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
327 (2000).
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makeup in recent years.77 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Hazelwood and the expanded authority of school officials in Fleming.
78
B. Circuit Court Applications of the School-Sponsored Speech Exception
1. Tenth Circuit: Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1
79
a. Facts
On April 20, 1999, two students from Columbine High School, Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold, entered the school and went on a shooting
rampage. 80 They killed twelve students and one faculty member. 8' The
shooters also took their own lives.82 The Jefferson County School Dis-
trict ("the District") decided to reopen the school the following fall.83 It
realized, however, that the "prospect of reintroducing students to the
[Columbine High School] building posed significant mental health chal-
lenges." 84 School officials were concerned that various "sensory clues"
85might remind students of the attack.
To help alleviate these concerns, Elizabeth Keating, the school li-
brarian, and Barbara Hirokawa, an art teacher, urged the District to con-
tinue an ongoing student art project that placed individually designed and
painted 4-inch-by-4-inch glazed tiles on the hallway walls throughout the
school. 86 After she consulted with various District administrators, the
area administrator who oversaw Columbine High, Barbara Monseu, gave
preliminary approval for Keating and Hirokawa to implement an ex-
panded version of the tile project.87 The District issued a press release
that gave two central reasons for the tile project.88 First, participating in
the tile project would give students the opportunity to become comfort-
able with their school surroundings again.89 In addition, students who
participated would play a part in reconstructing their school.90
In order to help the community heal, the District also asked mem-
bers of the victims' families, emergency workers who responded to the
incident, and health care professionals who cared for the wounded to
participate.91 Hundreds of individuals who were related to the shooting
77. Id.
78. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 929-34.
79. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).







87. Id. at 921.
88. Id. at 920.
89. Id. at 920-21.
90. Id. at 921.
91. Id.
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ultimately painted tiles.92 In order to better fulfill the aims of the project,
the District and Ms. Monseu issued guidelines for the tiles.93 These
guidelines were imposed primarily to "assure that the interior of the
building would remain a positive learning environment and not become a
memorial to the tragedy." 94 Participants were not to make any references
to the attack, the date the attack occurred, incorporate students' names or
initials, Columbine memorial ribbons, or religious symbols, or include
any material that was "obscene or offensive."
95
Teachers from Columbine High School informed the participants of
the guidelines and supervised the painting. 96 The plaintiffs objected to
the guidelines.97 These participants wished to paint tiles that included the
names of their lost loved ones and religious symbols.98 The supervising
faculty informed these participants that they were free to paint the tiles as
they wished, but if the tiles violated the guidelines, they would not be
used to decorate the walls and would instead be given back to the de-
signers for their personal use.99
The District ultimately removed eighty to ninety tiles that had es-
caped earlier review from the walls because they violated the guide-
lines.1°° In September 1999, Ms. Monseu met with some of the people
who had objected to the guidelines and agreed to relax some of the re-
strictions. 101 Participants were told that they could include the name and
initials of their children, dates other than April 20, and the Columbine
memorial ribbon.10 2 However, religious symbols, the date of the attack,
and offensive or obscene materials were still prohibited. 103
The plaintiffs were not satisfied with the relaxed standards. 1°4 They
filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, al-
leging that the District infringed upon their free speech rights and vio-
lated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 10 5 The district
court granted judgment for the plaintiffs on the free speech claim, and







98. Id. The Plaintiffs wished to include "Jesus Christ is Lord," "4/20/99 Jesus Wept," "There
is no peace says the Lord for the wicked," and signs of the cross in their designs. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 921-22.





106. Id. at 920 n. 1.
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The plaintiffs did not appeal the judgment against them on the Es-
tablishment Clause.10 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
address the issue, stating bluntly that "only the Free Speech Clause issue
[was] before [them]."'1 9 However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling on the free speech claim." 0 It diverged from the lower
court's central holding that the speech in question was not school-
sponsored speech."'
To elucidate the reasoning behind its reversal, the court began its
analysis by pointing out that "three main categories of speech ... occur
within the school setting."'" 2 Of the three, the court ruled that the tile
project was a nonpublic forum." 3 This issue was not really disputed,
however, because both "parties concede[d] that the tile project does not
constitute a traditional public forum or a designated public forum, and
[the court's] review of the record comport[ed] with this analysis."
'"14
Moreover, the District never opened the tile pro ject to "indiscriminate
use" by the general public or the participants."1  Thus, "[t]he level of
control that the District retained over the tile project" made the project a
nonpublic forum. 1
6
The district court ruled that the tiles were not school-sponsored
speech under Hazelwood. "17 According to the Tenth Circuit, the district
court concluded that in order to be school-sponsored speech, it had to
derive from "activities conducted as part of the school curriculum."'
18
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the district court had read Hazelwood too
narrowly.1 9 Instead, school-sponsored speech consists of "activities that
might reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school and
that involve pedagogical concerns."' 20 Speech bears the imprimatur of
the school if it is "so closely connected to the school that it appears the
school is somehow sponsoring the speech."' 21 In addition, "the level of
107. Id. at 920.
108. Id. at 920 n.1.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 934.
111. Id. at 923.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 929-30.
114. Id. at 929.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 929-30.
117. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (D. Colo. 2001).
118. Fleming, 298 F.3d 924 (quoting Fleming, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1108).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. d. at 925.
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involvement of school officials in organizing and supervising an event
affects whether that activity bears the school's imprimatur.",2 2The Tenth
Circuit stated that "expressive activities that the school allows to be inte-
grated permanently into the school environment and that students pass by
during the school day come much closer to reasonably bearing the im-
primatur of the school.' ' 23 The court defined pedagogical as "related to
learning. '' 124 The court noted that "[m]any cases have applied a Hazel-
wood analysis to activities outside the traditional classroom where, so
long as the imprimatur test is satisfied, the pedagogical test is satisfied
simply by the school district's desire to avoid controversy within a
school environment.,
125
The Hazelwood Court was not ambiguous about requiring greater
deference to school officials who are charged with educating the nation's
youth. 126 The Tenth Circuit followed this direction and gave
substantial deference to educators' stated pedagogical concerns. The
[Hazelwood] Court recognized that its articulated standard for
school-sponsored expression was 'consistent with [its] oft-expressed
view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the respon-
sibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and
not of federal judges.' 
127
The Tenth Circuit found that the tile project satisfied both prongs of
the test for school-sponsored speech. 28 The court's finding that the tiles
bore the imprimatur of the school was based on the belief that people
would imply that the school approved of them from the fact that they
were permanently attached to the walls. 129 Moreover, the significant level
of the school's involvement with the tile project strongly suggested that
the school had in some way approved of its content. 130 Finally, the court
dismissed the district court's argument that the tiles were all individually
painted by members of the surrounding community and not by school
officials:
No doubt the variety and number of tiles would lead an observer to
understand that the school itself did not paint the tiles. However, the




125. Id. at 925-26.
126. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 & n.7.
127. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
128. Id. at 931.
129. Id. at 930.
130. Id. ("When coupled with organizing, supervising, approving the funding, and screening
the tiles," the court wrote, "the school's decision permanently to mount them on the walls conveys a
level of approval of the message.").
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guidelines for, and ultimately approving, the tiles it allowed to be-
come a part of the school itself, which in this case, it did. 
131
The Tenth Circuit also found that the goal of the project implicated
legitimate pedagogical concerns. 32 According to the court, "[tihe pur-
pose of reacquainting the students with the school and participating in
community healing falls under the broad umbrella that courts have given
to pedagogical purposes."' 33 Furthermore, the fact that the tile project
involved people outside of the school's staff and student body didn't
diminish the project's pedagogical character. 134 "[S]o long as a peda-
gogical purpose is present," opined the court, "we do not believe that the
existence of broader and consistent objectives, such as community in-
volvement, should result in the loss of the proper pedagogical pur-
pose."'
135
In addition, the court found that the District's restriction of religious
content on the tiles was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. 136 The District contended that the tiles containing religious mes-
sages had to be prohibited because 1) they might remind viewers of the
shooting, and 2) displaying them would make walls "a situs for religious
debate, which would be disruptive to the learning environment."'' 37 The
court clearly agreed with the District because it found that the ban "was
reasonably related to its legitimate goal of preventing disruptive religious
debate on the school's walls."'138 To buttress its holding, the court de-
scribed the absurd situations that might arise if the school did not have
the authority to restrict such expression. 139 Referring to its conclusion
that the District had the right to make decisions based on viewpoint or the
content of particular expression, the court stated:
If the District were required to be viewpoint neutral in this matter, the
District would be required to post tiles with inflammatory and divi-
sive statements, such as "God is Hate," once it allows tiles that say
"God is Love." When posed with such a choice, schools may very
well elect to not sponsor speech at all, thereby limiting speech instead
of increasing it. 140
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the circuit courts of appeals
were split about whether schools could impose viewpoint-based limita-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 931.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 931-32.
135. id. at 932.
136. Id. at 933, 934.
137. Id. at 933.
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tions on school-sponsored speech. 141 Significantly, the potential for the
plaintiffs to appeal this decision to the United States Supreme Court
ended in January 2003, when the Supreme Court denied a writ of certio-
rari and refused to hear the case. 142
2. Other Circuits
a. Eighth Circuit: Henerey v. Cily of St. Charles'
43
i. Facts
Adam Henerey, a sophomore at St. Charles High School in St.
Charles, Missouri, requested to run for junior class president. 144 In order
to run, each candidate had to meet with a student council advisor and
sign a contract of obligation where the candidate agreed to follow all
school rules, which Henerey signed. 145 Sometime later a member of the
student counsel told Henerey that campaign fliers and posters had to be
approved by the school administration before they were disseminated.'46
Henerey obtained the school's approval to use the campaign slogan,
"Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice."'147 On the day of election, he handed
out approximately eleven condoms attached to stickers containing his
campaign slogan in the School's hallways. 14 8 The School subsequently
disqualified Henerey from the election because he had not obtained the
School's approval to hand out condoms attached to the campaign stick-
ers.149 Henerey later sued, alleging that the School violated his free
speech rights. 50 The district court found that the student counsel election
occurred in a nonpublic forum and that disqualifying Henerey from the




The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the election took place in a nonpublic forum and that the student
campaign materials used in the election were school-sponsored speech. 1
52
The main issue for the court, then, was whether the School District's
141. Id. at 926 (discussing the split in circuits regarding the issue of content-based restrictions
of expression in the public school setting).
142. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 123 S. Ct. 893 (2003); Jim Hughes, U.S.
High Court Leaves Alone Ruling Against Tiles'Display, DENV. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at 8A.
143. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).








152. Id. at 1133.
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decision "was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' 53
On this point the court concurred with the district court's finding that the
decision was reasonable. 54 As the court explained, "School districts have
an interest in maintaining decorum and in preventing the creation of an
environment in which learning might be impeded, an interest that was
particularly strong in the present case because the condom distribution
occurred within the context of a school-sponsored election."1 55 implicit
in this view is the belief that educators have a right to preclude speech
based on a message's content.1 56 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment in favor of the City of St. Charles because the decision
to disqualify Henerey was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns, and because "Henerey's distribution of the condoms carried
with it the implied imprimatur of the school."
157
b. Ninth Circuit: Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada,
Inc. v. Clark County School District
58
i. Facts
Planned Parenthood, a nonprofit organization that offers family
planning and reproductive health education programs, submitted adver-
tisements to the school newspapers and athletic programs within a school
district ("the District") for publication. 159 The majority of the schools in
the District refused to publish the advertisements.160 As a result, Planned
Parenthood filed suit alleging that the District had infringed on the or-
ganization's right of free speech. 161 The district court ruled that the
school publications were nonpublic forums under Hazelwood and that
the District's decision to reject the advertisements in question was rea-
sonable. 162 Planned Parenthood appealed the ruling.
163
ii. Decision
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the publications
sponsored by the District's schools, including advertising pages, were
nonpublic fora, and, thus, the District could control what expression was
included.164 The court dismissed the contention that the District had
opened the advertising portions to indiscriminate use by the public be-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1135.
155. Id.
156. See id. ("[Even if the School] was motivated by a disagreement with the content of [his]
speech, it does not follow that a First Amendment violation necessarily occurred.").
157. Id. at 1135-36.
158. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 820, 821.
160. Id. at 821.
161. Id. at 820.
162. Id. at 821.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 830.
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cause "the school district here showed an affirmative intent to retain edi-
torial control and responsibility over all publications and advertising
disseminated under the auspices of its schools."' 65 Further, the court
ruled that the District's practice of not publishing controversial adver-
tisements was reasonable, viewpoint neutral, and constitutional. 66 Fi-
nally, the court rejected Planned Parenthood's argument that Hazelwood
applies only to student speech and not to other private speech that occurs
in a school setting. 167 "Although the facts of Hazelwood dealt with stu-
dent expression," stated the court, "its rationale was not so limited. The
Court . . . remarked on a school's ability to regulate reasonably the
speech not only of students, but also 'teachers, and other members of the
school community.',' 68 Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel upheld the Dis-
trict' s decision to exclude Planned Parenthood's advertisements.1
69
c. Eleventh Circuit: Searcey v. Harris
70
i. Facts
The Atlanta School Board ("the School Board") created a "Career
Day" program to allow community members to come to schools to give
students information about career opportunities and the skills required
for particular jobs. 17 1 In February 1983, the Atlanta Peace Alliance
("APA") requested permission from several high schools to distribute
information in the offices of guidance counselors, run advertisements in
school newspapers, and participate in school Career Days. 1 2 The APA
was a local organization devoted to promoting peaceful, non-military
solutions to conflicts. 73 The School Board ultimately denied the APA
access to the schools because of the APA's controversial viewpoint to-
wards the military, 174 and the APA then brought a claim charging that the
School District infringed on the free speech rights of its members. 75 The
district court found for the APA and granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the School Board from denying the APA the same access
afforded to military recruiters.
76 The School Board appealed. 1
77
165. Id. at 824.
166. Id. at 829-30.
167. Id. at 827.
168. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
169. Id. at 830.
170. 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989).
171. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1316.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1318.
174. Id. at 1323, 1326.
175. Id. at 1316.
176. Id. at 1316-17.
177. Id. at 1315.
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ii. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling but modified parts of the School Board's regulations for Career
Days. 178 The court agreed that the Career Day program was a nonpublic
forum, and, thus, the School Board could impose some restrictions on
who may speak. 179 However, the court also noted that in order to be con-
stitutional, the restrictions had to be both reasonable and viewpoint neu-
tral. 180 The court concluded that a regulation that precluded an organiza-
tion from participating in a Career Day event when the organization's
objective was to dissuade students from entering a particular occupation
or from partaking of a particular educational opportunity was neither
reasonable nor viewpoint neutral.' 81 The court found that it was reason-
able to preclude an organization from denigrating opportunities presented
by another group.1 82 It was, however, unreasonable to "prohibit a group
from presenting negative factual information about the disadvantages of
specific job opportunities because such information is useful to students
making decisions about careers.' 83 Further, allowing one group to pre-
sent the advantages of a career, while forbidding another group to proffer
information about the disadvantages of the same career, was viewpoint
discrimination.184 Specifically, the court stated "the School Board denied
plaintiffs access to the forum for the reason of plaintiffs' viewpoint to-
wards the military."'' 85 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling. 1
86
C. Analysis
This survey's limited review of decisions by federal circuit courts of
appeals that involved the school-sponsored speech exception indicates
that the circuit courts have honored Hazelwood's directive to defer to
school authorities about expression in the schools. The circuits disagree,
however, about whether the schools must make viewpoint neutral deci-
sions about speech. 87 The Tenth Circuit takes a very unambiguous posi-
tion on the issue. In Fleming, the court took the position that "Hazelwood
allows educators to make viewpoint-based decisions about school-
sponsored speech.' ' 188 As Searcey'89 and Planned Parenthood'9" demon-
178. Id. at 1325-26.
179. Id. at 1320.
180. id. at 1319.
181. Id. at 1322-24.
182. Id. at 1324.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1326.
186. Id.
187. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926 ("Our sister circuits have split over whether Hazelwood
requires that schools' restrictions on school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral.").
188. Id.
189. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1324.
190. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 830.
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strate, however, some circuits still adhere to the notion that restrictions
on school-sponsored speech must be content neutral, or else they violate
the First Amendment.
Although the case involved controversial issues of religious expres-
sion in a public place, the Tenth Circuit panel did not analyze the facts of
Fleming under the Establishment Clause.' 91 To some proponents of a
strong separation between church and state, the court might appear to
have abdicated its constitutional duty to enforce the Establishment
Clause. The plaintiffs, however, did not appeal the district court's judg-
ment in favor of the School District on its Establishment Clause claim, 192
and, thus, the court was not bound to address the issue. 193 Still, it is inter-
esting that the court did not explicitly raise any concerns that posting
several clearly Christian messages on the wall of a publicly funded
school might violate the strictures of the Establishment Clause.
Importantly, the decision did mandate that the tiles containing reli-
gious expressions be removed from the walls of the school. 194 This com-
mand hews to the long-standing view that, as Thomas Jefferson wrote so
long ago, a solid "wall" should be erected between church and state.
95
This restrictive perspective on the proper relationship between religion
and government has long been referred to as a "separationist" position.,
96
According to this view, the separation is crucial to protecting individual
freedoms of religion. 97 If the government closely allied itself with reli-
gious views, there would be "inevitable coercion" to participate in the
government's chosen religion. 198 Thus, according to the separationists,
the strict division is necessary to ensure the protections guaranteed by the
191. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 n. 1.
192. Id.
193. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.4, at 53-54
(2d ed. 2002) (noting the requirement that, for a case to be heard by a federal court, there must be an
actual dispute between two parties, and that "it is firmly established that federal courts cannot issue
advisory opinions").
194. See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 921, 933 (stating that some of the tiles in question were clearly
religious in nature and that the public school district's restriction of these religious symbols was
proper).
195. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 303-04 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this
expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall
see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Id.
196. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 1149-50.
197. Id. at 1150.
198. Id.
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Constitution.' 99 While the court in Fleming did not expressly affirm the
separationist theory, its reasoning appears to support that perspective.
The court stated that in the public school setting, school officials have a
"legitimate interest in avoiding religious controversy and disruption re-
sulting from the posting of religious speech. ' 2°
In an era replete with various horrific school shootings, the tragedy
at Columbine High School represents the worst: in a few hours, the
community in which the school sat lost fourteen students and one faculty
member. 20 That sobering fact might have been reason enough for the
School District and the court to defer to the wishes of the grieving fami-
lies and friends who lost loved ones in the killing and agree to permit the
attachment of the controversial tiles to the hallway walls of the school.
Instead, the court applied free speech precedent and made its determina-
tion by applying Hazelwood.2 °2 When the court held that the Jefferson
County School District did have the right to control what would be per-
manently affixed to its walls,203 it gave another victory to those who be-
lieve that it is school officials, in "their role as 'a principle instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment[,], 204 who should be given the most prominent voice in determin-
ing what is and is not proper for the school environment.
II. RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY AND THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SUMMUM V. CITY OF OGDEN°5
A. The Legal Background: The Lemon Test and Subsequent Develop-
ments
For the past three decades, cases involving religious expression on
public property have primarily involved Establishment Clause disputes
and have been governed largely by the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 °6 In that case, the legislatures of
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania had both enacted statutory programs
providing for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by private church-
related schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other educational ma-
terials for certain secular subjects. 20 7 The plaintiffs in the case, citizen-
taxpayers from both states, claimed that the provisions were unconstitu-
tional because they violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
199. Id.
200. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 933.
201. Id. at 920.
202. See id. at 924.
203. Id. at 934.
204. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
205. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
207. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
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of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. °8
Although the Court recognized that its precedent did "not call for
total separation between church and state[,] ''2°9 it nonetheless held that
both statutes were unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment's
religion clauses. 210 The Court announced a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether the government has impermissibly encroached onto private
religious affairs in a given case.2 1 Under the test, for a statute or state
practice to be permissible: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its prin-
cipal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3)
it must not create "excessive government entanglement with religion. 212
The Lemon test, as it came to be known, was the preeminent test in
Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s. 13 For all its use, however, the test never elicited enthusiastic
and widespread support from the Court.1 4 Indeed, it drew much criticism
from commentators.1 5 Perhaps as a result of this criticism and lack of
consensus within the Court following the formulation of the Lemon test,
the Court has since turned to several other methods of Establishment
Clause analysis, including a "historical practice" inquiry216 and a "coer-
cion" test.217 In addition, the "endorsement" test that was espoused by
Justice O'Connor is perhaps the approach that has been the most favored
in recent years. 18 Under the endorsement test, a government statute or
action violates the Establishment Clause if "a reasonable observer would
conclude that official activity 'sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
bers of the political community.'
219
The endorsement test has gained particular significance resolving
disputes about religious displays on public property. Two cases decided
208. Id. at 606.
209. Id. at 614; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the Constitution
require complete separation of church and state").
210. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 625.
211. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a Historical Docu-
ment in Public Schools, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (2002).
212. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
213. See Dustin Zander, Note, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments on the Courtroom
Wall: Judge Roy Moore and the Constitution, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371, 372 (1999).
214. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1721 (observing that "[t]he Court was never willing to truly
abide by the Lemon Test").
215. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Stuck With a Lemon: A New Test For Establish-
ment Clause Cases Would Help Ease Current Confusion, 83 A.B.A. J. 46 (1997) (criticizing the
Lemon test); Choper, supra note 3, at 1720-21 (criticizing the Lemon test).
216. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 211, at 1028-29.
217. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1723-24.
218. Id. at 1723.
219. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).
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by the Court in the 1980S220 and one decided in the 1990s22' exemplify
the drift away from the controversial Lemon test towards the more coher-
ent endorsement inquiry.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,222 the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
erected a Christmas display in a city shopping area that included a creche
depicting the Nativity scene.223 Residents of the city and members of the
local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought
an action in federal district court alleging a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.224 The Court applied the Lemon test, inquired into historical
practices, and ruled that there was not a violation.225 The Court cited "an
unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least
1789.''226 It determined that in the context of the holiday season and the
traditions of the Christmas celebration, there was "insufficient evidence
to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surrepti-
tious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message.,, 227 It is important to note that the Court
made it clear that the Lemon test was not absolutely mandatory, stating,
"[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to
any single test or criterion in this sensitive area., 228 Indeed, in finding the
creche a permissible holiday display, both the majority,229 and more
markedly, Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion, incorporated an
endorsement analysis.23°
Five years later the Supreme Court decided County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.231 There, the Allegheny County government in the State of Penn-
sylvania allowed a Roman Catholic group to erect a creche on the grand
staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.232 Similarly, the City and
County of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, agreed to permit an 18-foot Chanu-
220. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a creche
displayed on the grand staircase of a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but that a
menorah placed outside a city-county building did not); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that a city's
inclusion of a creche depicting a Christian Nativity scene in a holiday display did not violate the
Establishment Clause).
221. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (hold-
ing that a municipal board's agreement to authorize the placement of a cross on public grounds at the
request of the Ku Klux Klan did not violate the Establishment Clause).
222. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
223. Lemon, 465 U.S. at 671.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 672, 687.
226. Id. at 674.
227. Id. at 680.
228. Id. at 679.
229. Id. at 681-82 (asserting that displaying the creche did not benefit or endorse religion more
that the actions that the Court previously upheld as not violating the Establishment Clause).
230. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing on institutional entanglement and on
endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.").
231. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
232. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579-80.
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kah menorah to be erected alongside a Christmas tree outside of the City-
County Building that the City and County owned jointly.233 Local resi-
dents and members of the local chapter of the ACLU combined to file
suit against the City and County, alleging that they had violated the Es-
tablishment Clause.234
In a divided opinion,235 the Court ruled that the creche was a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause, but the menorah was constitutionally
permissible.236 The majority opinion noted that the endorsement analysis
that Justice O'Connor presented in her concurring opinion in Lynch pro-
vided "a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of
religious symbols. 237 Thus, the majority decided the issue based on an
endorsement inquiry238 and found that the creche, standing alone on the
grand staircase, conveyed a clear religious message 239 that a reasonable
observer would believe the County was endorsing.240 Applying the same
principles to the menorah, the majority concluded that the menorah,
when placed next to a Christmas tree and a mayor's sign celebrating lib-
erty, was more a salute to diverse secular holiday traditions than a mes-
sage about the Jewish faith.24' Consequently, the overall secular nature of
the display in question made it highly unlikely that residents of Pitts-
burgh would believe that it was an endorsement of either the Jewish or
Christian religions.242 "On the contrary," stated the majority, "for pur-
poses of the Establishment Clause, the city's overall display must be
understood as conveying the city's secular recognition of different tradi-
tions for celebrating the winter-holiday season.,
243
By contrast, in a dissenting opinion, four justices applied a "coer-
cion" analysis and found that placing the creche in the Allegheny County
Courthouse was not in violation of the Establishment Clause.244 In so
doing, the justices expressly questioned the propriety of disregarding
Court precedent in favor of the newer endorsement test.245 Instead, the
dissent argued for an approach that would recognize "the tradition of
233. Id. at 582, 587..
234. Id. at 587-88.
235. Id. at 578; see Abdel-Monem, supra note 211, at 1032 (stating that Justice Blackmun
wrote the divided decision).
236. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
237. Id. at 595.
238. Id. at 597.
239. Id. at 598 ("Nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche's religious
message.").
240. Id. at 601-02 ("[Allegheny County has] chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has
the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ. ...
nothing more is required to demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause.").
241. Id. at 616-20.
242. Id. at 620.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[The endorsement test is] a recent, and in my view
most unwelcome, addition to our tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
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government accommodation and acknowledgment of religion that has
marked our history from the beginning. ''246 Through this approach, gov-
ernment would receive more "latitude in recognizing and accommodat-
ing the central role religion plays in our society. 247 Inherent in the dis-
sent's approach is an aversion to what the dissent refers to as "an unjusti-
fied hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and
our precedents. ' 48 The dissent asserted that "[g]overnment policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an ac-
cepted part of our political and cultural heritage." 249 Above all, though,
the "accommodationist" approach urged by the dissent is grounded pri-
marily on the belief that the presence of state coercion should be the
governing factor in identifying violations of the Establishment Clause. 250
The dissent, therefore, found the creche in Allegheny to be a permissible
religious holiday display.25'
Finally, in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,252 a
municipal advisory board ("the Board") responsible for regulating access
to a state-owned plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio,
refused to allow the Ohio Ku Klux Klan ("the Klan") to erect a cross
within the confines of the plaza. 3 A federal district court issued an in-
junction mandating that the Board give the Klan access to the grounds.254
255The Board gave the required permission but appealed the decision.
The Court held that placing the cross in the public plaza was not a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause and, thus, the Board could not deny the
Klan access. 6 While seven justices joined the opinion of the Court, two
justices filed separate dissenting opinions. 7
According to the majority, religious expression does not offend the
Establishment Clause if (1) it is purely private expression, and (2) it "oc-
curs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and
open to all on equal terms. 25 8 According to the plurality opinion, be-
cause the Klan's cross was a purely private expression, and because the
Board's policy regarding displays on the plaza grounds was neutral, there
could be no violation of the Establishment Clause. 259 The majority con-
cluded that this was so even if the Board's policy caused some incidental
246. Id. at 663 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise").
251. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
252. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
253. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 758.
254. Id. at 759.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 770.
257. See id. at 756 (Both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.).
258. Id. at 770. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 5, for a summary of public forum analysis.
259. See Choper, supra note 3, at 1737.
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benefit to religion, and even if some observers might perceive a govern-
260mental endorsement of religion. In ruling in favor of the Klan, the plu-
rality effectively carved out an exception to the endorsement test and
created its own per se rule.261
Despite this newly articulated per se rule, however, five of the jus-
tices still supported the endorsement test.262 Thus, even though the ac-
commodationists on the Court prevailed, as Professor Jesse H. Choper
has put it, "[T]hey lost the war of determining a replacement for the
Lemon test. The more separationist position of endorsement now has
garnered five votes, and that would seem to be the prevailing test for
alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, at least until the next Jus-
tice comes along.
263
B. Circuit Courts Addressing Religious Displays on Public Property
1. Tenth Circuit: Summum v. City of Ogden
264
a. Facts
In 1966, the City of Ogden, Utah ("the City"), erected a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on a lawn outside the City's mu-
nicipal building.265 The monument was given to the City by a community
group called the Fraternal Order of Eagles.266 Along with the text of the
Ten Commandments, the monument was also inscribed with two Stars of
David, the Greek letters "Chi" and "Rho," an "all-seeing eye," a pyra-
mid, an eagle, an American flag, some Phoenician letters, and a depiction
of a scroll containing the message, "Presented to the City of Ogden and
Weber County, Utah, by Utah State Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles
1966. "267 Placed alongside the monument on the lawn were a police offi-
cer memorial and a sister city tree and plaque. 68 Additionally, various
historical markers were placed in an area set apart from the monument.269
260. Id.
261. See id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ( "I see no necessity to carve out, as the plurality
opinion would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum context."); id. at 784
(Souter, J., concurring) ("This per se rule would be an exception to the endorsement test, not previ-
ously recognized and out of square with our precedents.").
262. Pinene, 515 U.S. at 762-69; Id. at 772-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 783-84
(Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 797, 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Choper, supra note 3, at 1737-38 (stating that Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg wrote that any government endorsement of religion violates the
Establishment Clause).
263. Choper, supra note 3, at 1738.
264. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
265. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997.
266. Id. at 998.
267. Id. at 997-98.
268. Id. at 998.
269. Id.
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Summum, a religious group formed in 1975 and chartered in Utah,
sought to have the City remove the monument.270 The City refused.27'
Summum then requested that the City agree to place a privately funded
monument inscribed with the group's "Seven Principles" in the same
area as the Ten Commandments monument.272 Again, the City refused.273
Summum then brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of
its First Amendment rights under the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses.274 The district court ruled that there was no Establishment
Clause violation because the Ten Commandments monument was largely
secular in nature.275 It found that the City adopted the speech located on
276the permanent monuments on the lawn as its own. Consequently, the
court thought that granting Summum's request would be tantamount to
277allowing a group to dictate what the City would or would not express.
In addition, the court held that the City did not violate the Free Speech
Clause.278 Summum appealed the trial court's decision on its free speech
claim to the Tenth Circuit.
279
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion by noting
that at oral argument, Summum's counsel conceded that, absent en banc
reconsideration of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anderson v. Salt Lake
City Corp.,2 80 the court could not reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the City regarding the Establishment
Clause claim. 281 However, the court also suggested in a footnote of its
opinion that Summum's concession was perhaps not wise.282 First, ac-
cording to the court, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Stone v.
Graham,283 as well as the Tenth Circuit's own ruling in Summum v. Cal-
284 285laghan,2 4 cast some doubt on "the health" of the Anderson decision.
Secondly, the court noted that the ruling in Anderson depended upon an





274. Id. at 999.





280. 475 F.2d 29, 30-34 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a municipality did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when it permitted a monument of the Ten Commandments to be erected as part of a
passive, secular display on public grounds).
281. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000.
282. Id. at 1000 n.3.
283. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that public schools could not post the Ten Commandments in
classrooms because of their unambiguous religious nature).
284. 130 F.3d 906, 913 n.8. (10th Cir. 1997) ("Our decision in Anderson has been called into
question by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham").
285. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000 n.3.
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the Ten Commandments monument to be posted, and "[t]he fact that the
municipality at issue in Anderson (Salt Lake City) maintained a proper
purpose in displaying that municipality's Ten Commandments Monu-
ment does not establish that the City of Ogden maintained such a proper
purpose.,
286
Once the court dispensed with the Establishment Clause issue, it
turned to the remaining free speech issue.287 The court first made a public
forum inquiry288 and determined that the permanent monuments on the
lawn of the municipal building were nonpublic forums. 289 Therefore, the
municipality could restrict access to the forum as long as the restrictions
were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.29° In support of its contention
that these two conditions had been satisfied, the City presented two dis-
tinct arguments. 29' First, the City stated that it had adopted the speech on
the Ten Commandments monument as its own.292 Thus, the City argued
that it had eliminated any form of private speech in the forum and could
not be seen as discriminating between any potential private speakers.293
Alternatively, the City argued that even if it had discriminated by allow-
ing the Ten Commandments monument and simultaneously rejecting the
Summum monument, such discrimination was reasonable and viewpoint
neutral because of the heightened historical relevance of the Ten Com-
mandments to the community as compared to that of the Summum
group's Seven Principles.294
The court rejected these two arguments in turn. 2 95 First, the court
analyzed the City's claim that it had adopted the speech 29 6 by applying
the four factors adopted in Wells v. City and County of Denver.297 The
four factors articulated in Wells were: (1) whether the central purpose of
the sign or monument in question was to promote the views of the mu-
nicipality; (2) whether the municipality exercised editorial control over
the content of the sign or monument; (3) whether the literal speaker was
an employee of the municipality; and (4) whether the ultimate responsi-
286. Id. Thus, unlike the Fleming Court, the court in Summum at least explicitly referred (albeit
in a footnote) to the potential for an Establishment Clause violation on the part of the government if
it accepted the religious expression onto public property. See id.; Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch.
Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 995,920 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002).
287. Id.
288. See Dagley, supra note 11, at 5.
289. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1002.
290. Id. at 1002-03.




295. Id. at 1004, 1006.
296. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1004.
297. 257 F.3d 1132, 1140-42 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court's ruling that upheld a
city's refusal to post a Winter Solstice sign devoted to atheist beliefs within the city's fenced-off
winter holiday display).
679
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
bility for determining the content of the sign or monument rested with
the municipality.298
Applying these four factors to the instant case, the court determined
that the City might have satisfied only the fourth.299 The central purpose
of the monument was to advance the views of the Fraternal Order of Ea-
gles, not the City.300 Furthermore, the City never exercised any editorial
control over the monument.3°1 Rather, the Eagles had controlled what
was expressed and had given a finished product to the City.30 2 The court
also believed that the Eagles were the true speakers of the monument's
message, notwithstanding the fact that the monument stood on municipal
grounds. 30 3 Lastly, though, the court observed that "[a]rguably .... the
City may be charged with ultimate responsibility for the content of the
Monument."
3°4
In considering whether the City had adopted the speech as its own,
the court also attributed great importance to the "after-the-fact nature of
the City of Ogden's effort to claim adoption of that speech.' 30 5 The court
alluded to the Supreme Court's concern over "post hoc rationalizations
[that] may obscure viewpoint discrimination." 30 6 The court felt that the
City of Ogden had not shown any pre-litigation evidence of its adoption
of the speech in question.30 7 Thus, in view of the four factors from Wells
and the "the caselaw's particular concern for post hoc rationalizations in
the Free Speech context," the court concluded that "the speech repre-
sented by the Ten Commandments Monument represents the speech of
the Eagles rather than that of the City of Ogden. 30
The court then turned to the City's historical relevance justifica-
tion.3 9 In ruling against the City on this claim, the court did not conclude
that "a municipality may never maintain a nonpublic forum to which
access is controlled based upon 'historical relevance' to the given com-
munity. ' '3 Rather, the court decided that the City could not base its ac-
tions on such a claim because it had failed to utilize sufficient safeguards
to ensure that the historical relevance justification did not become merely
a "post hoc facade for viewpoint discrimination.'
31'
298. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1004.
299. Id. at 1004-05.
300. Id. at 1004.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1004-05.
304. Id. at 1005.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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In order to show that its historical relevance justification did have a
sound basis, the City had to show either an official written policy sup-
porting such a justification or a "well-established practice" of utilizing
the historical relevance criterion.312 On both counts, the court concluded,
the City failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting its position.313
Thus, in its failure to show any official policy allowing the simultaneous
approval of the Ten Commandments monument and the rejection of the
Summum monument, the City had "unreasonably, and in violation of the
Free Speech Clause, risked viewpoint discrimination in the relevant fo-
rum.,
314
The court concluded its discussion by addressing the City's defense
that allowing Summum to erect a monument on municipal grounds
would violate the Establishment Clause.315 Interestingly, in analyzing this
Establishment Clause claim, the court applied elements of two of the
three major Establishment Clause inquiries: the Lemon test, and the "co-
ercion" analysis.316 The court concluded that the City would not violate
the Establishment Clause by erecting the Summum monument.317 Con-
trary to what the City argued, the purpose inquiry under the Lemon test
focuses on the government's purpose for allowing the speech in question,
not on the religious entity's purpose in requesting the expression. 318 In
the instant case, there was no evidence presented that pointed to any po-
tential for an improper purpose on the part of the City if it allowed Sum-
mum to erect its monument. 319 Rather, the evidence in the record showed
that the only viable motive that could be attributed to the City if it hon-
ored Summum's request would be "a concern for equal access., 320 The
City, rather ironically, argued that erecting the Summum monument
would cause a reasonable observer to conclude that the City endorsed the
Summum religion.321 The court reached the contrary conclusion and said
that a reasonable observer would actually "note the fact that the lawn of
the municipal building contains a diverse array of monuments, some
from a secular and some from a sectarian perspective.
', 322
Thus, the court held that there was, in fact, a violation of the Free
Speech Clause because the City's restriction of Summum's expression
312. Id. at 1007.
313. Id. at 1008-09.
314. Id. at 1009.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 1009-10.
317. Id. at 1010.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1011.
320. Id.
321. Id. ("The City['s argument was] ... somewhat ironic.., in light of the City's simultane-
ous insistence that the display of the Ten Commandments Monument alone does not violate the
Establishment Clause").
322. Id.
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was not reasonable or viewpoint neutral.323 Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the City regarding the free speech claim.324
2. Other Circuits




In 1993, the Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority ("the
Building Authority") in Indianapolis, Indiana, refused to allow the plain-
tiffs, Rabbi Abraham Grossbaum and Lubavitch of Indiana, Inc., an Or-
thodox Jewish organization, to erect a menorah in the lobby of the Indi-
anapolis City-County Building during the Jewish holiday of Chanu-
kah.326 For many years prior to this denial, the Building Authority had
given the plaintiffs permission to erect a menorah.327 However, because
of complaints that the menorah's presence violated the Establishment
Clause, the Building Authority issued a new policy in 1993 disallowing
the display of "seasonal religious symbols" in the City-County Build-
ing.328 This new policy initially included the prohibition of Christmas
trees, but after the Building Authority was informed by its legal counsel
that courts traditionally view Christmas trees as conveying secular rather
than religious messages, the Building Authority decided to have Christ-
mas trees erected in the lobby during the holiday season.329 The plain-
tiffs, alleging that the Building Authority was engaging in content and
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, brought
suit in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.330 The dis-
trict court ruled against the plaintiffs and held that the Building Authority
had not exhibited viewpoint discrimination when it simultaneously al-
lowed Christmas trees and rejected the menorah. 331 The plaintiffs then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
332
ii. Decision
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first noted that the forum in
question was nonpublic and, as such, government restrictions on speech
were permissible only if they were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.333
323. See id. at 1011-12.
324. Id. at 1012.
325. 163 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1995).
326. Grossbaum, 163 F.3d at 582.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 583.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 584.
332. Id. at 582.
333. Id. at 587.
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In a nonpublic forum context, the government violates First Amendment
free speech rights and the rule that requires viewpoint neutrality when it
"denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he es-
pouses on an otherwise includible subject., 334 The court, therefore, had
to decide whether the holiday season was an "includible subject" for
discussion in the lobby and the religious display just one particular view-
point, or whether religious displays in general were a subject that could
be properly excluded as part of a reasonable and viewpoint neutral re-
striction.335
The Court concluded that the Building Authority's policy that ex-
cluded the menorah "was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal
holiday displays of a religious character.",336 Because the Building Au-
thority permitted other groups with non-religious messages to apply for
space within the City-County Building lobby, and because the court be-
lieved that religious material was a viewpoint and not a general subject in
this context, the court found that the Building Authority was unconstitu-
tionally discriminating based on the plaintiffs perspective.337 The court
held that "the prohibition of the menorah's message because of its reli-
gious perspective was unconstitutional under the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause."
338
b. Seventh Circuit: Books v. City of Elkhart
3 39
i. Facts
The City of Elkhart, Minnesota ("the City"), erected a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on a lawn in front of the City's
Municipal Building.34° The monument was a gift from the Fraternal Or-
der of Eagles and was placed on the lawn near a monument that honored
Revolutionary War soldiers buried in Elkhart County and another that
celebrated freedom. 341 William Books and Michael Suetkamp, residents
of the City, brought suit in federal district court alleging that the City
violated the Establishment Clause. 42 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City and the plaintiffs then appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit.4 3
334. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
335. Id. at 588.
336. Id. at 590.
337. Id. at 591-92.
338. Id. at 592.
339. 235 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 2000).
340. Books, 235 F.3d at 295.
341. Id. at 295-96.
342. Id. at 294.
343. Id.
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ii. Decision
In an opinion written by the same judge who authored the Gross-
baum opinion, 344 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Ten
Commandments monument did violate the Establishment Clause, and
thus, the district court's decision had to be reversed.345 Citing the Lemon
test as "the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establishment
Clause claims, ' 34 the court determined that the City had failed the first
and second prongs of the test.347 In ruling against the City, the court ex-
pressed a distrust of the City's contention that the purpose of the monu-
ment was largely secular.348 Instead, the court found that "the purpose in
displaying this monument was to promote religious ideals. 349
C. Analysis
As in the Fleming decision, the dispute that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed in Summum did not involve the Establishment
Clause.35° Counsel for Summum conceded in oral argument that, absent
the overturning of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anderson, precedent
mandated that the City prevail on its motion for summary judgment re-
garding the Establishment Clause claim, and the court declined to pursue
the matter. 351 However, the court questioned whether Summum's conces-
sion was wise.352 Based on the Supreme Court's strongly worded asser-
tion that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact,, 353 Summum may have had
sufficient justification to argue that the Ten Commandments, under any
test, are inherently religious in nature and displaying them on govern-
ment property entails impermissible entanglements between religion and
government. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's divided opinion in
Pinette,354 in which the plurality opinion afforded government entities
substantially more leeway in allowing private religious expression on
public property,355 could stand as a significant and recent obstacle to Es-
tablishment Clause claims.
Regardless, in the end, Summum was, like Fleming, decided on free
speech grounds.356 The basis for the decision was the notion that, in a
344. See id. at 294; Grossbaum, 63 F.3d at 582.
345. Books, 235 F.3d at 304, 307, 308.
346. Id. at 301.
347. Id. at 304, 307.
348. See id. at 304.
349. Id.
350. See Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 n. 1.
351. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000.
352. Id. at 1000 n.3.
353. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
354. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 756.
355. See id. at 770.
356. See Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
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nonpublic forum, the government can only restrict expression if the re-
striction is reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and is view-
point neutral.357 Included in the reasoning behind the decision, however,
is the more recent view that, as the Supreme Court declared in Pinette,
"private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is
as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private ex-
pression.,
358
Thus, Summum represents the more inclusive and accommodationist
view of government's proper role in regulating and recognizing religious
expression. According to the approach, religious beliefs should be ac-
corded the same treatment as nonreligious beliefs and the government
may acknowledge them in a manner that does not offend the principles of
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.35 9 As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky writes, "[U]nder the accommodation approach the govern-
ment violates the establishment clause only if it literally establishes a
church, coerces religious participation, or favors one religion over oth-
ers." 36° Moreover, according to Chemerinsky, the accommodationist per-
spective argues that the Supreme Court "should interpret the establish-
ment clause to recognize the importance of religion in society and ac-
commodate its presence in government.9
361
In ruling that the City could not refuse to include Summum's
monument on municipal grounds while displaying the Ten Command-
ments,362 the Tenth Circuit seems to adhere closely to the principles sup-
porting the nascent movement to recognize the prominent role of religion
in the nation's culture and governance.363 Even though the expression in
question was religious in nature, and even though certain exceptions to
the right to free speech exist in First Amendment jurisprudence, the court
declared that the monument proposed by Summum "does not fall within
these limited exceptions and thus constitutes protected speech. 36
CONCLUSION
The history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been marked
by a tension created by the interplay of two competing values: the sepa-
ration of church and state and government neutrality towards religion.365
Heightening this tension is the enduring conflict between the Establish-
357. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1002-03.
358. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760.
359. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, § 12.2.1, at 1154.
360. Id. at 1153.
361. Id.
362. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1011.
363. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
364. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1001.
365. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1071 (2002).
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ment Clause itself and the Free Exercise Clause.366 As the First Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in Knights of Columbus v. Town of Lexington,
367
"[T]he Establishment Clause pulls in the direction of separating church
and state, while the Free Exercise Clause pushes in the direction of per-
mitting the unfettered expression of religious doctrine. 36 8 Government
actions designed to facilitate religious expression may be challenged as
"impermissible establishments," while government restrictions of relig-
ion may be seen as violating "the free exercise thereof., 369 The Tenth
Circuit's decisions in Fleming and Summum reflect the difficulties in-
volved in the government's attempt to avoid these scenarios. In one case,
the court was clearly inclined to keep religious content off the walls of a
public school and, thus, avoid any perceived governmental endorse-
370ment. In the other, the court looked to other values such as equal
treatment and historical tradition in finding that an out-of-the-mainstream
church had a right to voice its beliefs alongside more prominent sects on
public property.37t These two results embody two distinct visions of the
role of religion in our society and government, and their examples will
probably be followed for years to come as the republic strives to find a
balance between the religious and the secular and between faith and sci-
ence. Considering the historical volatility of such struggles, perhaps the
decision in Fleming was the better result, as its reasoning left faith and
religious expression to what might be their more appropriate settings-
our nation's houses of worship.
Sean Moynihan*
366. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, § 12.1.1, at 1140.
367. 272 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a town's ban on unattended structures on a town
green did not infringe on a religious organization's rights of free speech).
368. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d at 35.
369. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 1140.
370. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 930, 933 (10th Cir. 2002)
("The presence of permanently affixed tiles on the walls implicates the school's approval of those
tiles" and public schools have a "legitimate interest in avoiding religious controversy and disruption
resulting from the posting of religious speech.").
371. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1008-09, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002) (The court
found no discernible city policy of accepting monuments based on historical relevance and con-
cluded that "[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment compels the City of Ogden to treat
with equal dignity speech from divergent religious perspectives.").
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
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COST RECOVERY OR CONTRIBUTION FOR
"SUBSTANTIALLY INNOCENT PRPs" UNDER CERCLA?:
MORRISON ENTERPRISES V. MCSHARES, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Between September 1, 2001, and August 31, 2002, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided one case that re-
quired it to interpret two sections of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").' That case,
Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.2 is the principal case addressed
in this survey. Under CERCLA, any party that has spent money to re-
spond to a hazardous waste release, whether a federal or state govern-
ment or a private party, may recoup the costs from parties that may have
also contributed to the contamination. 3 In litigation under CERCLA, "po-
tentially responsible parties" are referred to as "PRPs. ' 4 When private
parties who are potentially liable clean sites themselves, they may later
sue other PRPs to recoup part of their expenses.5 This survey primarily
examines the relationship between §§ 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA in
actions between private parties.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the principal
agency that administers CERCLA on behalf of the United States, 6 can
enforce the Act in a number of ways. For example, the EPA can clean the
contaminated site itself using money from the "Superfund, ' 7 issue ad-
ministrative compliance orders directing the PRPs to clean the site,8 or
petition a district court for an injunction to force a PRP to clean a con-
taminated site.9 In addition to the federal government, state governments
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-75 (2000). The text of this survey will refer to the statute as the law was originally enacted,
CERCLA §§ 101-175. The footnotes of this survey, however, will refer to the most current version
of the Act as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-75 (2000).
2. 302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002).
3. See Richard D. Buckley, Jr., Note & Comment, Making A Case for Statutory Amendment
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA "):
Solving the Section 107/Section 113 Cause of Action Controversy, 31 TULSA L.J. 851, 851, 852
(1996).
4. Joel Wertman, Comment, The Importance of the Brownfields Revitalization and Economic
Restoration Act in Promoting Brownfields Redevelopment, 20 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 267, 273
(2002).
5. Buckley, supra note 3, at 854.
6. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 42 C.F.R. 52 (1987) (delegating executive enforcement
powers to the EPA Administrator).
7. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE SUPERFUND RESPONSE PROCESS (1998) (explaining that
the Superfund is a trust fund created to pay for cleanup actions), available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfundlcontacts/stbotlne/resp.pdf.
8. Wertman, supra note 4, at 273.
9. Id.
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and Indian tribes may also bring suits under CERCLA in order to facili-
tate cleanup of contaminated sites. °
Private parties and the government may recoup cleanup costs under
CERCLA through a § 107(a) cost recovery action or a § 113(f) contribu-
tion claim.'" A cost recovery action under CERCLA is a lawsuit brought
by a governmental or private party under § 107(a) to recover cleanup
expenses from the parties responsible for the contamination., 2 The EPA
and other parties who have cleaned a site can shift liability for the cost of
the cleanup to PRPs under § 107(a).13 In order to recover expenses from
PRPs, a plaintiff must prove that "(1) the defendant is a PRP, (2) the site
is a facility, (3) a release or threatened release of hazardous substance[s]
has occurred," and "(4) the release caused the plaintiff to incur response
costs.' 4 Under § 107(a), strict liability theory applies and liability is
joint and several, 15 unless the harm is divisible. 16 A defendant can avoid
liability under § 107(a) by establishing an affirmative defense. 17 The
statute of limitations under § 107(a) is six years.'
8
On the other hand, contribution actions are brought under § 113(f)
of CERCLA.19 Pursuant to § 113(0, "any person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section
[1]07(a).,,20 Black's Law Dictionary defines contribution as "[a] tortfea-
sor's right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
tortfeasor has paid more than his ... proportionate share.",2' Therefore,
contribution allows a party who has incurred a disproportionate share of
response costs to identify other PRPs to share the liability. 2 A party who
may be partially responsible for a spill, and hence a PRP, may use this
section to lessen his expenses by suing and recouping costs from other
PRPs. 23 Contribution suits may arise in three contexts: (1) when the gov-
10. - 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (f)(1) (2000).
11. Wertman, supra note 4, at 273; ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 215 (5th ed. 2000).
12. OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 171 (2d ed. 2001).
13. Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy Over
CERCLA Claims Brought By Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 89
(1997).
14. Wertman, supra note 4, at 274.
15. Ricky Pearce, Comment, A Call for a New Policy Toward CERCLA Cleanup Costs in the
Eighth Circuit: Is it Fair to Punish the PRP Who Initiates the Cleanup at a Superfund Site?, 7 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 126, 126 (2000).
16. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 213.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).
18. Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B) ("An initial action for the recovery of the costs referred to in section
[107] ... must be commenced.., for a remedial action, within 6 years after the initiation of physical
on-site construction of the remedial action").
19. Buckley, supra note 3, at 852.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (7th ed. 1999).
22. See MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 212.
23. Daniel C. Chang, Comment, CERCLA: The Problems of Limiting Contribution Claims for
Potentially Responsible Parties, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2002).
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ernment sues but does not sue all PRPs and the parties named in the gov-
ernment action initiate a subsequent lawsuit for contribution "against the
remaining unnamed PRPs; (2) when a private party incurring response
costs does not name all PRPs in its reimbursement action and ... [later
contribution claims] are brought by the named PRPs against remaining
unnamed PRPs; and (3) when one PRP brings a private action to recover
response costs against another PRP.' 24
Under § 113(f), only several liability attaches to a defendant. 25 To
establish this liability, the plaintiff must ascertain the defendant's share
of the cleanup costs. 26 "In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate. 27 The statute of limitations un-
der § 113(f) is three years.28
The majority of the circuit courts of appeals have held that PRPs
may only recoup cleanup costs under § 113(f), but not under § 107(a). 9
Courts that do not allow a PRP to bring a § 107(a) claim do so in large
part because a PRP by definition is a party responsible for some of the
contamination at the site.30 These courts believe that allowing a party
partly responsible for the contamination to reap the benefits of § 107(a)
disregards the very purposes of CERCLA. 31 A plaintiff usually prefers to
sue under § 107(a) because of the several procedural advantages it offers
over § 113(f), which can produce very favorable outcomes for the plain-
tiff.
32
However, the solutions to the controversy proposed in this survey
offer a compromise to these majority courts that protects the original
goal of CERCLA. That goal is the expedient "and voluntary cleanup of
hazardous waste sites" by the party that contaminated the site.33 This
long-standing controversy could be resolved if courts adopted solutions
such as the ones discussed below, Congress amended CERCLA to clarify
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f), or the United States Supreme
Court definitively ruled on the issue.
24. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 213.
25. Christine D. McGuire, Case Note, Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.: The
Potentially Responsible Party's Right to Full Cost Recovery is Expanded, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 511,
522 (1998).
26. Wertman, supra note 4, at 274.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
28. Id. § 9613 (g)(3) ("No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than 3 years after- (A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for
recovery of such costs or damages, or (B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g)
of this title... or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.").
29. Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
30. Id.
31. Lisa M. Glanvill, Note, The Superfund's Superproblem: Will Congress Clean Up the
Hazardous Wasteland of the Section 107/Section 113 Standing Controversy?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 153, 178 (1997).
32. Pearce, supra note 15, at 127.
33. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 86.
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Part I of this survey is a broad introduction to the CERCLA statute.
Part II explains the long-standing controversy over when parties are able
to bring a cost recovery action versus a contribution action. Part III dis-
cusses the Tenth Circuit's application of the statute in Morrison. Part IV
outlines cases decided by the Seventh Circuit that hold contrary to the
majority of the United States Courts of Appeal. Part V explains the posi-
tions that the remaining circuits take on the controversy. Finally, Part VI
is a critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Morrison decision as well as
an analysis of the minority view on the controversy. Part VII proposes
solutions to the controversy that take into account the policy considera-
tions that led Congress to enact CERCLA.
I. CERCLA
A. Background
In response to the Love Canal hazardous waste disaster in 1979, 34
Congress enacted CERCLA, also known as the "Superfund" law,35 in
December 1980.36 At the time that the CERCLA was enacted, other laws
were in force that dealt with improper disposal of hazardous wastes and
contamination of water-among them, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 197637 and the Clean Water Act of 1972. 8 However,
these statutes did not directly address the cleanup of most contaminated
sites and were not sufficiently comprehensive. 39 For example, the cost of
cleaning hazardous waste sites has soared astronomically over the past
two decades. In the 1980s the average cost to clean a single site ranged
"from six to ten million dollars per site."4 Today, "the cost has increased
to nearly thirty to fifty million dollars. ' 4i To address these costs,
CERCLA imposes harsh penalties on parties responsible for releasing
hazardous wastes into the environment. In a traditional cost recovery
action, a party can potentially incur "the total of all costs of response plus
$50,000,000 for any damages. 42 A court can impose treble damages to
penalize a party who "fails without sufficient cause" to clean a site.43
34. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 159. In Niagara Falls, New York, the Board of Educa-
tion built an elementary school over the Love Canal dumpsite of highly toxic waste. Id. Local offi-
cials then allowed construction of a residential subdivision next to that contaminated site. Id. Follow-
ing the evacuation of over 230 families from the area, residents brought suit seeking over two billion
dollars for personal injury, including many miscarriages, birth defects, and catastrophic property
damage. Id.
35. Id. at 205.
36. Id. at 159.
37. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000).
38. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
39. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 156; McGuire, supra note 25, at 512; John M. Hyson, "Fair-
ness" and Joint and Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 139 (1997).
40. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (2000).
43. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
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Accordingly, CERCLA has had a tremendous impact on shifting cleanup
costs from the taxpayer to the parties responsible for releasing the haz-
ardous wastes into the environment."a
Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 "with the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). 45 In addition to increasing
the Superfund coffers, SARA codified the right of contribution for par-
ties that initially bore the cost of site cleanup in § 113.46 By amending
CERCLA in this way, Congress attempted to "clarify and confirm a judi-
cially established right to contribution under ... [§] 107." 47 Before
SARA, CERCLA contained no express mechanism for a party to recover
from another when it paid more than its share of cleanup costs. 48 SARA
also added § 113(f)(2) to CERCLA.49 This section grants statutory pro-
tection from § 113(f) contribution claims to any PRP who settles with the
United States government. 50 This section however, does not protect a
PRP from future § 107(a) cost recovery claims.51
Finally, CERCLA liability is retroactive, meaning that the EPA may
hold parties liable for the costs of cleaning releases that occurred before
the statute's 1980 enactment.52 "This holds true even if the" release "was
customary and legal" when it occurred.53
B. Purpose
CERCLA's "purpose is to establish a 'comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.' ',54 One of
the goals of the Act is, therefore, to facilitate the expedient and voluntary
cleanup of environmentally contaminated sites, "such as old landfills,
industrial sites, and mining sites. 55 The "second goal is to encourage the
careful handling of hazardous wastes. 56 CERCLA accomplishes this by
shifting the costs of cleanup efforts from taxpayers to parties responsible
44. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
45. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
47. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
48. In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1118 (3dCir. 1997).
49. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
51. Martin A. McCrory, Who's on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and Protec-
tion, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 3, 25 (1999).
52. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND LIABILITY, ENFORCEMENT, AND SETTLEMENTS 7-8
(1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/contactslsfhotlne/liab.pdf.
53. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 208.
54. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Pub. Serv. Co. Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)).
55. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108; see McGuire, supra note 25, at 516.
56. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
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for releasing the hazardous waste into the environment. 57 This is known
as the "polluter pays" principal.58
C. Determining Liability
Section 107(a) makes "covered persons" liable for contamination of
property. 59 There are four categories of covered people: (1) owners and
operators of facilities where the spill occurred, ° (2) any party that owned
or operated the facility where the spill occurred at the time the hazardous
substances were disposed of at the facility,61 (3) any party that arranged
for the disposal of hazardous substances at the facility,62 and (4) any
party that accepted hazardous waste for transport to the facility if that
party selected the facility as the destination for the waste.63 Plaintiffs
may recover "any ... necessary costs of response incurred." 64 Once the
EPA or a private party identifies the PRPs and a PRP incurs or antici-
pates the extent of the cleanup costs, a court determines the extent of
each PRP's liability.65 "The extent of liability determines whether" a
court will hold a party responsible for all or only part of the cleanup ex-
penses.66
D. Defenses to CERCLA Liability-§ 107(b)
Section 107(b) provides very limited defenses to liability. It reads in
relevant part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish ... that the release ... of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the de-
fendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the'de-
fendant... if the defendant establishes ... that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substances concerned ... and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions.
67
57. McCrory, supra note 51, at 9.
58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
60. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
61. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
62. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
63. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
64. Id. § 9607(a)(I).
65. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 204-05.
66. Id. at 205.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3).
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People rarely invoke the first two defenses and the facts of a case only
rarely justify their application. 68 The third defense, often called the "in-
nocent landowner defense", remains the most frequently used. 69 It "ap-
propriately applie[s] if the contamination did not occur in connection
with a 'contractual relationship,' such as where a third party dumps
waste in the middle of the night on the defendant's property.,, 70 The in-
nocent landowner defense shifts the burden of proving causation to the
defendants to prove that a contractual relationship exists. 71 The defen-
dants must then prove that the third party's acts or omissions were the
sole cause of the release, the defendant exercised due care, and the de-
fendant took precautions against any foreseeable acts and omissions by
the third party and against the foreseeable consequences of any acts or
72omissions.
E. Advantages of a § 107(a) Claim Versus a § 113(f) Claim
Plaintiffs would prefer to bring claims under § 107(a) rather than §
113(f) because of the advantages a cost recovery claim offers over a con-
73tribution claim. However, courts only reluctantly allow a PRP to bring
cost recovery actions against other PRPs.74
The most significant advantage of recovery under § 107(a) is that a
plaintiff can recover all cleanup costs from a defendant if a court finds
the defendant joint and severally liable under a strict liability theory.75
Joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to recover damages from any
one of the defendants.7 6 Black's Law Dictionary defines strict liability as
"[l]iability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm,
but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe. 77 A court automatically considers a party "to be 'strictly liable' if'
the party is one of the four types of PRPs. 78 If, for example, the EPA
brings an action against a PRP under § 107 and wins a joint and several
judgment, "the EPA may recover all of the cleanup costs of the cleanup
from that [single] PRP., 7 9 If there are other PRPs, then the PRP who was
sued by the EPA may only obtain judgments against the other PRPs for
their "proportionate shares of the liability."80 That PRP "may not fully
68. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 52, at 9.
69. Id.
70. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 218.
71. Id.
72. McCrory, supra note 51, at 15-17.
73. See Glanvill, supra note 31, at 164.
74. McGuire, supra note 25, at 523-24.
75. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 84; McGuire, supra note 24, at 523.
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999) ("Liability that may be apportioned either
among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group .... Thus, each
liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation").
77. Id.
78. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 210.
79. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 84 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 84-85.
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shift liability [to another PRP] as the EPA can in its cost recovery ac-
tion."8' Finally § 107(a) has a longer statute of limitations than §
82113(f)-six years as opposed to three.
By contrast, if a plaintiff brings a § 1 13(f) claim, he does not have
as many procedural advantages as he would under § 107(a). 3 This fact
gives the defendant several advantages that he would have not had if the
plaintiff sued under § 107(a).8 4 Under § 113(f), the court equitably allo-
cates liability based on care and fault.85 The defendant then has the op-
portunity to lessen his response costs. 86 This in turn may leave the plain-
tiff responsible for more than his fair share of cleanup CoStS. 87 Also, li-
ability is several under § 113(f), as opposed to joint and several liability
under § 107(a).88 Therefore, each defendant remains liable only for "its
proportionate share of the total response costs, and is not responsible for
costs" attributable to others, such as orphan shares discussed below. 9
Another important difference between claims under the two sections
is the effect of § 113(f)(2) on each. As noted above, § 113(f)(2) provides
statutory protection from § 113(f) contribution claims to PRPs who settle
their liability for contaminating a site with the United States govern-
ment.90 This section, however, does not explicitly protect a PRP from
future § 107(a) cost recovery claims brought by non-settling parties.9' In
addition, plaintiffs may still bring other claims not included in that set-
tlement.92 So PRPs prohibited from bringing a contribution action under
§ 113(f) often choose to bring a § 107(a) action in an attempt to avoid the
protections of § 113(f)(2). 93
II. THE CONTROVERSY
After Congress enacted SARA, two express causes of action were
available to a party that incurred response costs.94 However, Congress
did not specify whether PRPs have standing to bring § 107(a) cost recov-
ery actions or whether CERCLA limits PRPs to contribution actions un-
der § 1 13(f).95 As a result, federal courts disagree about how to interpret
81. Id. at 85.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B), (g)(3).
83. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 127-28.
84. Id. at 128.
85. McCrory, supra note 51, at 23. Under § 113(f)(1), "the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1).
86. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
87. Id.; Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
88. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
89. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
91. Id.
92. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 165.
93. Buckley, supra note 3, at 863.
94. McGuire, supra note 25, at 523.
95. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 155.
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this new language. 96 An outgoing Congress hastily enacted CERCLA "in
the closing days of a lame-duck session," so the scarce legislative history
does not help to clarify this confusion.
97
The broad language of § 107(a)(4)(B) states that PRPs are liable for
"any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.' 98
This language makes it seem that a PRP can file a cost recovery action.
99
However, CERCLA's history and case law have indicated otherwise.' °°
Most courts of appeals, despite the vague language of the statute, have
held that the remedies available to PRPs are limited depending on the
party's motivation for seeking cost recovery under § 107(a). 0' After
SARA codified the right to contribution, courts disagreed over whether
PRPs could bring cost recovery claims or whether they were limited to
contribution claims. 102
A large factor in this controversy is costs called orphan shares.1
0 3
Orphan shares are the response costs that are attributable to insolvent or
unidentifiable entities.' °4 These response costs can be quite substantial in
multimillion-dollar litigation cases. 10 5 Under § 107(a), all parties bear the
orphan share costs except the plaintiff. 1°6 Under § 113(f), the court has
the authority to equitably allocate orphan shares among plaintiffs and
defendants. 0 7 Therefore under § 113(f), the plaintiff may also bear the
costs of orphan shares.
0 8
Courts have essentially taken three different approaches to the con-
troversy. 1°9 The majority of courts of appeals have adopted the first ap-
proach and interpret CERCLA to mean that PRPs may only sue for con-
tribution under § 113(f) to recoup cleanup costs and may not sue under §
107(a) for cost recovery." 0 According to the minority of courts of ap-
peals that have adopted the second approach, PRPs may sue under §
107(a) for joint and several liability to recoup cleanup costs."' Under the
96. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
97. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 83.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
99. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 104-05.
100. Buckley, supra note 3, at 852.
101. Ann Alexander, Standing Under Superfund §§ 107 and 113: Avoiding the Error of the
Blind Man and the Elephant (pt. 1), 10 Toxics L. REP. 155, 155 (1995). For example, if a PRP is
bringing a § 107(a) cost recovery action simply to take advantage of the longer statute of limitations
or to circumvent § 113(f)(2) protection, courts generally disallow the § 107(a) claim. Id. However, if
the PRP is bringing the § 107(a) claim in order to seek joint and several liability, courts are more
willing to allow the claim. Id.
102. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 105.
103. Id. at 84; Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
104. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL E7 AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 323 (3d ed. 2000).
105. Buckley, supra note 3, at 858.
106. Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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third approach, PRPs are allowed to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery claim,
but liability is determined the same way as in claims for contribution
under § 113(f). 12 A PRP who bore the entire cost of a cleanup will want
to share responsibility for any orphan shares with other PRPs." 3 How-
ever, if the court imposes several liability and requires the other PRPs to
pay only for their shares of the liability, the PRP who bore the cost of the
cleanup cannot share the orphan shares.'
14
The U.S. Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on this issue.
115
However, in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,1 16 the Court stated that
CERCLA "expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in §
113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping rem-
edy in § 107."'' l Key Tronic and several other PRPs contaminated a
landfill. 1 8 It filed suit to recover the costs of cleaning the site under §
107(a)." 9 The Court held that Key Tronic could recover the portion of
the costs related to identifying other PRPs under § 107(a)(4)(B). 12° Ac-
cording to some courts, this ruling implies that a PRP has standing to
assert a response claim under § 107.121 Other courts, however, disagree
and hold that the references to § 107 were dicta and, therefore, Key
Tronic "provides no guidance on the issue."'
122
Before Morrison, the Tenth Circuit last addressed this issue in
United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.123 In Colorado &
Eastern, the United States sued all known PRPs, including the defendant,
the current owner of the site, and the plaintiff, the previous owner of the
site.' 24 The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant for cost
recovery under § 107(a).' 25 The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
claim could only proceed with an action for contribution under §
113(f).126 The court reasoned that "[t]here is no disagreement that both
parties are PRPs by virtue of their past or present ownership of the site;
therefore, any claim that would reapportion costs between these parties is
the quintessential claim for contribution.' 27 The court stated that "were
PRPs . .. allowed to recover... from other PRPs under § 107's strict
112. Id.
113. See id. at 85.
114. Id.
115. Pearce, supra note 15, at 129.
116. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
117. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816.
118. Id. at 811.
119. Id. at 812.
120. Id. at 820.
121. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 129.
122. Id.
123. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. Colo. E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1533.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1536.
127. Id.
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liability scheme, § 113(f) would be rendered meaningless. 128 The court
focused solely on the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant were PRPs
in barring the plaintiff from bringing a § 107(a) cost recovery claim.
129
Ill. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
A. Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.130
1. Facts
Morrison Enterprises ("Morrison") owned grain elevators in Salina,
Kansas.' 31 McShares, Inc. ("McShares") supplied grain fumigants, which
contained carbon tetrachloride, to Morrison to use in the grain eleva-
tors. 132 In November 1963, while unloading a delivery to Morrison, a
McShares employee spilled fumigants on Morrison's property. 
133
In 1988, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment
("KDHE") tested water wells on the property next to Morrison's and
found carbon tetrachloride contamination. 134 KDHE issued an adminis-
trative order requiring Morrison to investigate the contamination. 135 Mor-
rison then hired an environmental consulting firm to investigate the con-
tamination. 136 Thereafter, Morrison entered into a consent order with
KDHE in 1992, under which Morrison agreed to investigate and to clean
up the spill. 137 By 1997, Morrison had spent over $430,000 to comply
with the consent order. 38 Morrison then sued McShares, seeking mone-
tary damages to recover cleanup costs and a declaratory judgment that
McShares would be liable for future cleanup costs.
139
Morrison failed to comply with the district court's disclosure dead-
lines, so district court issued a preclusion order that prevented Morrison
from calling expert witnesses at trial. 1 At the 1997 trial, the district
court excluded some of Morrison's evidence because of the preclusion
order.14 1 However, it found that Morrison met its burden of establishing
all but two of the prima facie elements of liability under CERCLA.
142
The court found that Morrison's inability to call expert witnesses fatally
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002).







138. Id. at 1130-31.
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affected its ability to meet its burden on the above two points. 43 The
court ordered judgment for McShares on monetary claims and declara-
tory judgment for Morrison on prima facie elements of liability.'" Mor-
rison appealed, arguing that the court should have issued a declaratory




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating
that in Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.146 it held that "where one PRP
sues another PRP for reimbursement of cleanup costs . . . the plaintiff
PRP must proceed under the contribution provisions of § [1]13(f) and is
barred from proceeding under § [1]07(a). 14 7 The Tenth Circuit noted
that in order to determine whether Morrison could proceed under §
107(a), the court had to determine whether or not Morrison was a PRP.148
It concluded that Morrison was a PRP because it owned the facility,
unless it qualified for one of the defenses described in § 107(b). 49 Morri-
son argued that it qualified for one of these defenses.1 50 However, the
court dismissed that argument because Morrison had a contractual rela-
tionship with McShares that called for delivery of the fumigant when the
spill occurred. 151 Therefore, Morrison did not qualify for the § 107(b)(3)
third party defense. 1
52
Morrison then argued that even if it did not qualify for a § 107(b)(3)
defense, it was an innocent PRP and the court should allow it to "pursue
recovery under § [1]07(a) because 'it ha[d] no responsibility for the
spill.""' 153 Morrison, attempted to reap the procedural benefits that suing
under § 107(a) offers over § 113(f), claiming that Sun Co. created an
"innocent PRP" exception to the rule that PRPs cannot bring suit under §
107(a).
154
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that
a PRP who does not qualify for a defense under § 107(b)(3) may still
pursue an action under § 107(a) if the PRP establishes "innocent" land-
owner status sufficiently. 55 The court also stated that a few federal
courts of appeals' decisions have also indicated in dicta that even PRPs
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1132.
146. 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
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who cannot rely on the § 107(b) defenses might still proceed under §
107(a) if their liability results solely from their status as landowner and
not from contribution to the contamination. 5 6 However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit pointed out that it did not decide the issue in Sun Co. as Morrison
argued.157 More emphatically though, the court stated that the Seventh
Circuit's exception does not comport with the underlying purposes of
CERCLA.'58
The Tenth Circuit noted that under § 107(a), if the landowner suc-
cessfully establishes the defendant's liability, the entire cost automati-
cally shifts to the defendant under strict joint and several liability.5 9
However, under § 113(f), even if the landowner proves the defendant's
liability, the landowner must also prove how liability should be divided
between the parties, "including, potentially, the plaintiffs."' 60 Therefore,
under § 113(f), "'innocent PRPs' may bear some of the costs.' 16 1 The
Tenth Circuit doubted that this would ever be the case though because
truly innocent PRPs should be apportioned the entire cost.'
62
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Morrison was a PRP because it
was the landowner and because it could not rely on the § 107(b) de-
fenses.163 As a PRP, the court concluded that it could only proceed with a
contribution action under § 1 13(f).164
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS
In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also prohibit a PRP from bringing a §
107(a) recovery action. 165 The majority of circuit courts reason that all
PRPs are by definition responsible parties and must, therefore, contribute
to cleanup costs. 166
A. First Circuit
In United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.,
167
the First Circuit held that a liable party could only recoup costs under §
156. Id.
157. Id. "We express no opinion on whether PRPs who assert their innocence with regard to
any waste at a site may be able to recover all of their costs from other PRPs in an action under §
107." Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1191 n.1.
158. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1134.
159. Id.





165. Chang, supra note 23, at 1121. The Eighth Circuit has not decided a case on point, but has
indicated that it would bar PRPs from bringing a § 107(a) action. Id.; Pearce, supra note 15, at 126;
see Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit also
has not directly ruled on this issue. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 130.
166. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
167. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
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113(f).168 In United, the Plaintiff entered into a consent decree with gov-
ernment officials and some other PRPs and incurred significant costs in
the cleanup. 169 The Plaintiff then sued several parties alleging the Defen-
dants were "wholly or partially responsible" for the contamination.1
7 0
The court, noted that the Plaintiff admitted that it was liable and rejected
the possibility of a cost recovery claim because "it is sensible to assume
that Congress intended only innocent parties--not parties who were




In In re Reading Co.,172 the Third Circuit held that "in an action
which presents a claim for apportionment of clean-up costs, § 113(f)
trumps § 107(a)(4)(B).' 173 There, Conrail, a PRP, sued the bankrupt
Reading Co. under § 107(a) for cleanup costs of a site in Douglassville,
Pennsylvania. 74 The Court stated that "a principal goal of § 113(f) was
to 'clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the right of a person held jointly and severally
liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other [PRPs], when the
person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that
may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances. '"1 75 The
Court concluded that § 113(f) "replaced the judicially created right to
contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B)."' 176 It said that Conrail sought contri-
bution from Reading and that "such a claim must be brought under §
113(f), not under § 107(a)."'177 In the end, however, the court held Read-
ing not liable to Conrail because of Reading was bankrupt.1
78
In New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,179 the Third Cir-
cuit held that a PRP landfill owner could only bring a § 113(f) contribu-
tion claim against other PRPs.180 The owner-operator of a contaminated
landfill sued, claiming the defendant was responsible "for all or part of
the response costs incurred" in cleaning up the site.' 81 The court held that
the plaintiff could not bring an action for cost recovery 82 and noted that
§§ 107 and 113 work together to "provide" and "regulate" a PRP's right
168. United, 33 F.3d at 100-01.
169. Id. at 97.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 100.
172. 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
173. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117.
174. Id. at 1116.
175. Id. at 1119 (first two alterations in original).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1121.
178. Id. at 1126.
179. 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997).
180. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 280 (quoting New Castle, 111 F.3d at 1120).
181. NewCastle, IIIF.3d at 1119.
182. Id. at 1126.
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to contribution. 83 The court recognized that "[s]ection 113 provides po-





In Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co.,185 Axel operated
a petroleum refinery on the piece of property that was at issue. 18 6 Axel
left the property in 1984, but by 1995 the EPA discovered extensive con-
tamination. 187 Axel refused to admit liability for the pollution, but en-
tered into an administrative order with the EPA whereby it agreed to pay
for and conduct the cleanup of the property. 188 Axel then sued Carroll,
the current owner of the property, under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) to recover
its cleanup costs. 189 Axel argued that even if it was a PRP, the court
should allow it to bring a cost recovery action because it was an "inno-
cent" party with respect to some of the contamination.1 90 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument and ruled that "potentially responsible per-
sons cannot sue under § 107" because this section "protects the strict
liability scheme created by the statute. ' ' The court explained that the
exception only applies to truly innocent parties, which Axel was not be-
cause overwhelming evidence pointed to Axel as the major polluter. 192
D. Fifth Circuit
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,193 a landowner argued that he did
not know of the contamination when he bought the land that was at is-
sue. 194 However, the court held that the landowner of a contaminated site
shares joint and several liability and limited the landowner to a § 113(f)
claim.195 The court applied both §§ 107(a) and 113(f), using § 107(a) to
determine the existence of liability and § 113(f) to apportion liability.
196
The Fifth Circuit held that a court must ascertain each responsible party's
equitable share of the cleanup costs under CERCLA's contribution pro-
vision. 197
183. Id. at 1122.
184. Id.
185. 191 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 1999).
186. Axel Johnson, 191 F.3d at 412.
187. Id. at 412, 413.
188. Id. at 413.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 415.
191. Id. at 416.
192. Id.
193. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
194. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 666.
195. Id. at 672.
196. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at I 11-12.
197. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 668.
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E. Sixth Circuit
Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.198 in-
volved a PRP seeking to recover the costs of responding to hazardous
waste under § 107(a). 99 Centerior, the plaintiff and parent company of a
previous owner, never contested its status as a PRP and the court held it
liable.200 The court stated that "[c]ost recovery actions by parties not re-
sponsible for site contamination are joint and several cost recovery ac-
tions governed exclusively by § 107(a). Claims by PRPs, however, seek-
ing costs from other PRPs are necessarily actions for contribution, and
are therefore governed by... § 113(f).
20 1
Years earlier, however, in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco,
Inc. ,202 the Sixth Circuit implicitly held that a PRP could bring a § 107(a)
cost recovery action if the PRP voluntarily cleaned up the site.203 In Vel-
sicol, the plaintiff brought a § 107(a) claim, alleging the defendant's re-
sponsibility for the contamination of a site that the plaintiff cleaned up.
2z 4
The court found that the defendant failed to establish one of the § 107(b)
defenses to liability and allowed the plaintiff to bring a cost recovery
action.2 °5 The main distinction between this case and Centerior was that
Velsicol cleaned the site voluntarily,2 6 whereas the EPA issued a unilat-
eral administrative order that led Centerior to cleanup the contamination
at issue there.20 7
F. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp.,2°8 refused to allow the plaintiff-PRP to proceed under § 107(a).2°9
The plaintiff, although it admitted its own liability, commenced an action
to recover the expenses it incurred in the voluntary cleanup from other
PRPs.210 The court stated that "[b]ecause all PRPs are liable under the
statute, a claim by one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for con-
tribution. 21'1 The Ninth Circuit said equity and fairness required that the
plaintiff be limited to a contribution claim, and distributed responsibility
198. 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998).
199. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 346.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 350.
202. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993).
203. See Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 530.
204. Id. at 527.
205. See id. at 530.
206. Id. at 526, 528; see Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
.207. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 346.
208. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
209. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 126; see also Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1306 (holding
that "a PRP does not have a claim for the recovery of the totality of its cleanup costs against other
PRPs, and a PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint and several liability").
210. Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1300.
211. Id. at 1301.
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for the orphan shares "equitably among all PRPs" under § 113.21 2 The
court explained that applying the joint and several approach to liability
for plaintiff-PRPs would be contrary to the purpose of CERCLA. 213 It
reasoned that if a court holds a group of defendant-PRPs "jointly and
severally liable for the total response costs incurred by a claimant-PRP,
reduced by the amount of claimant-PRP's own share, those defendant-
PRPs would [have to absorb] all of the cost attributable to 'orphan
shares.' ' 214 The United States Supreme Court denied Pinal's petition for
certiorari, thereby leaving the circuits to continue to decide the issue for
themselves.215
G. Eleventh Circuit
In Redwing Carriers Inc. v. Saraland Apartments.,216 Redwing
knowingly contaminated a site, which Saraland later acquired from sub-
sequent owners.21 7 Redwing consented to an administrative order of the
EPA under which Redwing would perform a remedial investigation of
218the contamination. Redwing conducted the investigation, incurring
almost $2 million in costs. 219 Redwing then sued Saraland under § 107(a)
and § 113(f) to recover some of those costs. 220 The court stated that in
order to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery action, Redwing would have to be
22 1innocent of contributing to the contamination, which it was not. There-
fore, the court concluded that Redwing's claim was one for contribution
under § 113(f) "as a matter of law. 222 The court stated that "when one
liable party sues another liable party under CERCLA, the action is not a
cost recovery action under § 107(a). Rather, it remains a claim for con-
tribution under § 113(f). 223
V. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co.
224
1. Facts
NutraSweet owned a food manufacturing plant in Illinois.225 X-L
Engineering ("X-L"), a machine shop, operated its business east of Nu-
212. Id. at 1303.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
216. 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
217. Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1494.
218. Id. at 1495.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1496.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1513.
224. 227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000).
225. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 780.
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traSweet's plant.226 NutraSweet ordered soil testing of vacant property to
the east of its land because it was considering expanding its plant.227 The
test showed high levels of hazardous waste near X-L's property.228 Nu-
traSweet then hired a company to more thoroughly assess the problem.229
This company determined that X-L could have caused the contamina-
tion. 230 NutraSweet then began to investigate. NutraSweet employees
saw an X-L employee dumping wastewater on the west side of X-L's
property, so NutraSweet sampled the water and found that it contained
hazardous substances. 231 It also took a soil sample from X-L's property
where the dumping occurred.232 This sample contained the same hazard-
ous substances found in the water.233 NutraSweet videotaped numerous
occasions where an X-L employee would dump wastewater next to Nu-
traSweet's property, as well as where the standing wastewater would
spill onto NutraSweet's property. 34 Therefore, NutraSweet requested
that the Illinois EPA and State Police begin surveillance of X-L. 235 The
State Police observed the dumping, tested the wastewater, which con-
tained hazardous substances, and confronted Paul Prikos, X-L's president
and principal shareholder owner.236 NutraSweet cleaned up its property
and then sued X-L Engineering and Prikos under CERCLA for improp-
erly disposing of the hazardous waste that contaminated NutraSweet's
property.237
2. Decision
The Seventh Circuit held that a landowner is strictly liable for haz-
ardous wastes located on his property under § 107(a) of CERCLA, but
that landowner may "seek contribution [under § 113(f)] from another
person who is liable or potentially liable under § 107. ' '238
The Seventh Circuit cited Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,239
where it held that under § 107(a)(B), any person, not only innocent par-
ties, may seek recovery of appropriate costs incurred in cleaning up a
hazardous waste site.240 The court also adopted the view that both § 107












237. Id. at 780-81.
238. Id. at 783-84 (quoting Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321,
326 (7th Cir. 1994)).
239. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994)
240. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
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. governs liability, while § 113(f) creates a mechanism for apportioning
that liability among responsible parties." 241
In Akzo, the EPA issued an administrative order that required emer-
gency removal activities at the landowner's facility.242 The landowner
cleaned the site, spending over $1.2 million.243 The landowner then sued
other PRPs under § 107(a). 244 The Seventh Circuit disallowed the §
107(a) action.245 In dicta, however, the court noted that the plaintiff could
have brought a cost recovery action if he had not actively contaminated
the site, thereby creating what courts in later cases have called the "inno-
cent landowner exception. '' 246 Therefore, a "landowner who, although
technically strictly liable for hazardous wastes on its property was inno-
cent of the contamination, would not have to bring a contribution action
under § 113(f) (because he did not contribute to the contamination); he
could instead bring a 'direct cost recovery action' under § 107(a) against
the responsible party., 247 The court, however, found that the exception
did not apply in Akzo and limited the plaintiff to a § 113(f) contribution
claim.
248
The NutraSweet court explained that a § 107(a) action is available
when "a landowner [is] forced to clean up hazardous materials that a
third party spilled onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent
lands., 249 The pivotal issue in this case was whether or not X-L released
the hazardous wastes found on NutraSweet's property.250 The Seventh
Circuit found X-L responsible for the hazardous waste on NutraSweet's
property. 251 NutraSweet was, therefore, entitled to recover its costs forcleaning up the hazardous waste from X-L.252
B. Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.
253
1. Facts
Plaintiff Rumpke purchased a contaminated landfill after the previ-
ous owners told it that they had never accepted hazardous waste at the
site.254 Rumpke then discovered that there had in fact been hazardous
241. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 27 F.3d
1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1994)).
242. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 762.
243. Id. at 762-63.
244. Id. at 764.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
248. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764.
249. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (alteration in original) (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 792.
252. Id. at 780.
253. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
254. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236.
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wastes dumped at the site for several years.255 It cleaned the site
voluntarily.256 Much of the waste at the site came from a recycling cor-
poration no longer in business.2 57 Therefore, Rumpke brought a cost
claim action against the manufacturers who sent materials to the recy-
cling plant for processing.258 These manufacturers had already entered
into a settlement with the U.S. government and they argued that this
barred Rumpke from bringing suit under § 113(f)(2).259
2. Decision
The Seventh Circuit held that § 107(a) entitled Rumpke to bring a
cost recovery action against the manufacturers to recoup all costs in-
curred in the cleanup. 26 As discussed earlier, § 113(f)(2) only protects
parties from liability in § 113(f) suits relating to matters addressed in the
settlement. 26' Here, the settlement that Rumpke entered in to with the
U.S. government did not involve the issue of Rumpke's property.
262
The Seventh Circuit found that its holding in Akzo indicated that an
exception exists to the rule that PRPs can only bring actions for contribu-
tion.263 The court stated that "when two parties who both injured the
property have a dispute about who pays how much .... the statute di-
rects them to § 113(f) and only to § 1 13(f. ' 264 However, the court con-
tinued, "a class of cases might remain in which a PRP might sue under §
107(a). ' '265 The court concluded that there was "nothing in the language
of § 107(a) that would make it unavailable to a party suing to recover for
direct injury to its own land, under circumstances where it is not trying to
apportion costs. ' '266 Since Rumpke did not try to apportion costs between
itself and other PRPs, but instead tried to recoup costs for cleaning up
contamination that it alleged was caused by others, the court determined
that Rumpke could bring a § 107(a) claim.2 67 The court did not require




256. Id. at 1239.
257. Id. at 1236, 1237.
258. Id. at 1237, 1238.
259. Id. at 1237.
260. Id. at 1236.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).
262. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236.




267. Id. at 1241.
268. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543.
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VI. ANALYSIS
Courts currently adopt three distinct approaches to the issue of
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f). Almost all of the circuit courts of
appeals have aligned themselves with one of these views. Since
CERCLA litigation usually involves large sums of money, how previous
parties fared in court will affect how later parties handle and dispose of
hazardous waste and how later parties respond to contamination of their
own land. As discussed below, each view has serious implications for the
parties involved as well for the environment because each ruling directly
affects the motivation subsequent parties will have to initiate cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.
A. Majority View Courts
Under the first approach to the controversy, the majority of courts
hold that PRPs may only sue under § 113(f) for contribution and may not
sue under § 107(a) for cost recovery.269 The Tenth Circuit aligns itself
with the majority courts.27° Many courts that limit a PRP to a § 113(f)
claim do so based solely on the party's status as a PRP under the stat-
ute.271 This was the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Morrison and Colo-
rado Eastern.
272
In Morrison, the Tenth Circuit looked solely at Morrison's status as
a PRP in holding that Morrison could not pursue a § 107(a) cost recovery
claim to recoup its costs from McShares: "[B]ecause Morrison is a PRP,
it may . . . only proceed with an action for contribution under §
[1113(f)., 273 If the court had allowed Morrison to pursue a cost recovery
action, a PRP would have reaped the full advantages of § 107(a), an op-
tion the court believes does not comport with the incentives CERCLA
was intended to create.274 One activity CERCLA was intended to pro-
mote that would arguably be frustrated is expedient and voluntary
cleanup of contaminated sites by the polluter.275
However, courts can still act in accordance with the purposes of
CERCLA and not relegate PRPs to only § 113(f). The majority view's
narrow interpretation of the statute is not necessarily compatible with
CERCLA's language and it is a potential threat to CERCLA's policies.276
"[O]n its face, [§ 107(a)] grants standing to 'any . . . person' who has
269. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 107.
270. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002).
271. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
272. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1133 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50
F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995).
273. See Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1135.
274. Id. at 1134.
275. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 121.
276. See Alexander, supra note 101, at 160.
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incurred necessary response costs" to clean up a site.277 Section 107(a)
,,278does not read "any innocent person. Also, Congress intended to cod-
ify existing case law in § 113(f).279 That existing case law consistently
interpreted § 107 broadly and found that it created a cause of action to
liable parties (PRPs) and non-liable parties alike. 8° If courts continue to
completely disallow cost recovery actions brought by PRPs, they will
virtually eliminate the right of private parties to seek joint and several
liability since these PRPs only receive judgments for several liability
under § 1 13(f).28
The unavailability of joint and several liability when a party is lim-
ited to a claim under § 113 can also deter cleanups by private parties.
2 82
When a court holds a defendant severally liable, the plaintiff may only
recoup a small fraction of his cleanup costs.283 In contrast, where a court
holds a defendant jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff can recoup all
the cleanup costs from one defendant.284 The plaintiff-PRP also absorbs
any orphan share costs when it brings a § 113(f) claim. 285 If a private
party knows how expensive, difficult, and perhaps impossible recovering
costs would be, that party will be less likely to settle with the government
or voluntarily initiate cleanup since it may be left "holding the bag" for
the majority of the cleanup costs. 286 The plaintiff-PRP may not even have
originally been responsible for many of those cleanup costs if it did not
contribute that share of the contamination to the site. Even if the PRP
does decide to perform the cleanup, it remains at a disadvantage with
respect to other PRPs because it cannot use the threat of joint and several
liability to bring other PRPs into negotiation.287 If a defendant-PRP faces
the possibility of a court holding it responsible for all the cleanup costs,
including outstanding orphan shares, it will willingly negotiate with the
plaintiff-PRP in order to minimize its liability and avoid litigation.88
Therefore, the inadvertent result of restricting PRPs' access to joint and
several liability gravely undermines the key CERCLA policy of encour-
aging settlement.289





282. Id. at 161.
283. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1145.
284. Id. at 1134.
285. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
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B. Minority View Courts
Under the second interpretation of the controversy, the minority of
federal courts of appeals hold that PRPs may sue under § 107(a).29° Un-
der § 107, a "person" who spends money to clean a contaminated site
may sue other PRPs to recover those costs. 291 The definition of "person"
under CERCLA does not exclude PRPs who may also have contributed
to the contamination. 292 "Therefore, under a literal reading of the statute,
a PRP may bring a . .. [§] 107 cost recovery action against fellow
PRPs. '293 Similarly, under § 113, a "person" may seek contribution from
294those who are liable or potentially liable for contaminating a site.
Therefore, it appears that a PRP who incurred response costs may seek
recovery of its costs under § 107(a) or under § 113(f).295 This view still
remains consistent with cases before the SARA amendment that allowed
PRPs to bring cost recovery actions, as well as with the dicta in Key
Tronic.
2 96
When courts read the statute literally in this way, they create an ex-
ception to the majority court view. That exception allows PRPs substan-
tial leeway to bring cost recovery actions. If courts allow PRPs to bring §
107(a) claims, the result is that the plaintiff-PRPs can recover a joint and
several judgment against the defendants and shift all responsibility for
any orphan shares to defendants.297
The Seventh Circuit adheres to this view.29 a This circuit determines
liability based on whether or not a party qualifies as a PRP.29 9 However,
the circuit mitigates that liability somewhat according to the circum-
stances in each case. 300 The circumstances that might mitigate a party's
liability include: whether or not the party was a PRP by virtue of its
status as a landowner; whether the PRP actively contributed to the con-
tamination; and the PRP's knowledge of the contamination before it ac-
quired the property. 0 '
290. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 110.
291. See Buckley, supra note 3, at 851.
292. Buckley, supra note 3, at 851; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000) ("The term "person"
means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commer-
cial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body.").
293. Buckley, supra note 3, at 851.
294. Id. at 852.
295. Id.
296. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 110.
297. Id. at I 11.
298. See NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 30 F.3d 761, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1994).
299. See NutraSweet, 30 F.3d at 783-84.
300. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 281 (quoting Rumpke of nd., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.,
107 F.3d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also McGuire, supra note 24, at 545 (explaining that the
court relied on the assumption that Rumpke purchased the land without knowledge of the contamina-
tion and that all of the contamination had already occurred (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239)).
301. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 281 (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239); see also
McGuire, supra note 24, at 545 (explaining that the court relied on the assumption that Rumpke
20031
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In NutraSweet, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its adoption of the mi-
nority view.30 2 It stated that under § 107, "any person" may sue to recoup
cleanup costs, including, under a literal reading of the statute, PRPs. °3
The court recognized the statute's strict liability, but mitigated Nu-
traSweet's liability to zero because NutraSweet was a PRP and land-
owner that did not actively contribute to the contamination.3° In
Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit again mitigated the PRP's liability because
Rumpke did not actually participate in the contamination, his ignorance
of the existence of the pollution, and his voluntary cleanup of the site.
305
"Innocent" parties may bring § 107(a) claims.30 6 However, a PRP
must successfully assert one of the established affirmative defenses un-
der § 107(b) to establish its innocence.30 7 Neither the NutraSweet nor the
Rumpke court required the plaintiffs involved to establish such a defense
before declaring them an "innocent" party.308 The court in each case al-
lowed the circumstances of the case-to mitigate the plaintiff-PRP's liabil-
ity.
3°9
The Seventh Circuit's approach does not adhere to CERCLA's strict
liability scheme. It allows PRPs to escape PRP status despite the clear
definition of PRP in the statute. 310 Lack of knowledge of contamination
before purchasing land, lack of actual participation in the contamination,
and the voluntariness of the cleanup should not factor in to determine
whether or not a party fits the definition of a PRP because these factors
are missing from the statute's definition of a PRP.311 Courts determining
which section, § 107(a) or § 113(f), though, may minimize the effect of a
party's PRP status without running afoul of CERCLA; a PRP may sue
other PRPs under § 113 in order to recoup cleanup costs.
C. The Third View
Under the third approach to the controversy, courts hold that PRPs
may bring a § 107(a) cost recovery claim, but then determine liability as
if the claim were for contribution under § 113(f).31 2 The courts do not
treat the claims like governmental cost recovery claims.31 3 Unlike the
government, the plaintiffs cannot establish joint and several liability and
purchased the land without knowledge of the contamination and that all of the contamination had
already occurred (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239)).
302. See NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 792.
305. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543.
306. Id. at 551; see Glanvill, supra note 31, at 162.
307. McGuire, supra note 25, at 551-52.
308. Id. at 543; see NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 783-86.
309. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543; see NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 785-86.
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining PRP).
311. See id.
312. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 112.
313. Id.
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shift all liability, including responsibility for any orphan shares, to the
defendants.314 Instead, these courts allocate costs, including orphan
shares, among PRPs.
315
The courts that adopt the third view take one of two approaches.316
Under the first approach, a court applies § 107(a) to determine whether
liability exists, and § 113(f) to apportion liability.31 7 Courts following the
second approach explicitly affirm the right of a PRP to bring a cost re-
covery action due to the plain language of § 107(a)(4)(B), but then ap-
portion responsibility among all parties, not just the defendants, for any
orphan shares.318 Under this view, no one, including the plaintiff, collects
more from another party than the other party's equitably apportioned
share.319 So, even though these courts interpret CERCLA differently than
the majority view courts, they achieve essentially the same result because
of the way that they allocate liability.
320
When courts combine § 107(a) and § 113(0, they seem to solve the
statutory interpretation problem associated with limiting standing under §
107 because the PRP still brings the action under § 107(a) during the
initial phase of litigation.32' But this does not solve the policy questions
raised by limiting joint and several liability in the second phase of litiga-
tion, cost apportionment.322 Under this approach, courts do not allow §
107 and § 113 to fulfill their separate functions.323 As the Supreme Court
noted in Key Tronic, and as the different statutes of limitations for the
two sections demonstrate, these provisions provide distinct causes of
action.324 Also, a court does not have to apportion liability when an ac-
tion is brought under § 107(a).325 If the harm is not divisible, the plaintiff
will usually obtain a judgment for joint and several liability, allowing the
plaintiff to shift all liability to any defendant.326 If the defendant never
brings a claim for contribution in response to a plaintiffs claim under §





317. Id. at 111-12.
318. Id. at 112.
319. Ann Alexander, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Relationship Between
CERCLA §§ 107 and 113 (pt. 2), 10 ToXiCS L. REP. 184, 185 (1995) [hereinafter Alexander I1.
320. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 112-13.
321. Alexander IL supra note 319, at 185.
322. Id.
323. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 96-97.
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VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY
A. Cost Recovery for Parties Who Initially Clean a Site
Joint and several liability is the key to CERCLA's success. A better
solution, therefore, would determine which plaintiffs most need joint and
several liability "as a matter of practicality and sound policy," and allow
those plaintiffs to bring § 107(a) actions, entitling them to collect all of
their costs from the many defendants.328
Courts would allow a § 107(a) claim for only those parties who per-
form a cleanup themselves and incur necessary remediation costs.
32 9
Only money directly spent to remediate a site, and not money paid to
reimburse another party who performed remediation, would be included
in necessary costs. 33 "This approach [would] preserve[] the integrity of
the broad language of § 107, while permitting effective resolution of the
policy dilemma inherent in defining standing under that section., 33' This
approach would also encourage private parties to enter into settlement
agreements by shifting the risks of uncertain liability and uncollected
costs to those who refused to actively participate in the cleanup.
332
Commentators also favor using this approach when a PRP voluntar-
ily remediates a site.333 Even though the PRP remains partially responsi-
ble for the contamination at the site, its voluntary cleanup is the exact
conduct that Congress invited by enacting CERCLA and the statute
should be used to reward the PRP.334 Allowing the PRP to bring a §
107(a) claim will provide an incentive for other PRPs to voluntarily
remediate sites, thereby furthering a primary goal of CERCLA. 335 The
reward for voluntary cleanups would be a joint and several judgment
against other PRPs. 33 6 Courts should encourage expedient, voluntary
remediation of hazardous waste and allocate cleanup costs equitably by
requiring the defendant-PRPs alone to bear responsibility for orphan
shares.33 7 If a court forces the PRP who voluntarily cleaned the site to
pay part of the orphan shares, then PRPs in subsequent cases will have
almost no incentive to cleanup sites voluntarily, since they will bear
more than the cost of their own contamination.338
It would also be inconsistent for a court to require the PRP who
cleaned the site to pay part of the orphan shares, while imposing joint





333. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 121; Pearce, supra note 15, at 136-37.
334. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 121.
335. Id.
336. id. at 113.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 122-23.
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and several judgment on the PRPs who did not participate in the
cleanup. 339 The PRP who cleaned the site bore the entire responsibility
for the cleanup and paid the shares of all PRPs.34 It would, therefore, be
inequitable to shift part of those orphan shares back to the PRP who
cleaned the site.341 Furthermore, shifting all costs to the other PRPs
serves the goal of imposing costs on those responsible for the pollu-
tion.342
B. Contribution Claims Only for Parties Who Do Not Participate in
Cleanup
Under another proposed solution, if a PRP does not clean the site,
but simply seeks to share liability imposed on him, the PRP may only
bring a § 113(f) action for contribution. 343 PRPs who did not clean the
site have not incurred any response costs.344 These PRPs are, therefore,
suing to reallocate the liability already imposed on them, the essence of a
claim for contribution, and should not be allowed to bring a cost recov-
ery claim. 345 All PRPs, including the PRP who sues, will be proportion-
ately liable for the cleanup costs, including any orphan shares.
If courts allow PRPs who did not participate in the cleanup to bring
cost recovery actions, § 107(a) and § 113(f) will be interchangeable.347 In
that situation, plaintiffs would always prefer a § 107(a) claim because it
offers joint and several liability.348 No one would ever bring a claim un-
der § 113(f).349 Congress did not intend this interpretation because it
would make § 113(f) meaningless.350
C. Cost Recovery or Contribution for Parties Ordered to Clean a Site
A third solution is to allow a PRP to bring either a cost recovery ac-
tion or a contribution claim when the PRP is compelled to clean a site,
for example, by order of the EPA.351 This approach is consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of CERCLA.352 In Key Tronic, the
Court said: "[CERCLA] expressly authorizes a cause of action for con-
tribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat over-
lapping remedy in § 107."353 Section 107(a) does not specify that only
339. Id. at 123.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 122, 123.
342. Id. at 123.
343. Id. at 114-15.
344. Id. at 114.
345. Id. at 114-15.
346. See id. at 116.
347. Id. at 115.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 115, 116.
351. Id. at 124.
352. Id.
353. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
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innocent parties and parties who clean a site voluntarily may seek cost
recovery. As long as the PRP meets the requirements of § 107(a), the
PRP may bring a cost recovery claim.
355
A claim for contribution should also be available to a PRP who is
ordered to clean a site.356 In this situation, the PRP was not only obli-
gated to clean the site, but the PRP also incurred costs that he can recoup
through a contribution claim.357 Regardless of the nature of the claim,
however, courts should require plaintiff-PRPs to pay a portion of the
orphan shares.358 The result would be equitable.359 In addition, distribut-
ing liability for the orphan shares in this situation would create a power-
ful incentive for other PRPs to clean up sites promptly and voluntarily.
360
Only then would PRPs avoid paying a portion of any orphan shares.36'
CONCLUSION
Persuasive policy considerations support allowing PRPs to bring
cost recovery actions, with the resulting benefits inducing PRPs in a po-
sition to cleanup a Superfund site to so act. A plaintiff-PRP who is al-
lowed to bring a cost recovery claim can recover a joint and several
judgment against the defendants and shift full responsibility for any or-
phan shares.362 If a plaintiff-PRP can choose to sue under either § 107(a)
or § 113(f), he can still control the lawsuit, "evaluating the potential for
prevailing on a cost recovery claim based on the 'innocence' of his ac-
,,363tions.
The solutions described in this survey demonstrate that there is a
middle ground between the views of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits.
Both of the circuits attempt to remain true to the purposes of CERCLA.
The Tenth Circuit does that by barring a liable party, a PRP, from recov-
ering all costs under § 107(a) when that party is responsible for some of
the costs.3 64 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit adheres to judicial
interpretations of CERCLA before it was amended by SARA, which
conclude that a PRP may have standing under § 107(a).365 However,
courts that adopt the proposed solutions discussed herein will more fully
354. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 124.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 124-25.
358. Id. at 125.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 126.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 111.
363. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 179.
364. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132-36 (10th Cir. 2002).
365. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 96; see also NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 227 F.3d
776, 784 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing previous cases where the Seventh Circuit stated that a PRP could sue
under § 107).
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satisfy Congress's intent-that responsible parties cleanup polluted sites
quickly and voluntarily.
This controversy has been long-standing. The solutions proposed in
this survey might assist courts in adopting more equitable and practical
solutions for the parties that come before them. This complicated issue
requires courts to thoroughly understand the nature of the controversy. It
is unlikely that majority view courts will adopt any of the proposed solu-
tions because of the entrenched precedent. Therefore, to resolve the issue
for all courts, Congress needs to amend CERCLA to clarify the issue of
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f) or the Supreme Court needs to de-
cide a case directly on point.
M. Noelle Padilla*
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Reviewed by Britney Beall-Eder*
INTRODUCTION
As American law develops over time, the meaning and implications
of our cultural norms mirror society's chosen rules. At times, American
law can produce unjust results.' However, just, in addition to unjust, re-
2suits develop historically based on the values and customs of the times.
The development of American law has been a rich and diverse process,
creating a complex legal system based on customs, values, and interpre-
tations of the Constitution, sometimes static and other times changing
with society. Understanding the law's developmental process explains
the law's current role in everyday American life in the new millennium.
Lawrence M. Friedman's Law in America: A Short History explains the
role of law in American society from the colonial period to the present to
illustrate his theory that "American law is a reflection of what goes on in
American society in general. '4
Friedman's chronological account of American history correlates
the law to the values, enforcement mechanisms, and societal norms of
different historical periods. Although the legal historian may need to
look elsewhere and delve deeper to understand legal history, this book
gives a short, illustrative account of the role of American law in history
for the layperson.
Structurally, Friedman divides the book into four parts reflecting on
four different eras: the colonial period, the nineteenth century, the twen-
tieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Within each
time period, Friedman evaluates major themes and developments in the
law pertaining to that era. Friedman's use of temporal categorization
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Denver College of Law.
I. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which validated segregation, and holding that "[iuf the two races are to meet upon terms of
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits
and a voluntary consent of individuals."), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 6-7 (2002).
3. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 12-13.
4. Id. at 37.
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creates a historical narrative of the past for the reader, but gives substan-
tially less attention than others.5
In this review, Part I explores the law in colonial times, specifically
evaluating the influence of English law upon colonial ideology. In addi-
tion, Part I looks at Friedman's account of colonial slavery and the pro-
gression towards independence from England. Part II examines the law's
development during the nineteenth century and the changes that Fried-
man contends resulted from the development of American law beyond
the borrowed common law from England. Part HI summarizes the dra-
matic increase in legislation in the twentieth century. It also explores
Friedman's view of the changing role of law enforcement, tort and con-
tract law, and the impact of the civil rights movement. Finally, Part IV
explores the beginning of the twenty-first century through Friedman's
eyes and the impact of past generations of the law on contemporary soci-
ety.
I. COLONIAL AMERICA AND THE LAW
In Law in America: A Short History, Lawrence M. Friedman de-
votes little space to colonial law, briefly describing the role of American
law in the colonial period. Friedman focuses on three underlying themes:
the relationship between law and religious values; colonial slavery; and
the progression towards independence from England. The extremely
limited scope of Friedman's discussion of colonial America tends to de-
value the impact of early American law, thus presenting a less-than-
accurate picture of the era.
A. Law to Achieve Religious Morality
Friedman begins by discussing the emergence of colonial law. "In
essence, [the colonial legal system] was English law-at least in the
sense that this was the only system the colonists knew anything about."6
However, in addition to following the English law, Friedman contends
the colonists also incorporated their own values and needs into American
law.7 Friedman asserts, in effect, that this integration contradicted the
ideologies of traditional English men and women. 8 For example, the Pu-
ritans developed law to achieve what they perceived was a more holy
society.9 Friedman argues that the Puritans implemented procedures in
5. See Carl A. Pierce, The Law in America, 42 TENN. L. REV. 615, 619 (1975) (reviewing
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973)). In reviewing Friedman's earlier
book, Pierce asserts that Friedman fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods. Id. Here,
the colonial period is given substantially less attention in the book than the Nineteenth and Twenti-
eth Centuries. Thus, although being criticized for the flaw in analysis twenty-seven years earlier,
Friedman still fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods, most particularly the colonial
era.






their daily lives that they believed would help to achieve a godly soci-
ety. 10 The Puritans, therefore, designed and orchestrated a legal system
that would achieve results they desired."
Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that the Puritans
shaped the law to fit the religious morals they strove to achieve. He fails,
however, to adequately connect colonial law and the reasons underlying
the Puritans need for intertwining religion with law. Why did the Puri-
tans need religion in order to form a moral society? To that effect, why
did they need law when they had religion? And more importantly, how
did they make the conversion from technical English law to a hodge-
podge set of rules defined by religious values and morals of the time?
Friedman, therefore, proposes a viable thesis, but fails to adequately ex-
plain himself.
B. Colonial Slavery
Friedman also discusses slavery during the colonial era. He asserts
that one of the mirrors shining back at the colonists was, unfortunately,
the law of slavery.'2 Although "slavery was unknown to England, and
English law," by 1640, "legal" slavery appeared in Virginia's history.'
3
Friedman posits that "a strong consciousness of race" was a key aspect
in the development of the slave custom and laws, as it certainly did not
fit in with the godly society of many colonial communities. 14 Although
slavery was an immoral practice of the colonists, Friedman explains that
the slaves served an important role in supporting the colonial economy. 5
Specifically, labor shortages on the sugar plantations drove the demand
for slaves. 16 The Africans transported to the colonies were "culturally
and racially" different from the colonists. 17 Friedman posits that "[t]he
deep consciousness of race-America's original sin-helped to bind
these foreign servants to a status that degraded and exploited them."'1
8
Friedman, however, fails to explain the source of race consciousness.
Why did white colonists perceive African slaves differently from, for
example, white indentured servants? Was race consciousness the cause
of the African slave trade or was race consciousness its result?
10. See id. at 24-25.
11. See id. at 25 (explaining that the Puritans lived in "small, tight-knit, hierarchical" commu-
nities where the leading voices in the community were the clergy and the male heads of the house-
hold). The Puritans believed that their ideologies and societal values were best represented by male
clergy and, thus, reprimanded those in their community who did not conform to their values by
punishing church truancy, blasphemy, and morally reprehensible behavior. Id. at 24-25.
12. See id. at 25-26.
13. Id. at 26-27.
14. Id. at 27.
15. See id. at 28.
16. See id. ("Blacks were imported from Africa to do the hard work in the fields. Slavery was
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As slavery became more rooted in colonial life, so too did the grow-
ing "body of slave law."'19 Slave law gave slavery the stamp of approval,
thus further instilling racism into colonial America.20 Friedman argues
that "the law codified custom and crystallized it; it put its enforcement
power behind the 'peculiar institution. ' ' 21 In subsequent chapters,
Friedman describes slavery's unfortunate and lasting effects. In contend-
ing that there remains no equivalent to the damaging effects of American
slave law,22 Friedman distinguishes his approach to the colonial era from
that of most historians, who place the greatest emphasis in the colonial
times on the progression towards independence from England.23
C. Progression Towards Independence from England and the Emer-
gence of Early American Law
By the time of King George III's reign, colonial America had grown
quite different from old England.24 Friedman explains that, except for
slavery, colonial America was much more egalitarian than England due1 • ~25 "Ae
to the differing conditions in the colonies. In colonial America, land
was more abundant and society was less organized.26 People born in the
colonies had no incentive to remain loyal to the mother country. 27 Al-
though Friedman effectively explains the significance of the physical
separation and the geographic differences between England and the
colonies, he still undervalues religion as an impetus for the colonists'
move for independence, which culminated in the Revolutionary War.
After the war, the colonies set out to form an independent repub-
lic. 28 "It was to be a 'government of laws and not of men.' 29 The colo-
nists' decision to pledge their allegiance, not to a king, but to the law,
was "the basis for the experiment in democracy---or at least in democ-
racy as defined by the leading men of the time., 30 This "American ex-
periment," Friedman explains, was a society based on "laws, rules[, and]
general principles," rather than the divine rights of royalty.
3'
The first attempt at creating colonial American law resulted in the
Articles of Confederation.32 Friedman posits that, because the Articles of
19. Id. at 29.
20. See id.
21. Id. Specifically, Friedman divides slave law into three categories in the colonial period:
rules pertaining to the status of black slaves, rules pertaining to controlling and punishing slaves, and
technical law dealing with their rights to property, water, etc. Id. at 29-30.
22. See id. at 30.
23. Id. at 31.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 31-32.









Confederation formed a weak central government, they proved unsuc-
cessful at providing a legal framework capable of unifying the colonies.
33
As a result, a convention proposed and adopted a federal constitution.
34
The Constitution, Friedman argues, "has lasted so long, and served the
country so well, because it is brief and general-helped by the fact that it
acquired, very soon, a kind of aura of the sacred. 35 In effect, the Consti-
tution was the voice of the people; it established fundamental principles
36and rules that apply across time.
Although the reader is left trying to connect early colonial religious
values to the constitutional framework that ultimately emerged, Fried-
man does an artful job of explaining the progression towards freedom in
colonial America. Friedman's past writings on the topic have been criti-
cized for not evaluating the relationship between law and morals in the
colonial period.37 Here, Friedman adequately makes this connection.
However, more space could be devoted to other important building
blocks of the era, such as "the politicization of legal issues, 38 "economic
instrumentalism, ''39 and other legal institutions that had an impact on the
future of American law.4°
Although Friedman acknowledges that traditional English law was
the only law with which the colonists were familiar,4 ' ultimately, he un-
derestimates colonial law's impact upon American legal history. In a
review of another Friedman book on American legal history, Carl A.
Pierce makes a similar criticism. 42 In the earlier book, Friedman suggests
that "only collectors and historians care about Massachusetts' laws of
16 30 ,, 43 which may explain why Friedman's account of the colonial pe-
riod is so brief in comparison to other periods. However, understanding
why the colonists deviated from the common law when developing their
own American law could explain the gradual move of the law toward a
democratic nation.
In addition, Friedman underestimates the value of colonial history.
Colonial law can be seen as much more than a reflection of the colonial
life; it also can be viewed as reflecting the old common law of England,
33. See id.
34. See id. (stating that the Constitution drafted by the founding forefathers "was the first and
only Constitution of the United States" and is the "oldest living constitution" in the world).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 620 (criticizing Friedman's earlier work for failing to connect
colonial law with the relevant moral values of the time).
38. See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Low in Colonial America, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
39. Pierce, supra note 5, at 620.
40. Id. at 620-21.
41. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 24.
42. Pierce, supra note 5, at 619.
43. Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 29).
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which became a building block of a new American law.44 For example, a
"colonial legal historian might emphasize the continuity of both public
and private law from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries and argue
persuasively that the nineteenth century cannot be comprehended absent
a knowledge of its colonial antecedents.
'A5
Friedman's overview of colonial America leaves larger gaps in the
law's development than sections describing other eras. Friedman seems
to follow consumer demand in this book by devoting relatively more
attention to post-colonial times.46 However, his choice to downplay the
colonial era may be justified in that Friedman's expertise lies in post-
colonial American law and economics .47 In this regard, Friedman's ex-
planation of the history of slavery and general overview of early colonial
times only skims the surface. Although the book is just a "short history,"
greater depth of treatment of the colonial period would give the reader a
stronger historical base upon which to build in understanding subsequent
eras.
II. PROGRESSION OF LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Friedman's account of the nineteenth century is more comprehen-
sive than that of other temporal eras in the book. The nineteenth century
produced a huge body of law relating to the economy.48 Friedman pri-
marily looks at the relationships among the economy, the law, and soci-
ety. However, in the nineteenth century, he also shows how social as-
pects of society can move the law to achieve society's desired results.49
This review evaluates just a few of Friedman's central themes for this
era: the myth of a laissez-faire economy; the dramatic change in tort
law; the rise of the contracts clause; slavery; and crime and punishment.
A. Laissez-faire: Myth or Reality?
Friedman contends that the notion that the nineteenth century was
the era of laissez-faire economics is not entirely true because the gov-
ernment's influence on the economy was significant.50 Friedman initially
contends that, during this period, the government gave people rights "so
basic that people tended to take them for granted." 5' Many people took
44. See id. at 621.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 619-20; see also supra notes 5, 37-45 and accompanying text.
47. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 623.
48. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[People] took for granted, for example, the idea of private property-in land, in
commodities of all sorts.").
51. Id. But see Richard A. Epstein, Legal History: The Assault That Failed: The Progressive
Critique of Laissez Faire, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1999) (reviewing BARBARA H. FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS
MOVEMENT (1998)). Epstein argues, although the laissez-faire era takes a "cautious view of gov-
ernment power," the notion of laissez-faire did give immense value to the ideas of individual liberty,
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advantage of the basic right to contract, "the right to buy and sell, [and]
to make agreements, with the understanding that the force of law stood
behind these agreements. 52
The government had a larger impact on the economy in the nine-
teenth century than many historians credit.53 Although the government's
presence in everyday life was not as pervasive in the nineteenth century
as it is today,54 Friedman contends that the main aim of the government
then was "promotional; to enact laws to help the economy grow." 55 The
government concerned itself with creating ways to support the infrastruc-
ture of the "institutions that made economic growth possible. 56 For ex-
ample, the government created "roads, canals, bridges, ferries, and (later)
railroads" in order that farmers and merchants could get their goods to
market.57 The government also created what Friedman calls "the invisi-
ble infrastructure," which consisted of money, banks, and credit.58 Al-
though the government "had very little in the way of money," it had a
surplus of land.59 The government "used land grants to stimulate the
economy-grants to states for educational purposes, cheap land to set-
tlers," and uncultivated land to states "who would put it to productive
use.
,6°
Because of Friedman's "professional focus on state private law and
,,61its relation to our economy, some reviewers have characterized his
treatment of the economy as "over-emphasized" and at times bordering
"on the purely Marxian. ' '62 However, Friedman's unique view of Ameri-
can legal history enables the reader to compare not only law and society,
but also law and economics.
B. Applying Nineteenth Century Tort and Contract Law
Friedman argues that the law of torts also took a dramatic turn in the
nineteenth century.63 Torts constitute a civil, as opposed to a criminal,
wrong.64 Within tort doctrine, one of the largest nineteenth century de-
velopments was the law of negligence.65 The Industrial Revolution in-
the right to own property, and freedom of contract. Without these fundamental pieces of historical
power, American society could not operate as it does today. Id.
52. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 37-38.
55. Id. at 38.




60. Id. at 40-41. For example, states received swamp lands that they could sell for money to
build drainage systems and levees. Id. at 41.
61. Pierce, supra note 5, at 625.
62. Id. at 626.
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creased the use of machinery in the workplace, thereby causing more
accidents resulting in bodily harm.66 "Nothing does a better job of man-
gling human bodies than machines. 67 For example, Friedman notes that
"the explosion on the Sultana, a sidewheel steamboat, on April 27, 1865,
killed more than 1,700 people., 68 American law responded by, for the
first time, permitting an individual injured in an accident to recover dam-
ages without proving that the tortfeasor intended to injure the victim.
69
Many legal historians assert that the nineteenth century change in
tort law was a shift from "strict liability to a moralistic 'fault' princi-
ple. ' 70 Friedman comments that it was "not really accurate to talk about a
shift from strict liability; rather, there was a shift from no liability. '7 The
issue was not morality, but, instead, who should bear the risk of loss in
72an action in tort. Friedman takes a position similar to that of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., separating morality from the liability framework.73
Holmes believed that, because the common law was uninterested in
evaluating the "state of mind" of the individual in deciding liability in a
negligence action, there could be no "individual moral culpability" in-
herent in attributing liability to an individual.74 Holmes evaluated tort
law in terms of "standard[s] of external conduct. 75 Hence, tortfeasors
could be liable for damages due to their negligence "even if they do their
incompetent best.,
76
Although the nineteenth century development of negligence in tort
created the legal vehicle for a victim to receive compensation for injury,
the law as applied at that time favored business over the individual in
determining where to place risks of lOSS. 77 Therefore, the external stan-
dards for reasonableness, by which an industry accused of doing wrong
was to be judged, were defined by industry itself.78 "The defendants were
the entrepreneurs, the doers, the bringers of wealth., 79 Friedman posits
66. See id. ("Railroad locomotives, belching fire and steam, and racing through the country-
side were a tremendous source of injuries and deaths").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 43-44.
70. Id. at 44.
71. id.
72. See id.
73. See A.W. Brian Simpson, 1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: VIII, Legal History:
The Elusive Truth About Holmes, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2027, 2028 (1997) (reviewing DAVID
ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: His THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY (1995)); see also O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). "A man may have as
bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.... What the law really forbids, and the
only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise."
Id. at 110.
74. Simpson, supra note 73, at 2027.
75. id. at 2028; see HOLMES, supra note 73, 110-11 ("The standard... must be fixed.").
76. Simpson, supra note 73, at 2028.
77. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 44-45.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 45.
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that, because the law follows society, law in the economic growth-
oriented nineteenth century followed the wealth.80 Thus, the courts at-
tributed liability to the wrongdoer only when the risk of loss fell on
someone other than an industrial defendant. 8'
To illustrate this point, Friedman discusses Farwell v. Boston &
82Worcester Railroad Corporation. In Farwell, a railroad employee was
badly injured on the job due to the actions of another employee.83 Far-
well sued his employer, the railroad, "claiming that the negligence of
another worker was the cause of his injury."84 The plaintiff relied on the
old "master and servant" rule, which provided that, "if an agent (a ser-
vant or employee), on the job, does something that harms somebody else,
that somebody could sue the principal (the master or employer), because
the principal is generally responsible for the acts of the agent., 85 In this
case, however, the court held that the master-servant rule imposed liabil-
ity on the employer only when the employee's actions injured a railroad
passenger, but did not apply when the victim was a fellow employee
engaged in the same work. 86 Friedman asserts that the underlying mes-
sage from Farwell was the power of enterprise and the movement of law
toward protecting business and industrial development. 87 Law favored
industry because society also favored industry.88 Society favored industry
because most Americans at this time lived in rural areas,89 so they
viewed development of the railroads and further enterprise as keys to
their economic prosperity.90 Therefore, as Friedman suggests, morality
was not a relevant factor in determining liability during the rise of enter-
prise, rather determining risks of loss resulted from industrial develop-
ment and the power of enterprise. 91
Friedman also discusses the impact of the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Contracts Clause in the nineteenth century. 92 The Constitu-
tion prohibits individual states from enacting any regulation or law "im-
pairing the obligation of a contract. '93 Friedman argues that the Contracts
Clause was "about the relationship of government and the economy, par-
80. See id. at 44-45.
81. See id. at 46.
82. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
83. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 55.
84. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45; see Farwell, 45 Mass. at 55.
85. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45.
86. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 54.
87. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
88. See id. at 47.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 44-45.
92. Ld. at 51. The Contracts Clause was most likely created to prevent states from interfering
with creditors' rights in bankruptcy cases. Id.
93. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (The Contracts Clause states that: "No State shall...
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts").
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ticularly in times of great financial uncertainty." 94 Friedman asserts that
"the whole point of the 'contracts clause' was to prevent states from go-
ing too far in helping out debtors," and thus to further protect enter-
prise.
95
The validity of Friedman's analysis is evident today in how courts
apply the Contracts Clause. Because the application of the Contracts
Clause in the courts can be inconsistent as a result of judicial discretion,
the government retains a vehicle to loosen or pull back the reigns of en-
terprise.96 Courts do not interpret the Contracts Clause "to prohibit all
impairment of contracts." 97 Instead, the courts apply a balancing test that
weighs the "contractors' private rights with the public interest in a man-
ner reminiscent of Lochner v. New York."98 In a practical application of
the Contracts Clause, judges do not have to follow precedent explicitly
because "[blalancing allows judges to weigh competing values on an ad
hoc basis, which permits them to change the weight they give to different
values over time."99
In effect, judicial discretion could have led to the opposite result of
Friedman's contention that the courts primarily chose to protect enter-
prise during this time period.'30 Because the balancing of interests is left
solely to judges, a decision could fall either way depending on the opin-
ion of a particular judge.10' However, sentiments of judges will most
likely follow the economic and moral standards defining the law at a
given time, as evidenced in the nineteenth century.10 2 Judges apply the
balancing test according to their own legal interpretation of a particular
case at hand. 0 3 Thus, the Contracts Clause allows the judiciary to skew a
clear legal rule, resulting in the Contracts Clause creating uncertainty for
persons subject to contract, as well as security for governmental inter-
vention in contracting during times of economic hardship. 
°4
By limiting himself to a chronological, subject-by-subject analysis,
Friedman overlooks the impact of contract law upon tort law during the
nineteenth century. Although separately Friedman comes to interesting
conclusions regarding the relationship between torts and the economy,
94. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 5 .
95. Id. Friedman notes that most states by this time had insolvency laws to protect "at least
some basic items from the clutch of creditors." Id. at 53.
96. See Michael B. Rappaport, Note: A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918, 919-22 (1984).
97. Id. at 919.
98. Id.; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (applying the contracts clause balanc-
ing test).
99. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
100. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
101. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
102. See, e.g., supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (illustrating how the courts used their
discretion to promote and protect economic development in the tort liability context).
103. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 919-21.
104. See id. at 921.
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and contracts and the economy, he fails to show the interrelationship the
two legal subjects had on the economy as a whole. Specifically, during
the nineteenth century, the legal regime was designed to allow "contract
to dominate," thereby allowing a party to contract out of tort liability.'0 5
Thus, "[tiotal exemption or too great cutting down of remedy by 'con-
tracting,' without regard for the tort phase of risk in hand" can result in
legal implications for both subject areas.' °6 In addition, by failing to con-
sider the relationship between torts and contracts, Friedman fails to con-
sider the affect that both legal subjects had in shaping and influencing
"social and economic behavior."' 07 After all, "while rules of law may be
enacted in response to social and economic pressures, those same rules
will influence and shape social and economic behavior."'
10 8
C. Nineteenth Century Slavery
Slavery not only continued, but, according to Friedman, became a
stronger institution in the South during the first half of the nineteenth
century because it was a strongly contested political issue.' °9 After the
Revolutionary War, the northern states abolished slavery while the
southern states expanded the institution." 0 Slavery remained "vital to the
southern economy" and thus became "an essential aspect of the social
structure.""' By 1860, the population of slaves in the United States "had
grown to 3,922,760, all of them in the South."'"12 While Friedman dis-
cusses race consciousness as an underlying social issue in his colonial
account of slavery, his nineteenth century discussion of slavery explores
continuing social complexities, such as the rise of segregation. Friedman
points out that by the turn of the century, many Southerners accepted
segregation. In fact, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States Supreme
Court "gave segregation its seal of approval" and explained "so long as
institutions were separate but equal, they were constitutionally accept-
able."" 
3
The battle between the North and South over slavery ultimately
ended in the Civil War, which had become "a crusade against slavery.
'' 14
President Lincoln delivered his Emancipation Proclamation, and later,
105. See John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enter-
prise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1988).
106. Id.
107. Pierce, supra note 5, at 630.
108. Id.
109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 69. Southern states continued to expand the body of slave
law; for example, slaves could not enter into a legal marriage, and it became a crime to teach a slave
to read or write. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 69-70.
112. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Develop-
ment, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1009, 1032 (1993).
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 70.
114. Id.
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the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery-at least in theory.1 5 Al-
though people in the North did not accept the institution of slavery, they
also did not treat African-Americans as equals. 16 Friedman argues that,
because the northern states after the Civil War had become indifferent to
southern slave practices,' ' 7 the South "relapsed into white supremacy."'18
Friedman's "brief history" again raises unanswered questions. Were
white supremacy and segregation ways to extend the effects of slavery
despite its abolishment? Furthermore, why would the North suddenly
become indifferent to southern slave practices after crusading for years
for its abolition?
D. A Change in Crime and Punishment
The law of crime and punishment-specifically, the "rise of the
penitentiary and the development of urban police forces"-is another
area of the law that significantly changed in the nineteenth century." 9 In
colonial times, the onus was on the community to punish wrongdoers by
banishment, branding, or the like. 20 Friedman contends that, as opposed
to the godly colonial society, the booming population of the nineteenth
century brought a decay of community morals, and disorder and riots in
the streets, giving rise to a demand for urban control.' 2' The law re-
sponded by creating the penitentiary. 122 Friedman explains that "the peni-
tentiary was designed to remove the criminal" from the community while
enabling the prisoner to reform. 123 In addition, Friedman posits, the peni-
tentiary was designed to reduce capital punishment.1
2 4
Friedman describes the Cherry Hill penitentiary in Pennsylvania as
an example of the nineteenth century .penitentiary.125 The prison system
began as a strict, regimented system.'2 In Cherry Hill, inmates were iso-
lated and not allowed to speak under any circumstances pursuant to the
theory that time to think and prepare for re-entry into society would re-
form them.1
27
By the late nineteenth century, the strictly regimented system had





119. Id. at 80.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 80-81.
122. See id. at 81 ("The community was no longer a cure for deviance, but if anything the





127. See id. at 81-82.
128. See id. at 83.
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was considered in the release process, and the parole system was intro-
duced into the criminal justice system.129 Friedman explains that the
"whole point of these devices was to shift emphasis away from the of-
fense, and put the emphasis on the offender himself-his character, his
personality, his propensities for good and evil."'130 As society progressed
towards a more individualistic society, Friedman argues, so did the law
itself.13 Here, as in his Crime and Punishment in American History,
Friedman "portrays the criminal law as a product of social forces-a
mirror of the society it regulates."'' 32 According to one commentator,
Friedman's narrow focus fails to consider "the power of the law to shape
social values," and, thus, "makes it an incomplete portrait of the criminal
law" and the justice system "in American history.' ' 133 The law itself "has
great power both to preserve the social order and to promote change, and
it is Friedman's failure to describe this half of the relationship between
law and society that renders his account flawed."' 134
III. LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The twentieth century produced a huge body of new law. In his ac-
count of American legal history during this period, Friedman again
evaluates a vast array of subjects pertinent to the era. A few of his central
topics here include: criminal justice and the role of the federal govern-
ment, the evolution of tort law, and the Civil Rights Movement.
A. Criminal Justice and the Role of the Federal Government
In the twentieth century, social changes spurred change in the defi-
nition of crime and in the applicable punishments. 35 Friedman argues
that new technologies and innovations required new law.136 Automobiles
increased bank robberies; computers created the need for laws to punish
the computer hacker.1
37
Along with the increase in technological advancements, came the
growth in the federal government's role in criminal justice.3 8 The federal
government became involved in criminal justice for the first time, pass-
129. See id. at 83-84.
130. Id. at 84.
131. See id. at 84, 87.
132. Book Note, Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1994) (review-
ing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993)). Although
Friedman's book Crime and Punishment in American History is solely about criminal law and soci-
ety, Friedman fails to acknowledge the implication of law upon society in this book, a weakness
repeated in Law in America: A Short History. See, e.g., id. at 1817.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1815.
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ing a vast amount of federal criminal legislation. 39 Crime ultimately
became "a national issue-an issue in presidential politics.""' For ex-
ample, President Hoover appointed a task force to study violent crime,
14 1
and the growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar
Hoover's leadership opened the door for the federal government's entry
into the "law enforcement business.' 42
States also began to tighten up their criminal justice systems by
cracking down on a new surge of violent crime. 143 Friedman explains
that, beginning in Washington State in 1984, states began to enact "truth
in sentencing laws."'144 These laws required criminals to serve no less
than 85 percent of their entire prison sentences, thus eliminating to a
large degree credits given for good behavior."45 Federal monetary incen-
tives for prison construction accompanied these "truth in sentencing
laws," '46 and most states jumped on the bandwagon to receive the federal
grants. 147
Heightened societal demand to punish criminals, along with federal
monetary incentives, stimulated the growth of the United States' huge
population of prisoners according to Friedman."48 Friedman's argument
partially explains the increase in the prison population, but does not ad-
dress the effect the law itself has on the population of prisoners. Some
attribute the prisons' population growth to the growing number and com-
plexity of laws, which creates more reasons to prosecute an individual.1
49
Friedman posits that the war on drugs is another reason for the dra-
matic growth in the prison population. 150 Friedman discusses how
American values and the law have eliminated most other victimless
crimes, such as sex outside of marriage.' 5' However, the drug laws re-
main an anomaly that in many states make possible life imprisonment for
a drug offense. 52 Friedman draws a valid conclusion here, but fails to
acknowledge the underlying American societal values inherent in the
139. See id. at 107. The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act was passed making it a federal





143. See id. at 108-10.




148. Id. In 1998, California alone had more prisoners than "France, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, Singapore, and the Netherlands combined." Id.
149. See generally R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the
Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000) (discussing complexity in the
law).
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 115.
151. Id. at 115-16.
152. Id. at 116.
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decision to fill prisons with non-violent drug offenders. Many people
perceive, or even believe, an act is criminal because it is illegal. 53 In
addition, "law confers legitimacy because it persuades us that the exist-
ing social order is necessary, and, if not ideal, at least reasonable."' 154 In
other words, "the criminal justice system legitimates its own rules and
outcomes.' 55 Again, Friedman's critics note, "Law has great power both
to preserve the social order and to promote change."'156 Thus, Friedman
fails to address the independent impact that law, itself, can have on social
order and law enforcement in society.1
57
In his analysis, Friedman fails to consider how history has shaped
the development of twentieth century change. Although he correctly
identifies new aspects of modem-day technology that require changes to
be made in the law, such as the rise of computer crime, he fails to de-
velop this theory. How did we get from there to here? Is moral decay
multiplying exponentially over time, creating the social need for new
laws, or is America creating new laws that criminalize more behavior?
Friedman recognizes that prohibition and the drug wars "put millions of
dollars into the pockets of men like Al Capone,"'5 8 yet he fails to realize
that law actually can drive crime as well as hamper it.
159
B. Tort Law in the Twentieth Century
As the twentieth century progressed and society became more indi-
vidualistic, the nature of tort law had to change.16° No longer could a
court consistently side with enterprise. 16' One prominent example oc-
curred in the area of products liability. 62 Friedman discusses the land-
mark case of MacPherson v. Buick163 to support this contention.
In MacPherson, the plaintiff purchased an automobile with a defec-
tive wheel, which caused an accident that injured him.164 MacPherson
sued the auto manufacturer, Buick. 165 Historically, under the law of priv-
ity, MacPherson could have sued only the dealer from which he pur-
chased the automobile because no privity existed between him and the
153. Book Note, supra note 132, at 1817 (criticizing an earlier Friedman book for his narrow
view of the criminal justice system and its impact on the law).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1815.
157. See id.
158. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 104.
159. See Book Note, supra note 132, at 1813. As an example, just as the criminalization of
alcohol during prohibition made bootlegging more profitable for the criminal, the drug war has made
narcotics trafficking more profitable for the drug lords.
160. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 129.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
164. See MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 384.
165. See id.
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manufacturer. 166 Friedman asserts that "[Judge] Cardozo effectively un-
dermined the old rule," thereby giving birth to products liability as we
now know it and signaling the end of the age of enterprise. 67 For the first
time, privity was abandoned in tort, and "if a product was dangerous, and
caused harm, the victim must be able to sue the manufacturer di-
rectly."' 168 After MacPherson, many other states followed Cardozo's
holding and removed privity as an obstacle in determining liability in a
tort action.
169
Friedman explains that liability expanded dramatically after
MacPherson with the emergence of the strict liability doctrine in which a
product manufacturer could be held liable despite no finding of negli-
gence.170 Friedman's analysis, again, attributes legal development to
changes in the economy and the rise of individualism, but fails to address
another important social phenomena-the growing demand for fair-
ness.' 7' The practical distinction between the time of Farwell and
MacPherson is that an emerging concern in twentieth century society
was protecting the small party to an accident; that fairness should be a
factor in determining risk of loss, shifting the risk toward big business.
172
The early years of national development were lean times, when society
placed a high value on strengthening the economy, but during prosperous
times that followed the Industrial Revolution, society came to view cor-
porations as too powerful. Because the corporate defendant generally has
the deepest pockets, 173 in some cases fairness dictates that liability should
accrue to the party who is best able to bear the cost.
174
C. The Civil Rights Movement
In addition to dramatic changes in tort law, Friedman also discusses
one of the twentieth century's most significant historical developments-
the Civil Rights movement.17 After many years of segregation and un-
fair treatment of African-Americans, the Supreme Court overruled Plessy
v. Ferguson.176 In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,
177
the Court ruled that "all school segregation violated the Fourteenth





171. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate De-
fendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 350 (1998) (explaining that in determining the liability of a
corporate defendant, many jurors emphasize the issue of fairness in their consideration of damages).
172. See id. at 350-52.
173. See id. at 329.
174. See id. at 337 (explaining that jurors may consider how "the financial equities" of an
award will affect the party paying damages; thus, fairness may establish that a corporate defendant
may be better suited to bear the cost).
175. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 140.
176. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 141-42.
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Amendment."' 7 8 Friedman argues that, although Brown was a cautious
case in that it only pertained to education, Brown was the beginning of
the end. 1
79
After Brown, Friedman asserts the "Supreme Court struck down
every instance of official apartheid that came before it: parks, swimming
pools, public facilities in general.' 80 Friedman suggests that federal
court jurisprudence changed race relations dramatically and that, in the
last half of the century, "race relations in the United States were totally
revolutionized."' 81 This is true with respect to the changing racial
dynamics in the country and the acceptance of minorities in equal
positions in the work force. However, Friedman fails to discuss the
lingering impact of race consciousness and geography on American
society in the twenty-first century.
Soon after the courts ordered desegregation, many schools fell di-
rectly back to segregated conditions. Although segregation ceased to
exist in its most heinous form, which historically had barred African-
American children from particular schools, segregation remained in the
form of geographic segregation and socioeconomic inequality because
many minorities lacked the financial resources to live in wealthier, pre-
dominantly white school districts. 82 Therefore, race relations cannot
possibly be totally revolutionized as Friedman suggests because, had race
relations been revolutionized, socioeconomic segregation would have
ended with court-ordered integration of schools and workplaces.1
83
With respect to the twentieth century, Friedman provides an inter-
esting account of the change in the criminal justice system due to in-
creased federal criminal legislation. In addition, he effectively documents
the change in tort liability and the significant progress made in the Civil
Rights Movement. Although he fails to identify the impact that law itself
can have upon society, and belittles the complications inherent in deseg-
regation, Friedman's overall presentation of the law's role in the twenti-
eth century is adequately portrayed.
178. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 142; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating in relevant part,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
179. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (com-
menting that replacing the desegregation order "with a system of neighborhood school assignments
for grades K-4 resulted in a system of racially identifiable schools").
183. Cf id. at 263-64.
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IV. AMERICAN LAW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
In the last temporal era in his book, Friedman explores the role of
the legal profession in modem America and the shift toward national
unity. Although society has become more individualistic over time, the
national government has unified the nation by providing all Americans
access to information on an equal basis. Although little time has passed
in the present century, Friedman gives an exceptional account of law's
current role in society.
A. The Lawyer's Role in the New Millennium
Friedman argues that the law continues to be an important aspect of
American life.184 The role of the legal profession has become vital to our
society due to the sheer volume of law created in the past two centu-
ries. 1 85 "In a society where 'law' is everywhere, there is everywhere a
need for people who know how to use it or abuse it.' 186 The economy
Americans worked so hard to build over time created and will continue
to create new legal problems. As Friedman asserts, "All big modern
economies need lawyers."'' 87 Whether running the administrative state,
writing a contract, or sealing a deal, the modem economy needs legal
help, and thus it needs lawyers.
1 88
In the past, Friedman has been criticized for failing to give "any
systematic consideration of the interrelationship of law, legal institutions,
lawyers, legal education, and legal literature and their relative impact on
the development of American legal history."1 89 Here, Friedman remedies
the problem by describing the lawyer's role in everyday life and history,
discussing the continuing surge in the number of law schools, and the
many different facets of business that the law must address. 90 Although
Friedman does not address the effects that the growing legal community
has "on the nonlegal spheres with which it admittedly interacts," 191 his
account of how the function of modern day lawyers and law firms has
evolved explains even to the layperson the need for lawyers in contem-
porary American society.
184. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 165.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 168.
188. See id. at 169.
189. Pierce, supra note 5, at 628.
190. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 166-68.




B. The Shift Toward National Government
Friedman also contends that the shift towards national government
seems to be a continuing trend. 92 Americans are coming together as a
unified nation, "[a]nd, as the culture gravitates to one central point, so,
too, does the law."' 193 Friedman explains that "in times of crisis-the
Great Depression, the two world wars, the savage attack on the World
Trade Center in September 2001-the country looks to its leader, to its
center, to the national government. ' 94 Americans look to Washington
for answers to "national problems" because, as Friedman persuasively
argues, "[cllassic federalism is, in truth, quite dead."'195 Friedman posits
that "the federal government can do almost anything-can regulate any-
thing-and the restrictions of federalism do not really hem it in."'196 For
example, even if the state retains the power to freely spend block grants
provided by the federal government, "Congress can choose not to use"
them if it wishes.
197
Friedman argues that another reason that society gravitates toward
the federal government is increased media attention. 198 The President has
become a movie star in the spotlight.' 99 Friedman contends that the me-
dia and the public are consumed with his role as leader of the govern-
ment and entertained by his personal life.20 Government in the twenty-
first century sits in a glass house, which everyone peers into through the
media. 20 1 As a result, "what we see is of course not 'government,' but
images and personalities. The public knows less and thinks it knows
more." 202 Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that govern-
ment is bigger because we see more of it. An alternate view, however, is
that the government is growing in complexity20 3 and, therefore, citizens
may feel they need to know more in order to adequately protect their
interests. In addition, Americans want to know more; society is hooked
on the national government's daily soap opera produced by the media.
To that effect, Friedman observes that "the.celebrity nature of authority,
of leadership, means that society is governed, not so much by the invisi-
ble hand, as by the visible tube., 20 4 As such, "politics [have] become just
192. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 170.
193. Id. at 171.
194. Id. at 171-72.
195. Id. at 173.
196. Id. at 171.
197. Id. at 173.
198. See id. at 175.




203. See Wright, supra note 149, at 717-18.
204. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 182.
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another reality show, like Survivor or Big Brother. The electorate is the
audience. The campaign is the show. 2°5
Friedman's short account of the role of law in the new millennium
is proportionate to the short period of time that has passed since its be-
ginning. Friedman effectively explains the importance of the legal pro-
fession in our complicated society. In addition, he gives a keen account
of the relationship between the media and society's shift to unify as a
nation through a mutual interest in the national government.
CONCLUSION
From colonial America to the present, a vast amount of law has
been created in response to the needs and norms of society. Friedman's
Law in America: A Short History is a quick trip though time, displaying
his view of the relationship between law and society. In addition to
showing how society shapes current law, this book also gives a unique
account of the relationship between the law and economy. Friedman pro-
vides an accurate account of the historical reasoning and development of
American law, although his book could expand on. certain areas of the
law to present a more thorough look at every temporal era covered in the
book. These few shortcomings are likely due to the fact that it is a "short
history." Friedman artfully explains how history creates and moves the
law and how law ultimately is a reflection of our society. As Friedman
concludes, "Law is the glue that binds the cells of Leviathan's body; and
the body of society itself."20 6 This book is worth the read and may be
attractive to both the legal historian and the lay reader, wishing to take a
limited glance at America's legal history and, particularly, how eco-
nomic forces drive legal change.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 183.
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